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OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 


INFORMATION FROM ABRO 



BATTLES AND CAPITULATION 


OP 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA. 


BY 


Lieutenant JOSE MULLER Y TEJEIRO, 

Second in Command of Naval Forces of the Province of Santiago de Cuba. 


TRANSLATED FROM THE SPANISH. 


NAVY DEPARTMENT, 

Office of Naval Intelligence. 


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WASHINGTON: 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 

1898. 










IKS. OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 

I 

INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 


BATTLES AND CAPITULATION 


OF 



SANTIAGO DE CUBA. 


BY 


Lieutenant JOSE MULLER Y TEJEIRO, 

it 

Second in Command of Naval Forcf.s of the Province of Santiago de Cuba. 


TRANSLATED FROM THE SPANISH. 


NAVY DEPARTMENT, 

Office of Naval Intelligence. 


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WASHINGTON: 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 

1898. 










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INTRODUCTORY. 


The Battles and Capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, by Lieutenant Muller y 
Tejeiro, second in command of the naval forces of the Province of Santiago de 
Cuba, just issued in Madrid, contains matter of particular interest and value in 
connection with the operations of our Navy and Army at Santiago. The writer 
was an eyewitness of most of the events he describes, and from his position he 
had access to official information. The style is peculiarly interesting, free from 
bias, and has an air of authenticity which will give the book a place in history, 
though it is not an official publication. It is to be regretted that, due to the 
pressure of work on the very limited force of this office, it has been found neces¬ 
sary to omit the following chapters in the translation: 

I. Some Historical Antecedents. 

II. The United States and the Maine . 

III. The First Shots. 

IV. The Scene of Events. 

V. Forces of the Jurisdiction (Santiago). 

VI. Works of Defense. 

VII. Artillery Set Up. 

VIII. The Cruiser Reinci Mercedes. 

XIV. The Volunteers. 

XXX. Escario’s Column (being a description of General Escario's march 
across the country from Manzanillo to Santiago). 

XXXIII. Suspension of Hostilities. 

XXXVII. Traders, not the Spanish People (responsible for the Cuban trouble). 
XXXVIII. Gerona and Santiago de Cuba (comparison of the two battles). 

Richardson Clover, 

Commander, U. S. Navy, 

Chief Intelligence Officer. 

Navy Department, 

Office of Naval Intelligence, 

November 22, 1S98. 


(in) 









PREFACE. 


On the 18th of May, the first hostile ships were sighted from the Morro of 
Santiago de Cuba and the first gunshots were heard, which since that date, for 
the space of two months, have hardly ceased for a single day. 

On the following day, the 19tli, the Spanish fleet, commanded by Rear Admi¬ 
ral Cervera, entered with very little coal, which it was absolutely necessary to 
replenish. 

It did not require great power of penetration to understand that, owing to 
the scant resources available at this harbor, it‘would take more days to get the 
necessary fuel on board than it would take Admiral Sampson, Commander of 
the United States fleet, to find out that circumstance, and that consequently the 
Spanish fleet would be blockaded, as indeed it was; and as a natural and logical 
inference, that the enemy's objective would be the city and harbor of Santiago, 
where the only battle ships that Spain had in the Antilles, or at least in the 
Greater Antilla, had taken refuge. 

Thus, the arrival of the fleet gave this city a military importance which 
without that event it would never have acquired, and changed it to the princi¬ 
pal—not to say, the only—scene of operations in the island, the denouement of 
which would necessarily be of great interest and of powerful influence on the 
result of the campaign and the war. Subsequent events have shown the truth 
of my assumption, which was also the assumption of everybody else in the city. 

From that time on, I have kept an exact diary, from day to day, from hour 
to hour, from minute to minute even—and when I say this I am not exagger¬ 
ating, for it is still in existence and may be seen—of everything I saw, or that 
came to my notice, or that passed through my hands in my official capacity, or 
that I knew to be accurate and trustworthy. 

When some official duty prevented me, I was ably replaced by my friend, Mr. 
Dario Laguna, aid of the captaincy of the port (ayudante de la capitanla de 
puerto), who gladly rendered the service I asked of him, in spite of his 
constant and manifold obligations. 

If truth is a merit, these “Notes” (begging pardon for my want of modesty) 
possess it, though it may be their only merit. Whatever they contain has 
actually happened, and those who have returned from Santiago will testify to 
it. Not a single fact, no matter how insignificant, herein related, is doubtful 
or hypothetical. Wherever I did not know the outcome of any event, or where 
its objects or consequences have remained a mystery, I have openly acknowl¬ 
edged it, without circumlocution, as any one may see who reads these notes. 
There is in them nothing of my own invention, and my imagination has had 
nothing to do with them, unfortunately, for I do not possess the gift of inven¬ 
tion, which I admire so much in others. My work has been confined to 
gathering data and obtaining as much information as possible, my only care 
having been to see that everything was correct, and I have made sure of this 
by comparing the data collected with the information obtained. 


(v) 



VI 


PREFACE. 


Feeling sure that the events which have taken place from May 18 to July 17— 
hence the true situation in which were Santiago de Cuba and the forces defend¬ 
ing it—can not be known in Spain in detail, but only in general, I am desirous 
of making them known in their whole truth, so that the country, to whom I 
think that we who were intrusted with defending its honor and interests at a 
distance of fifteen hundred leagues, owe the strictest account, may be able, 
with a complete knowledge of the facts, to call us to account, if it thinks that 
we have incurred any responsibility. 

Such has been my object, and I trust that my comrades of Santiago de Cuba, 
both in the Army and in the Navy, will approve of it. 

Santiago de Cuba, August 10, 1898. 





IX. 


THE TWO FLEETS. 


When the war between Spain and the United States became a 
fact, it is hard to tell how much was said and written about the 
Spanish fleet, or rather, fleets; everybody knows of the thousands 
of items which appeared in the newspapers concerning the pur¬ 
chase of ships, to such an extent that, if all could have been believed, 
our navy would have been vastly superior to that of the United 
States, in number and quality. And this is so true that the least 
optimistic, the most reasonable people, those whom we considered 
best informed as belonging to the profession and who knew to a cer¬ 
tain extent what we could expect, counted on not less than eight 
battle ships leaving the Peninsula, to say nothing of the transports, 
torpedo boats, destroyers, etc. How much we were mistaken! 

On the 19th of May, at 5.50 o’clock a. m., the look-out signaled 
five steamers to the south; shortly after it was signaled that the 
five steamers were five warships, and a little later that they were 
Spanish. So the much wished-for fleet had arrived, which, accord¬ 
ing to the newspapers, was under the command of Vice Admiral 
Butler. 

At 7.15, the Infanta Maria Teresa, hoisting the rear admiral’s 
flag, was sighted from the captaincy of the port; a few minutes 
later, she cast anchor in the bay, some distance from the royal pier, 
her draught not permitting her to go nearer. Then the Vizcaya , 
Oquendo , and Cristobal Colon anchored one after the other, the last 
named with the flag of the second-in-command (brigadier); then 
the destroyer Pluton entered, went out again without anchoring, 
and returned an hour later with the Furor , of the same class, and 
both anchored at a convenient place. 

The day when the fleet entered Santiago harbor was one of those 
beautiful mornings that are so frequent in tropical countries; not 
the slightest breeze rippled the surface of the water, not the least 
cloud was to be seen in the deep blue sky, and still, notwithstand¬ 
ing all that the local papers have said, very few were the people 
who came down to witness the arrival of the ships. With the ex¬ 
ception of the official element and a small number of Peninsulars, 
the arrival of our warships inspired no interest, nor even curiosity. 


(1) 



2 


And I say tliis and want it understood, because it is the best proof 
of the sympathies which the country professes for us and of which 
it gives us constantly unquestionable proofs whenever opportunity 
offers. 

The fleet was under the command of the eminent Rear Admiral 
Pascual Cevera who, as already stated, had hoisted his flag on the 
Infanta Maria Teresa , Captain Joaquin Bustamente being chief 
of the general staff. The second in command was Captain Jose 
de Paredes, who had hoisted his flag on the Crist6bat Colon. 

The Infanta Maria Teresa , built at the Nervion shipyards, is a 
ship of 103.63 metres length, 19.81 beam, and 7,000 tons displace¬ 
ment, with a draught of 6.55 metres. Her engines develop 13,700 
I. H. P., giving her a speed of 20.25 miles. Her armament con¬ 
sists of two 28-cm. Hontoria guns (mounted in turrets, one for¬ 
ward and one aft); ten 14-cm. Hontoria guns; eight 57-mm. Nor- 
denfeldt rapid-fire guns; eight 37-mm. Hotchkiss revolving guns, 
and two 11-mm. machine guns. She was commanded by Captain 
Victor Concas. 

The Vizcaya , commanded by Captain Antonio Eulate, and the 
Oquendo , commanded by Captain Juan B. Lagaza, are exactly 
like the Maria Teresa and built at the same yards. 

The Cristobal Colon , under the command of Captain Emilio 
Diaz Moreu, was acquired in Genoa from the firm of Ansaldo. 
She is 100 metres long by 18.20 beam; her displacement is 6,840 
tons and her draught 7.75 metres; her speed is 20 miles and her 
engines develop 13,000 I. H. P. Her armament consists of two 
254-mm. Armstrong guns (in turrets); ten 132-mm. guns; six 
120-mm. guns; ten 57-mm. Nordenfeldt guns; ten 37-mm. and two 
machine guns. 

Important note: The last-named ship, her 254-mm. or large 
calibre guns mounted in turrets not being ready, had to go with¬ 
out them. 

The destroyer Pluton was commanded by Lieutenant Pedro Vaz¬ 
quez, and the Furor , of the same class, by Lieutenant Diego 
Carlier; both of them were under the command of Captain Fer¬ 
nando Villamil. 

The arrival of these six ships produced real enthusiasm among 
the better peninsular element in Santiago, especially as nobody 
wanted to believe that they were the only ones that Spain was 
going to send, since they were called the “first division,” and at 
least two more divisions were expected. The only ones who had 
no illusions, who knew what to expect, who were acquainted with 
the true condition of affairs, were those who had arrived in the 
ships. From the admiral down to the last midshipman, they 


3 


knew perfectly well that there were no more fleets, no more divis¬ 
ions, no more vessels, and that those six ships (if the destroyers 
may he connted as such) were all that could he counted on to 
oppose the American fleet, which consists of the following ships, 
not including those in construction, and taking into account only 
armored and protected ships—that is, those of the first and second 
classes: 

Iowa , 11,340 tons, steel, first-class battle ship, 18 guns. 

Indiana , 10,288 tons, steel, first-class battle ship, 16 guns. 

Massachusetts, 10,288 tons, steel, first-class battle ship, 16 guns. 

Oregon , 10,288 tons, steel, first-class battle ship, 16 guns. 

Brooklyn, 9,215 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 20 guns. 

New York, 9,200 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 18 guns. 

Columbia, 7,375 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 11 guns. 

Minneapolis, 7,375 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 11 
guns. 

Texas, 6,315 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 8 guns. 

Puritan, 6,060 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 10 guns. 

Olympia, 5,870 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 14 guns. 

Chicago, 4,500 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 18 
guns. 

Baltimore, 4,413 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 10 
guns. 

Philadelphia, 4,324 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 12 
guns. 

Monterey, 4,084 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser (with 
turrets), 4 guns. 

Newark, 4,098 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 12 guns. 

San Francisco, 4,098 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 
12 guns. 

Charleston, 3,730 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 8 
guns. 

Miantonomoh, 3,990 tons, iron, monitor, 4 guns. 

Amphritite, 3,990 tons, iron, monitor, 6 guns. 

Monadnock, 3,990 tons, iron, monitor, 6 guns. 

Terror, 3,990 tons, iron, monitor, 4 guns. 

Cincinnati, 3,213 tons, iron, second-class protected cruiser, 11 
guns. 

Raleigh, 3,213 tons, iron, second-class protected cruiser, 11 guns. 

Note: Before war was declared, they bought of Brazil the Ama¬ 
zonas, a magnificent protected cruiser of more than 6,000 tons, with 
perfect armament. She was one of the ships that blockaded this 
port. 

It is to be noted that in the first eleven ships enumerated, the 
number of guns stated is only that of the large-calibre guns, that 


4 


is, from lG-cm. upward, without including rapid-fire, revolving, 
machine guns, etc. 

The first four, namely, the Iowa, Indiana, Massachusetts , and 
Oregon , have four 32-cm. guns each, that is to say, larger guns 
than the medium-calibre ones of the Maria Teresa , Oquendo, and 
Viscaya , each of which had but two 28-cm. guns. The Cristobal 
Colon, as has already been stated, did not have her large guns 
mounted. 

Shortly after the fleet had anchored, the civil and military author¬ 
ities went on board to pay their respects to Admiral Cervera. 

It will be remembered that these ships had been assembled at 
the Cape Yerde Islands and that many notes were exchanged on 
that subject between the Governments of Spain and the United 
States, until finally the Spanish Government gave definite orders 
for the ships to proceed to the Island of Cuba. 

They arrived at Martinique, where they left the destroyer Terror , 
commanded by Lieut. Francisco de la Rocha, for the reason that 
the vessel had sustained injuries to her boiler and was no longer 
able to follow the fleet. From Martinique, the ships proceeded to 
Curasao, where only two ships coaid take a small quantity of coal, 
as the laws of that Dutch colony did not allow any more to enter 
the harbor. Finally, as stated above, the fleet reached this harbor, 
without having met Admiral Sampson’s fleet, whether accident¬ 
ally, or whether Admiral Cervera went by way of Curagao on 
purpose to mislead the American admiral, I do not know. 


X. 


PROVISIONS OF THE CITY. 


So far my task lias been, if not easy, at least pleasant, for in 
honor of the truth and deference to justice, I will say that all per¬ 
sons who have so far figured, directly or indirectly, in the events 
under discussion, deserve praise and congratulations. Unfortu¬ 
nately, I can not say as much regarding the question of provisions, 
which is of such great importance, and has had so much to do with 
the capitulation of this city. 

It is far from me to want to mention or censure any person or 
persons in particular. I am citing facts which everyone knows, 
and I believe it to be a duty which I must not shun to set forth 
everything with perfect impartiality. I am making history, and 
with that I have said everything. 

The city of Santiago de Cuba has never been very well supplied 
and provisions have never been abundant there. 

It is only just to state that the whole military element of the 
province and also the hospitals were nine or ten months in arrears 
in the payment of consignments. They had been living on credit 
for some time, and the firms furnishing the supplies, not being 
able to order new ones and meet their obligations, had allowed 
their stores to run very low. We were passing through one of 
those crisis which were so frequent in our last war, and which, 
unfortunately, are being repeated in this, owing to the parsimony 
of the Treasury. 

But now, under the circumstances in which Santiago de Cuba 
was, the problem assumed more serious shape, for living became 
almost impossible. Everything was lacking; articles of food, 
prospects, money; our credit and purchasing resources were ex¬ 
hausted. And this was the case not only at the capital, but extended 
to the whole division. What happened at Santiago, also happened 
at Manzanillo, Holguin, Puerto Principe, Ciego de Avila, Moron, 
Splritus, and other places of the island, namely, the cities supplied 
the people of the surrounding country and the latter had no pro¬ 
visions or stores to furnish in return. 

Moreover, the merchants of this city, little given to great enter¬ 
prises and risky speculations, did not have on hand any more than. 


(5) 



6 


what tliey felt sure they could sell in a short time. And, there¬ 
fore, I repeat it, provisions, even those of first necessity, were cer¬ 
tainly not abundant, and everybody knew that when the hostile 
ships should arrive to blockade the city, as must happen sooner or 
later, these would soon give out. A few families understood it 
and laid in supplies in anticipation of what was to come, and they 
certainly did not regret it, for their fears were realized, although, 
be it said in honor of the truth, there was no motive or reason to 
justify such a condition of affairs. 

War was officially declared on April 21, and until the 18th of 
May not a single hostile ship apjDeared in sight of the harbor. 
There were in it five Spanish merchant vessels, which were pre¬ 
vented from leaving by the breaking out of hostilities, the Mejico , 
Montera , San Juan , Beina de los Angeles , and Tomas Brooks. 
Jamaica is only 80 miles from Santiago, and yet not a single sack 
of flour entered the city since before the 21st of April, when a 
small English sailing schooner came from there with a cargo of 
butter, potatoes, onions, and corn meal, which she sold for a good 
price without landing it at the custom-house. The example was 
not followed; everybody saw the possibility of the conflict which 
had to come without trying to prevent it. 

Had it not been for the arrival of the German steamer Polaria, 
which, fortunately, left at Santiago 1,700 sacks of rice intended 
for Havana, there would have been an absolute lack of provisions, 
as neither the merchants nor anyone else attempted to import them. 

The last provisions entering the trading houses were brought by 
the steamer Mortera on the 25th of April, consisting of 150 head 
of cattle, 180,000 rations of flour, 149,000 of peas, 197,000 of rice, 
79,000 of beans, and 96,000 of wine, hiow, without including the 
forces of Guantanamo, Baracoa, and Sagua de Tanamo, the needs 
of the troops of Santiago de Cuba amounted to 360,000 rations a 
month. Thus it will be seen that the provisions on hand in the 
trading houses the last days of April were hardly sufficient for 
half a month. 

And this is not the worst; but the merchants, far from contrib¬ 
uting to the welfare of the army, which in reality was defending 
their interests, hid whatever they could and raised the prices in a 
manner which I do not wish to qualify, taking advantage of the 
sad stress to which the blockade had reduced the city. 

An example will show this better than anything I may say on 
the subject. The man who had the contract of furnishing water 
at the bay, relying on the letter of his contract, tried to charge the 
ships of the fleet for the water which they were getting at Las 
Cruces pier, this water being the property of the American com¬ 
pany of the Juragua mines, for which the Spanish Government 


7 


could therefore not contract, and was conveyed on board by means 
of the water pipes, which, are there for that purpose, the pump be¬ 
ing kept going night and day by the soldiers of Colonel Borry’s 
column. Nearly all the ships took over 500 pipes of water each, 
which, at 4 pesetas a pipe, amounts to several thousand dollars. 
The contractor in question, whose name I do not wish to remem¬ 
ber, is from the peninsula, a captain of volunteers, and, as he says 
himself, “a better Spaniard than Pelayo.” 

I do not know what news may have reached the Peninsula about 
the conditions at Santiago de Cuba. It is possible that people believed 
there that only certain articles of food were lacking; if that is the 
case, they are greatly mistaken. People here have suffered from 
actual hunger, and many persons have starved to death, although 
the population had been greatly decreased, since whole families 
had left prior to the 21st day of April. I, myself, saw a man who 
had died of hunger in the entrance of the Brooks Plouse opposite 
the captaincy of the port—died because he had nothing to eat. 

Horses, dogs, and other animals were dying from hunger in the 
streets and public places and the worst thing was that their car¬ 
casses were not removed. I also saw—this is significant on account 
of the fatal consequences that might follow—I saw, I repeat, a dog 
throw himself upon a smaller one and kill and devour him. The 
water from the aqueduct had been cut off, as will be seen, and 
the city was exposed to the danger of the dogs going mad, and we 
should have had that calamity to add to the many that were weigh¬ 
ing upon us. But why go on ? What I have said is more than 
sufficient to show the immense responsibility incurred by those who 
might have supplied the city with provisions, and who neglected 
and eluded so sacred a duty. 

There were orders and decrees published regulating the price of 
articles of first necessity, but the merchants paid no attention to 
them, as though they did not concern them, and the raising of 
prices was the more unjustifiable and inexcusable, as everything 
that was in the city had been there prior to the declaration of war, 
and had cost no more freight or duty than in normal times. 

If there had been flour and bacon, the soldiers might not have 
become weakened and sick, and yet they fought as the Spanish 
soldier always has fought. What a contrast between him and the 
merchant of this city! But there are things which it is better not 
to air and this is one of them. 


XI. 


COALING. 


Tlie fleet which left the Cape Verde Islands, which took no coal 
at Martinique where it touched, and which at Curasao took on 
only a few tons in two of the ships, arrived here, as was natural, 
with the bunkers almost empty. Admiral Cervera prepared to 
replenish them, and it may be easily imagined how imperative it 
was to hasten an operation without which the ships were unable 
to execute a single maneuver, even though their very salvation 
might depend on it. 

Unfortunately, the harbor of Santiago, where there is little 
movement of shipping, has but very scant means and resources, 
especially since the breaking out of the present insurrection. 

There were only four steamers—the Alcyon , Juragua , Esme¬ 
ralda , and Colon. The first two do not possess the necessary re¬ 
quirements for towing launches; the Esmeralda does very well 
when the sea is calm and there is not much head wind; the only 
one that has all the necessary requirements is the Colon , but the 
Colon was having her boiler overhauled and it required a week to 
finish the work, which was indispensable. Unfortunately, the 
gunboat Alvarado , which might have rendered good services, was 
in dock renewing her bottom planks, and the work was very slow. 

The army, in its turn, also had a great deal of work on hand 
which it could not possibly leave, such as taking supplies to the 
Morro, water to Punta Gorda, and war material and ammunition 
to both of these places and to the Socapa, and the chiefs and offi¬ 
cers were needed for directing all the work undertaken. 

The only launches and lighters in the harbor were those of 
Messrs. Ros, some of them useless, others in bad repair, and a few 
only in condition to be used; besides these there were those of the 
Juragua Company, which were good but few in number, and, as 
they belong to American subjects, it was not easy for the Govern¬ 
ment to get them. With such small resources and with so much 
that had to be done, it will be understood how difficult it was, not 
to say impossible, to accomplish everything. 

To give even an imperfect idea of the lack of appliances of every 
description, I will mention that the contractor of water, which 

(8) 





9 


latter is very bad and for which he charges exorbitant prices, had, 
for the purpose of supplying the ships, only two small rudder 
boats, each with two pipes (about four hogsheads), and there 
were four ships requiring 1,500 pipes each, without counting the 
destroyers. 

Naturally all the demands, requests, and complaints, everything 
the fleet needed, wanted or desired, went to the comandancia de 
marina, the personnel of which consisted of the commander, the 
second in command, the aide, the paymaster, three enlisted seamen 
(cabos de matricula), one of whom had charge of the provision 
stores, and two orderlies, and with this personnel everything had 
to be done that was asked for and everything furnished that was 
wanted. 

The army wanted a tug, the military government wanted a tug 
and launches, and the fleet wanted launches and a tug, and all 
wanted them badly, and all the services were important and urgent, 
and at the captaincy of the port we constantly had to solve prob¬ 
lems that had no solution, and furnish launches that did not exist 
and tugs that were not to be found. 

The coaling, which went on day and night, progressed very 
slowly, in spite of everything; for at the two piers where the coal 
was there was very little water, and at the end of each pier only 
one lighter could be accommodated without danger of running 
aground, in which case it would have been necessary to wait for 
high water to float it again. 

There is no end to the time and work which it took to put the 
Cardiff coal of the navy depot on board the ships, and though 
laborers were hired for the Cumberland coal of the Juragua mines, 
the ships, which neAW stopped coaling as long as as they stayed 
at Santiago, never succeeded in filling their bunkers. One detail 
will show the lack of means available at the port. Although every 
store in the town was visited and any price offered for baskets, only 
a very limited number could be found for carrying the coal; it had 
to be put in as best it could. 

There is some work that can neither be understood nor appreci¬ 
ated, that passes by unnoticed and of which people do not even 
have an idea, because it does not constitute actions of war, more or 
less brilliant, and which yet can not be kept up nor stood for any 
length of time. We who belonged to the captaincy of the port 
finally dined, breakfasted, and slept there—or rather, did not sleep 
there, for there never was a night when it was not necessary to 
transmit to the admiral two or three urgent papers, orders, or other 
cablegrams, at all hours, and the telephone did not stop a minute 
and did not give us any rest. Still it was not the work that made 





10 


the situation unbearable; what soldier or sailor did not work des¬ 
perately at Santiago de Cuba? No, the sad, the lamentable thing 
was that, being so anxious to please all, we were unable to satisfy 

anybody. 

The coal belonging to the navy, consisting of 2,300 tons of Car¬ 
diff, was taken on at the piers of Bellavista, situated in the western 
part of the bay. Besides this, General Linares placed at Admiral 
Cervera’s disposal about 600 tons of Cumberland coal from the 
Juragua mines and 600 tons from the Sabanilla railway. 

The water had to be gotten by the boats of the fleet in bulk at 
the piers of Las Cruces and at the faucet near the Royal Pier. 
Some of the ships got their own water by going alongside the first- 
named pier. 



XII. 


OPINIONS AS TO WHY THE FLEET DID NOT GO OUT. 


In narrating tlie events of Santiago, it was not my intention to 
make remarks of any kind on tliem, nor to permit myself com¬ 
ments thereon, as I consider that I have neither the authority, nor 
the ability (and this I do not say from false modesty), nor the 
right to do so. My object has been to give a simple account of 
what I witnessed, what I saw, and what I heard from trustworthy 
sources, and of the authenticity of which I am certain, feeling- 
sure that in Spain, though the facts are known as a whole, they 
are not known there in detail; but in the presence of certain insin¬ 
uations and certain doubts I can not remain silent and indifferent. 

Great was the joy caused by the arrival of the fleet among the 
peninsular element generally and some of the sons of Cuba who 
truly love us. But after a few days, a number of intelligent and 
prominent people, or at least recognized as such, showed great 
impatience and surprise that the ships should remain in port, and 
never got tired asking what the fleet was doing there and why it 
did not go out. 

It is easy to answer that question. 

If Admiral Cervera can be accused of anything, it is an excess 
of courage. One need only read his record of service to be con¬ 
vinced of that, and the third day of July proved it only too well. 
Admiral Cervera received many cablegrams and official letters; no 
one knew better than he did what was going on in Spain and in 
Cuba, and what was being ordered and required of him, and that 
Admiral Cervera acted as he should have done admits of no dis¬ 
cussion. My only object is to answer the question which so many 
were asking in Santiago: “What was the fleet doing there?” 
What was it doing? Well, a great deal. 

It is not always great battles or great fights that decide the out¬ 
come of a campaign. Napoleon I, by an admirable maneuver, 
closed in on the Austrian General Marck at Ulm, and the latter 
had to surrender with his whole army without having fired a single 
shot. 

(it) 

8630-2 







12 


When Admiral Villeneuve, who unfortunately commanded 
the allied fleets of France and Spain, learned that Admiral Ros- 
silly, appointed to relieve him, was at Madrid, he preferred to 
fight with Nelson rather than present himself before Napoleon. 
So he decided to leave Cadiz, and he called together the com¬ 
manders of both fleets on the ship Bucentaure. The Spanish 
objected, on the grounds that, in order to leave Cadiz, they needed 
time and a favorable wind, that the ships were in need of repairs, 
had to replenish their provisions and ammunition and complete 
their crews, that the season was far advanced, and that, if the 
English were compelled to blockade them in winter, it would be 
equivalent for them to the loss of a naval battle; that was the 
opinion of men like Gravina, Churruca, and Galiano. 

They added that, moreover, the barometer was very low and 
that a storm was imminent, whereupon Rear Admiral Magon replied 
“that what was low was the courage in some hearts.” At this 
insult, the Spanish, losing all prudence and calm, decided to go 
out in search of the enemy to prove that they still retained their 
courage. That was all that the French admiral wanted. The 
combined fleets went out, and what happened at Cape Trafalgar 
is well known. 

Now, then, the question is answered already: the ships were 
compelling the enemy to sustain with superior forces the blockade 
of Santiago de Cuba, with all its difficulties and dangers. While 
our ships were in port, safe from the ordinary dangers of the sea, 
using hardly any coal, not exhausting their engines, and waiting 
for a favorable opportunity to maneuver, when and as best they 
could, the hostile fleet was obliged to cruise on the coast day and 
night, using a great deal of coal, constantly doing sea service, 
which is always laborious, especially in time of war, exhausting 
their engines, and exposed to the danger of having to abandon the 
blockade in case of a storm from the south or east, still more if 
the season of cyclones should come. 

It is certainly true that a victory can be achieved without the 
necessity of giving battle, so much so that, if it had been 
possible for us, besides the ships that were at Santiago, to have 
two at Cienfuegos, for instance, and two more at Nuevitas, which 
ports are well suited for placing lines of torpedoes, owing to their 
narrow entrances, there is no doubt but that the Americans, who, 
outside of the ships they had in the Philippines, had sent their 
whole fleet to the island of Cuba, would have had to blockade 
those three ports with forces superior to ours and to keep watch at 
Key West if they did not want to expose themselves to a serious 
disaster, or would have had to force one of the ports, thereby 
exposing themselves to a hecatomb; and we only need think of 


13 


t le “T b ® r ° f thelr slli P s t0 understand that they could not suc- 
cessftilly threaten so many points; though they only had to deal 
^lth Santiago and had almost all the ships of the fleet in front of 

it, they would have found it necessary to desist from taking the 
oiiensive. 

The foregoing shows that ships do not necessarily have to give 
battle m order to obtain results. Those in Santiago harbor suc¬ 
ceeded for forty-six days in keeping before the mouth of the har¬ 
bor a vastly superior fleet, which performed no special acts of 
prowess except to throw a hail of projectiles which comparatively 
did very little damage. One could not obtain better results with 
ess v ork; and if provisions had not been wanting in Santiago, 
God knows, if our fleet had remained there, to what extremes 
impatience and despair might not have carried Admiral Sampson! 


XIII. 


THE BLOCKADE. 


As I have already given a description, though very deficient, of 
the sites and places that were the scene of these events (IV: Scene 
of Events), and of the miserable resources we had for their defense, 
it will he easy to understand them by remembering and fixing the 
attention on what has been said. 

I have already stated that on the 18tli of May, the Saint Louis , 
equipped for war, and a gunboat whose name could not be ascer¬ 
tained, fired about 80 shots, which were answered by Punta Gorda, 
the only battery that was then in condition to answer the attack. 
If it had happened a few hours later, one of the 16-cm. Hontoria 
guns of the Socapa could have been fired, but as stated, it was not 
mounted until the night of the 18th. The hostile ships disappeared 
to the east. The next day, the 19th, the Spanish fleet, coming from 
Curasao, entered the harbor and commenced to coal on the 20th. 

21st .—This day, a ship coming from the south came close to the 
mouth of the harbor, then shaping her course westward. At 10.30 
p. m. the Morro telephone gave notice that two ships had been fir¬ 
ing on Punta Cabrera for 15 minutes, ten shots in all. Probably 
they were firing at Colonel Aldea’s forces, which covered that part 
of the coast. 

22d .—At 7 a. m. the look-out signaled a steamer to the east and 
another half an hour later. We learned from the Morro that one 
of them appeared to be the same that had been sighted the day 
before; the other was a three-master. Both of them were thought 
to be hostile vessels because they were going very slowly and 
reconnoitering the coast. The new one had three smokestacks. 

At 11.30 the vessels were south of the Morro (that is, in front of 
it), proceeding very slowly westward, where they disappeared at 
half-past four. 

23d .—At 5.45 a vessel was signaled to the south and an hour 
later two to the east. At 9 the Morro said that one of the three 
vessels had three smokestacks, the same that had been sighted the 
day before, and one was a battle ship, and that flag signals were 
being made. 


( 14 ) 



15 


At 11.30 a vessel was signaled to the west; at 12.30 the Morro 
said that the vessel just arrived had three masts and three smoke¬ 
stacks. 

At 4.10 we learned by telephone that one of the four vessels had 
disappeared to the south and the others were coming closer to the 
mouth of the harbor. 

At 7 the three ships disappeared, one to the east and two to 
the south. 

2fth. —At 2 o’clock the lookout signaled two steamers to the 
south. The sky was clouded and nothing could be distinguished 
beyond a certain distance. 

At 11.45 the destroyer Pluton went out. 

At 12.30 four hostile vessels were distinguished, though with 
difficulty, owing to the cloudy weather, to the east of the mouth of 
the harbor. 

When seeing the Pluton go out, one of them shaped her course 
to the westward and passed close to the destroyer without being 
able to attack her, then proceeded westward. The others started 
in the same direction, also in pursuit of her, but without success, 
as the Pluton had naturally eluded meeting them. 

The four vessels disappeared to the westward. 

At 2 o’clock, the Spanish flagship ( Infanta Maria Teresa ) started 
up and went alongside the Las Cruces Pier for water. 

At 5.30 two vessels were signaled to the south; they disappeared 
in that direction after dark. 

25th .—At 6 o’clock two steamers were signaled, one to the south 
and one to the west. 

At 7.30 the Cristobal Colon started up and shortly after cast 
anchor again. 

At the same hour, the Morro reported that one of the two ves¬ 
sels signaled was apparently heading toward the harbor at full 
speed, and the other seemed to be chasing her. Three-quarters of 
an hour later it was reported that the vessel appeared to have been 
captured at quite a distance from the mouth of Santiago harbor, 
and that both were going south, the captured vessel ahead and the 
other following. 

The Infanta Maria Teresa sheered off from Las Cruces Pier at 
1 o’clock p. m., and the Oquendo then went alongside, also to take 
water; the former anchored again in the bay. 

At 2 o’clock the Vizcaya cast anchor south of Cay Ratones, near 
Cajuma Bay. The Cristobal Colon anchored south of Punta Gorda. 

26th. —At 2 o’clock p. m. the Oquendo left Las Cruces Pier and 
anchored again in the bay. 

The position of the fleet was as follows: The Cristobal Colon was 
at anchor south of Punta Gorda, close to it, presenting her broad¬ 
side to the mouth of the harbor, in line with the channel to which 




16 


she presented her gnns, so as to he able to attack the enemy in case 
he should try to force it. 

The Vizcaya close to Cajmnas Bay, facing the same as the Colon 
so as to nnite their fire in case the enemy shonld succeed in passing 
Punta Soldado. 

The Maria Teresa and Oquendo south of Cay Ratones, so as to 
defend the channel of Punta Gorda as well as the general anchor¬ 
ing place and the city. During the day three shijjs were sighted 
to the south, and disappeared shortly after in the same direction. 

27th. —At 6 the lookout signaled two vessels to the south. 

At 11.30 it signaled five more ships. There were now seven in 
sight. 

At 12.15 General Linares went to the Morro in the steamboat of 
the captaincy of the port. 

At 12.30 four more ships were'sighted; total, eleven ships. 

Of the eleven ships in sight, four are battle ships. 

At 2.30 p. m. another ship arrived. 

At nightfall General Linares returned from the Morro. The 
ships disappeared to the south. 

28th. —At 6.15 the lookout signaled a vessel within 5 miles of 
the Morro, and at noon she disappeared to the south. 

At 4.30 p. m. six large ships were signaled, disappearing to the 
south at nightfall. 

29th. —At daybreak the destroyers Pluton and Furor went out 
to reconnoiter, returning at 8. 

During the day they anchored in the bay; at night they cast 
anchor at the Socapa and at Nisi^ero Bay in order to guard the en¬ 
trance of the harbor. 

General Linares went to the Morro in the tug Alcyon. 

At 7, seven hostile ships were sighted reconnoitering the coast, 
at a distance of about 8 miles; they withdrew to the south before 
dark. 

30th. —At 5.30 the hostile fleet was signaled approaching to within 
9 miles of the harbor. It consisted of seven ships. 

At noon three others arrived from the south and joined the former. 

31st. —At 5.45 the lookout signaled eleven ships to the south. 

At 2 p. m. gun fire was heard. The lookout reported that the 
coast was being fired on. 

At 2.40 Punta Gorda battery opened fire, ceasing again shortly 
after. 

The ships of the Spanish fleet hoisted their battle flags and fired 
up their boilers. 

At 2.30 the firing was quite lively. 

By 3 it became slower and ceased at'3.30. 


17 


The enemy had been riring on the Morro and Socapa batteries, 

without anv casualty in either. 

% % 

The ships disappeared, as usual, to the south before dark. 

Thus ends the events of the month of Mav, insignificant on the 
whole and only a prologue to those that were to follow. 

Diming the davs of Mav 20th to 22d, the insurgent chief Calixto 
Garcia, with a numerous contingent of troops and artillery, at¬ 
tacked the village of Palma Soriano on the Cauto river. General 
Tara de Rev. at the head of 1,000 men and two guns, repulsed the 
hostile forces, routing them and killing a great many. On our 
side we had 16 wounded. This operation of the soldier hero, sim¬ 
ulating a surrounding movement by crossing the Canto at three or 
four fords, and pursuing the rebels 2 miles beyond Palma Soria: . 
was due to the skillful distribution of the scant forces of the line 
of observation. This line, as will be readily understood from the 

tart at the end of the book, was weak, very weak, in almost its 
whole extent. It was, indeed, work that deserves praise, to guard, 
patrol, and sustain strategic points, cultivated land, coasts, roads, 
and railroads, with such a small and weak contingent of troops. 
And the forces that we were expecting from Havana, and the arrival 
of which had been announced, did not appear. 

As a collier was being expected, it was supposed that the vessel 
captured on thr 25th was the one. It is possible; but. on the other 
hand, it may not have been. In any event, there was much sur¬ 
prise expressed at Santiago that, since the hostile tleet was not in 
sight, but only one or two vessels. Admiral Cervera had not pre¬ 
vented the capture, or at least recovered the prize. 

The reason why he did not is very simple. Our tleet had taken 
on board all the Cardiff coal that was at the navy depot, without 
succeeding, as has been seen, in tilling its bunkers, and there 

remained onlv the 1.100 tons of Cumberland coal of which Gen. 

• * 

Linares could dispose; this latter coal is inferior to the former, and 
I believe it is hardly necessary for me to point out how important 
it is that a fleet should have good fuel: ; t may be its salvation at 
a given moment: consequently the fleet, which had the prospect of 
having extremely difficult maneuvers of the highest importance to 
execute, could not afford to waste even a single piece of coal to no 
purpose. 

The capture took place a long distance from the mouth of the 
harbor: before a ship could weigh anchor, clear the channel, get 
up full steam and traverse that distance, at least three hours must 
elapse, and where would have been the captor and the prize by that 
time? And even granting that the former could not bring the 
latter in safety, would he allow it to fall into our hands ? Certainly 
not. Two gunshots would have sunk her very quickly, especially 


18 


if, as was believed, she had a heavy cargo; and the Colon , or any 
other ship that had gone out on that errand, would have consumed, 
probably to no purpose, a quantity of coal which it was impera¬ 
tive to keep for much more important and less hazardous oj^era- 
tions than pursuing merchant steamers equipped for war and tak¬ 
ing or recapturing prizes. Moreover, from the 22d to the 28th, the 
swell of the sea prevented the ships from going out; the pilots of 
the harbor were not willing to take them out, saying that in view 
of the state of the sea, they might touch bottom, especially the 
Cristobal Colon. 


XV. 


WAITING. 


Tlie events of the month of May, although they are not, or rather 
do not appear to he, of great importance in themselves, because 
there were no special movements on the part of the enemy and no 
casualties of any kind on ours, are in reality of great importance, 
and their consequences have had great influence and weight on the 
result of the war, which lias been decided, so to speak, in the waters 
of Santiago de Cuba and in front of the trenches in this precinct. 

If we take into consideration the position of Santiago de Cuba, 
situated at the southern extremity of the island, and therefore 
at a comparative distance from the United States and Key West, 
the base of operations of the Yankees; the topography of its harbor, 
difficult in itself to force; the absence of military importance of 
the city, which is not a stronghold or even a military city, and the 
scarcity of roads and railways so that it is almost cut off from com¬ 
munication with any important or strategic point, it is not too much 
to assume that the Americans had no idea of making great demon¬ 
strations or operations, but thought that it would be sufficient to 
blockade it, and throw in a few projectiles as they had done at other 
cities on the coast, and a proof of this is that, until the 18th of May, 
that is, nearly a month after the declaration of war, not a single 
hostile vessel was seen, and the two that appeared then were a 
merchant vessel equipped for war and a small gunboat, which, after 
reconnoitering, disappeared to the east. 

But the arrival of the Spanish fleet, though composed of only 
four battleships, but these the only ones of that class which we had 
in the island, and therefore the only ones that could inspire any 
fear, the absolute necessity of replenishing them with coal, which 
took a number of days, because, in view of the scarcity of facilities 
of any kind it could not be done in less time, compelled the enemy 
to make the city, and especially the harbor where the fleet was at 
anchor, their objective, although they had not taken much thought 
of it at first; to concentrate upon this objective all their forces on 
sea and on land, and to take for the scene of the war one which 
was least adapted for their plans and which they had least thought 
of choosing. 


( 19 ) 





20 


When did they learn that our ships had anchored in the harbor ? 
I do not know; nor do I believe that anybody in Santiago knows 
it. If the St. Louis and the gunboat which has been mentioned 
several times returned from Guantanamo on the 19tli, where they 
went presumably to continue the blockade when they left these 
waters, there is no doubt but that they could see our ships and 
some people think that they at once notified their admiral, but I 
doubt it, because it was not until the 27th that ships appeared in 
such numbers as would make it possible to check or defeat ours. 

It might be said in answer to this that the hostile fleet may have 
had a thousand reasons, which we could not know, for this delay 
in assembling and appearing at the harbor. It is possible, but in 
that case, if the enemy knew ever since the 19th, what had hap¬ 
pened, why did they continue to appear in small numbers before 
the mouth of the harbor, exposing themselves to serious trouble ? 
I do not believe that the enemy received any information on the 
subject, or at least complete evidence, until the 24tli, when the 
vessels which were cruising in Santiago waters, saw the Pluton 
come out and go back again, for they knew that she accompanied 
the fleet and formed part of it. It was three days later, the 27th, 
that eleven ships appeared, four of them, at least, battle ships. 
This interval of time was necessary, of course, to advise the hostile 
fleet, which was perhaps between Cape San Antonio and Havana, 
or Cape San Antonio and Cienfuegos. 

In any event, the operations of the month of May assumed great 
importance, for the harbor remained closed, where since before the 
declaration of war no provisions of any kind had entered, if we 
except those which the small English schooner already mentioned 
brought from Jamaica, and which are hardly worth taking into 
consideration. 

Another problem: Why did the hostile ships which remained 
all day long in front of the mouth of the harbor disappear at dark 
instead of continuing to watch it during the night ? I do not 
know that either. The whole coast is accessible and the ground 
so high that it can be distinguished perfectly even in stormy 
weather, so that there was no danger in remaining there in calm 
weather such as we have had all this year (for even in that Provi¬ 
dence had favored them), and what I say is true, as shown by the 
fact that afterwards they never left the mouth of the harbor for a 
single moment, day or night, as will be seen. 

Was it perhaps because they had become convinced of the diffi¬ 
culty of forcing the harbor, especially with a fleet inside, and 
wanted, by opening a passage, give the fleet a chance to come out 
in order to take refuge in another harbor less difficult of access? 
But such tactics might have had fatal results, because if our ships 


21 


should reach Havana harbor, a few hours from Key West, under 
the protection of its 300 guns, and united with the other warships 
that were there, the situation would have become materially 
changed, and the Americans might have had a chance to regret 
such tactics. That they should have made such a mistake is not 
to he thought of; besides, if that had been their intention, they 
would not have maintained such vigilance during the day. Were 
they simulating a retreat to return at night to the harbor, without 
lights, so as not to be seen ? That is not probable; in order to see 
the mouth of the harbor they must have been seen themselves 
from the heights of the Morro or Socapa, where the strictest watch 
was also exercised. I suppose, for I can not think of anything 
else, that, not having been able as yet to unite all their naval 
forces, they did not want to run the risk of a battle at night with 
a fleet that had destroyers, the number of which they probably did 
not know, and did not learn until later, through the secret infor¬ 
mation which they probably received from the insurgents. 

But all this is only supposition and hypothesis, no doubt entirely 
erroneous. The incontrovertible, undeniable fact is that, on the 
27th, the enemy appeared with forces much superior to ours and 
remained all day long opposite the Morro, retreating at night, or 
simulating retreat. Thus ended the month of May. 




XVI. 


THE MERRIMAC. 


June 1st .—At 6 o’clock the look-out signaled the hostile fleet in 
sight, consisting of thirteen ships; five battle ships and eight 
merchant and warships, among them one torpedo boat. 

At 7 o’clock gun shots were heard. 

At 12.30 the fleet started up, moving away from the harbor 
from which it was about 6 miles distant; half an hour later it 
reversed its course and came again closer. 

At night the Spanish fleet changed its anchoring place. 

The Maria Teresa and Vizcaya anchored south of, and with 
their broadsides towards Cay Ratones and were forming the first 
line for the defense of the harbor. The Colon and Oquendo 
anchored north of the same Cay and were forming the second line. 

2nd .—At 5.30 nineteen ships appeared at the mouth of the 
harbor, at a distance of about 5 miles. 

At 7 the Morro reported that they were going to fire a few 
shots to discharge some of the guns. 

3rd —At 3.30 gunshots were being heard towards the mouth of 
the harbor and the firing became very lively. 

At 4 o’clock it was learned at the comandancia de marina that 
a merchant vessel had come very close to the mouth of the chan¬ 
nel; that the batteries had fired at her and she had not answered; 
and at that moment she was already inside; shortly after she 
passed by the bow of the Reina Mercedes , which, it will be 
remembered, was moored between the Socapa and Cay Smith, 
with her bow towards the channel which she was defending with 
her two 16-cm. Hontoria guns and Whitehead torpedoes. 

By 4.20 the firing, which had been very violent, ceased. 

At 4.30 it was learned that the hostile ship had gone down in 
the mouth of the channel, close to Punta Soldado, but without 
obstructing it. 

At 5.30, it now being daylight, very slow firing was again heard 
and ceased at 6. 

At 5.30 the commandant of marine went to the mouth of the 
harbor in the steam launch. 


( 22 ) 





When lie returned, we learned that one of the merchant vessels 
forming part of the American fleet, called the Merrimac , with two 
masts and one smokestack, larger than the Mejico , had forced the 
entrance at 5.30; that she had been sunk in the channel close to 
Punta Soldado, by the guns of the Mercedes and the rapid-fire 
guns of the battery below the Socapa, and was lying in the direc¬ 
tion of the Socapa, without obstructing the entrance or preventing 
our ships from going out, and that one lieutenant and seven sailors 
forming her crew had been captured and were on board the Mer¬ 
cedes. 

Besides the firing on the vessel from the guns, the Minton 
launched two torpedoes and the Mercedes two more. Two sub¬ 
marine mines were discharged from the first line and one from the 
second. 

During the events related above, General Linares was at the 
Morro, where he had repaired by land on receipt of the first news. 
At daybreak, General Toral, military governor of Santiago, came 
to assist the navy with a force of regulars and volunteers. 

At 7 a company went to reenforce the forces at the Socapa and 
the Morro. 

At 7.30 the forces that had come to assist the navy withdrew. 

At 11 p. m. firing was heard at a great distance in a south¬ 
easterly direction; it ceased at 12.15. The fire was extremely slow. 

As may have been noticed, on June 1 the enemy appeared before 
the Morro with thirteen ships, five of them battle ships and eight 
merchant and war vessels; that is to say, with forces superior to 
ours, in number as well as caliber of armament, and also from the 
fact that they were better protected than ours, as may be seen 
from the report of the United States Navy, and as unfortunately 
we found out ourselves later. From-that time on the hostile 
ships, which were afterwards increased in number, established day 
and night a constant watch, without withdrawing at nightfall, as 
they used to do. Probably they suspected—for they never lacked 
advices and secret information—that our fleet, for want of pro¬ 
visions, would before very long be compelled to go out, and that 
is what they were waiting for. 

On the 2d, nineteen ships were present. 

At daybreak of the 3d, the Merrimac forced the entrance of the 
harbor, at 3.30, with the result above set forth. 

In spite of the time that has elapsed, we, at Santiago, have not 
succeeded in ascertaining definitely—though it is probably known 
in Spain from American newspapers that are in the habit of pub¬ 
lishing everything—what was the real object that the Merrimac 
had in view. 


24 


She liad guns and did not fire; she had torpedoes, though imper¬ 
fect and primitive, if I may be permitted the expression, or rudi- 
mental, which she did not use; if she was trying to explode our 
mines, she did not accomplish her design; and, finally, she had 
2,000 tons of coal on board. The lieutenant who commanded her 
refused to state the object of his maneuver, saying only that it was' 
made by order of Admiral Sampson; later, he said to Mr. Rams- 
den, British consul, that if the vessel were examined, it would bf 
found that she carried torpedoes, as indeed was the case. There¬ 
fore, it may be reasonably supposed that the object was to sink the 
vessel across the channel, so as to obstruct it and prevent our ships 
from going out; and having made sure of that, to use part of their 
ships in other operations; and if the vessel did not come to lie 
across the channel and did not obstruct it, it was because she lost 
control of her movements, her rudder having been disabled by 
some projectile, so that she went down where it suited her least. 

There is another fact in this connection which may and should 
arrest the attention of experts in that subject: The Pluton launched 
two torpedoes, the Mercedes two more, all of them Whitehead; two 
mines were discharged from the first line and one from the second; 
and yet the vessel was not blown up and passed both lines in safety, 
which shows that the effect of torpedoes is moral rather than 
material, and that it is not easy to discharge them at the right 
moment. To do so requires a degree of experience, a range of sight, 
and a presence of mind not easily found united in a single man. 
The occurrence to which I have reference demonstrates this very 
clearly. 

During the day the officer and seven men of the Merrimac, who 
had first been taken on board the Mercedes , were temporarily 
transferred to the Morro. 

From 11 to 12.30 in the night, the hostile ships were firing, 
though slowly, outside of the harbor and towards the southeast. 
The object of this has never been ascertained. 

I have several times spoken with General Ros, governor of the 
Morro, and he has always repeated these and similar words: 
“From the beginning of the hostilities to the end I have remained 
in the castle, from where, as you know, everything can be seen 
and observed. Sooner or later I have always learned the object of 
everything the enemy has done and the reason for it; but the firing 
of that night, though I saw and heard it myself, I have never 
understood. I believe they were firing on some ship they saw, oi* 
thought they saw; but it may be that they were firing on the land; 
but I believe in that case the object and result of the firing would 
have become known sooner or later.” 


That same day Captain (General) Parades, second in command 
of the fleet, disembarked from the Cristobal Colon and embarked 
temporarily on the Mercedes , where he remained until the 21st, 
taking command of all the defenses at the mouth of the harbor. 







XVII. 


THE BLOCKADE CONTINUES. 


June 4-th .—There were to he seen at the mouth of the harbor 
seventeen ships: Six battle ships, five war ships, and six merchant 
vessels. 

At 11.30 a. m., the second commander of the local naval forces 
(being the writer of this book), as judge, accompanied by the aid 
of the captaincy of the port, Mr. Leguina, as secretary, and the 
Government interpreter, Mr. Isidoro Agostini, went to the Morro 
in the steam launch of the captaincy of the port, for the purpose 
of taking the depositions of the lieutenant and seven men who had 
been taken prisoners. 

The former, Mr. Hobson, 27 years old, born in the State of Ala¬ 
bama, is a lieutenant in the corps of naval constructors, who, in 
the United States, study in the naval college, and those first pro¬ 
moted are assigned to that corps; I state this so that it may not 
seem strange that he commanded the Merrimac , for. as they are 
officers of the Navy, they can build and command ships. 

Upon learning the object of the visit, the prisoner, from whose 
room a great extent of the sea and part of the blockading fleet 
could be seen, asked why the British Consul, who was in charge 
of the United States Consulate, was not present when his deposi¬ 
tion was to be taken, and he wanted to know whether I belonged 
to the army or the navy; what might be the consequences of his 
statements; by whose authority he was being examined; and he 
stated that, since he had been taken prisoner by Admiral Cervera 
himself in his own boat (as was true), it was his understanding 
that he could and should answer only Admiral Cervera. or some 
one delegated by him. And although all this was said in the very 
best form and with a thousand protestations of his respect and 
deference for me, it did not prevent our positions from being 
reversed, and far from my asking the prisoner questions, it was 
he, on the contrary, who asked them of me. I told him so, asking 
him through the interpreter to state categorically whether he was 
disposed to answer. He replied he was ready to answer the ques¬ 
tions which he thought he ought to answer, but not those which 



27 


lie deemed untimely. Therefore, and in order not to lose time, I 
at once asked him one question which I knew beforehand he would 
refuse to answer, namely, by whose order and for what purpose 
he entered the harbor; he replied: “By order of Admiral Samp¬ 
son; the second part I can not answer.” I then deemed my mis¬ 
sion at an end and had the fact set down. 

A few days later, this officer was transferred to quarters on the 
Reina Mercedes that had been prepared for him, and the seven 
men to others on the vessel, where they remained until they were 
released. 

As I left the Morro and stood on the esplanade in front of it, I 
had an opportunity for the first time to admire the spectacle that 
presented itself to my eyes; T say “admire,” for the picture was 
truly worthy of admiration. 

The evening was most beautiful; the sea was as smooth as a 
lake, there was hardly any wind and the sky was perfectly clear. 

At a distance of about five miles, seventeen ships could be seen: 
eleven war ships, among them seven battle ships and one torpedo 
boat, and the other six merchant vessels, the nearest one about six 
miles from the harbor, formed a large arc, one extremity of which 
was at Aguadores and the other at Punta Cabrera. The largest 
and most powerful ships were in the center. Among them were 
the Iowa , Indiana , Brooklyn , and New Yorkj the latter two may 
be easily recognized by their three smokestacks. The fifth was 
presumably the Massachusetts; and finally the Texas and Ama¬ 
zonas. The New York and Brooklyn taking advantage of the 
state of the sea, had a merchant steamer alongside and were coal¬ 
ing. All of them had their engines stopped and their bows in dif¬ 
ferent directions according to the current. From time to time, one 
of them would move a short distance forward and then return again 
to her place. Among the merchant vessels Avere specially notice¬ 
able the Saint Louis (the first vessel that had been seen at Santiago), 
a huge transatlantic steamer of over 10,000 tons, which looked larger 
than any of the other ships, including the armorclads, and a steam 
yacht of great speed, very small, on the contrary, and Avhich looked 
like a ship’s boat. This is the yacht that Avas in constant com¬ 
munication with Punta Cabrera. There also was a torpedo boat 
or destroyer. A few days later, I saAV the same spectacle from the 
high battery of the Socapa, and I shall never forget it. 

Before I continue, I will state that on May 26, the cable had been 
cut at Cape Cruz, so that communication Avith Manzanillo was 
interrupted until June 17, Avhen the connection was reestablished. 

5th .—The American fleet could be seen at the mouth of the har¬ 
bor, being the same ships Ave had seen the night before. 


8630-3 



General Linares returned from the Morro at 8 o’clock p. m. and 
ordered the launches and a tug to be gotten ready to take 150 men 
to the mouth of the harbor. 

At 10.30, a chief, two officers, and 120 soldiers embarked and 
went out in a launch towed by the Colon, assisted by the Alcyon; 

the tugs returned at 1 o’clock at night. 

At 2 o’clock in the morning, through the fault of a collier coa mg 
near the hut of the English cable at Las Cruces, said hut was 
burned; it was an accident, but none the less deplorable. 




XVIII. 

THE BOMBARDMENT INCREASES. 


June 6th. —Eighteen ships were visible at the month of the har¬ 
bor. At T. 30 the lookout reported that the ships were starting np 
and approaching. 

At 8.30 ten ships—the Ioiva , Indiana, Massachusetts, Brooklyn, 
New York, Texas, Amazonas, Minneapolis, and two other war¬ 
ships—forming two divisions, opened fire, the first division, on 
the Morro and Aguadores, the second on the Socapa; one ship was 
detached from the latter division to bombard Mazamorra and 
adjoining points on the coast, where the column of Colonel Aldea 
(Asiatic battalion) had detachments and was operating. 

When the American fleet opened fire, it was so intense and the 
shots followed each other in such quick succession that it might 
have seemed like a fusillade if the mighty thunder of guns can be 
compared with the crackling of small arms. 

By 9 o’clock it became somewhat slower, shortly after reaching 
again the same intensity, then decreasing once more at 10.15, and 
again becoming terribly intense at 10.30. 

At 11.2 it ceased. 

Punta Gorda battery fired only 7 shots. 

At 12.15 intense firing was heard again in the distance to the 
east; it ceased at 1.45. 

At 2 p. m. there arrived at the royal pier a boat from the Reina 
Mercedes, towed by her steam launch, with Lieutenant Ozamiz, 
bringing three seriously wounded sailors, who were taken to the 
military hospital. This officer reported the death of Commander 
Emilio de Acosta y Eyermann, second in command of the cruiser, 
and of five sailors; also, that Ensign Molins, one boatswain, and 
several other sailors had been wounded; their names could not be 
ascertained owing to the condition of the ship, nor could even the 
exact number of wounded be stated, as it had been necessary to 
extinguish two fires on board. 

At 2.45 a private boat arrived at the pier, carrying a sergeant 
and a wounded soldier from the Mazamorra detachment. They 
were also taken to the military hospital. 

There were no more remarkable events during the night. 


( 29 ) 



30 

\ 

Ten warships, eight of them battle ships, divided into two divi¬ 
sions, opened fire shortly after 8 a. m., on the batteries at the 
mouth, and by elevation on the bay. During the first moments, 
the firing was so intense that it resembled one prolonged thunder. 
In fact, I had no idea that any firing could be as terrific as that of 
those ten ships. Much has been said of the bombardments of 
Sebastopol and Alexandria, but I do not believe that they could 
have been as terrible as the bombardment we suffered that Gth day 
of June—a day which the inhabitants of Santiago will never for¬ 
get. I might write pages about it, and even then would probably 
not give the faintest idea of what it really was. 

The hostile ships (see list of ships and armaments) had at least 
120 large guns, that is to say, of 14, 20 and 32-cm. calibers, and 
about 80 small-caliber guns, that is to say, of 57 and 42-mm., or a 
total of 192 guns, for they fired with guns of all sizes; and as I 
am far from wanting to exaggerate and since the guns of the two 
sides of a ship can not be fired at the same time (those mounted 
in turrets forward and aft can), I will say that 91 guns were 
firing upon four 16-cm. muzzle-loading guns attheMorro and two 
16-cm. breech-loading Hontoria guns of the Socapa battery. 

I do not count the guns of Punta Gorda battery, which fired 
only seven shots; for the Americans, in spite of their enormous 

superiority, still had the-prudence of avoiding it and not 

engaging it because it was not in line. Before the eloquence of 
numbers, anything else that I might say becomes unnecessary. 

How did it happen that the Morro was not razed to the ground 
and that its guns and those of the Socapa were not dismounted ? 
How did it happen that those who served these guns were not 
buried under the ruins? I do not know; that is all I can say; and 
those who were in those forts may be sure that, since they were 
not killed that day, they will die of old age. 

Captain Concas, who is very clever at computations of a certain 
nature, counted at different times the number of shots fired in a 
minute, and his deduction is that about 8,000 projectiles were 
fired; though this figure may appear exaggerated at first sight, it 
is not soin reality; tho firing lasted 175 minutes, which would 
give an average of 45 shots per minute. I believe, if anything, 
the computation falls below the truth. 

I have always believed that the hostile fleet, which, by means of 
the yacht referred to, communicated with the insurgents on the 
coast by way of Punta Cabrera, knew everything that was going 
on in Santiago as well as in the harbor and the position of our 
ships. But if I had had any doubts on that subject, they would 
have been dispelled that 6th day of June when I saw the aim of 



31 


their projectiles. Most of them dropped in the bay in the direc¬ 
tion of the Maria Teresa and Vizcaya , which were covering the 
first line, and it was a miracle that both of them were not seriously 
damaged; for the large-caliber shells fell all around them; there 
were moments when it seemed as though some had hit them, especi¬ 
ally the Vizcaya. 

They were also perfectly acquainted with the position of the 
Mercedes , which is proved by the fact that the ships to the east, 
being the division which bombarded the Morro, were firing their 
projectiles right at the cruiser, and though protected by the hill of 
the Socapa, she received in her hull and rigging 35 shells, causing 
two fires, one of them quite extensive, being in the paint locker 
forward. 

Commander Emilio Acosta y Eyerman was directing the extin¬ 
guishing of the fire in the forecastle, when a large shell cut off his 
right leg at the hip and also his right hand, mutilating him horribly. 
But he lived for half an hour after that and kept on looking after 
the fire, as I was told by Mr. Ozamiz, who was close to him in 
those critical moments. I do not like to think of it; he had been 
a fellow-student of mine at college and our old friendship had 
always remained the same. As there was no safe place in the 
ship, his body was placed on a cot and taken to the Socapa coast; 
five soldiers who had been killed the same day were also carried 
there, and all of them were covered with the flag which they had 
been dofending and for which they had died. May he rest in peace, 
this first chief of the navy killed in this war. 

The large projectiles shot through the space across the bay, 
causing a tremendous noise which only those who heard it can 
understand; some fell on the opposite coast (to the westward), 
raising, as they exploded, clouds of dust and smoke; others could 
not be seen falling, which proves that they must have dropped in 
the hills at a great distance. This explains that they did not only 
reach the city, but went thousands of meters beyond. 

Toward evening, the ships also fired twice on Daiquiri, probably 
at the forts and the detachments in the mineral region and at Fir- 
meza, but without any effect worth mentioning. The high bat¬ 
tery of the Socapa (two 16-cm. Hontoria guns) fired 47 shots; that 
was all they could fire, because during the bombardment the ships 
were hidden most of the time through the smoke. 

The inhabitants of Cay Smith had to take refuge in the northern 
part, which is very abrupt, and many were in the water up to the 
waist; if they had not gone there, most of them would have been 
killed, for nearly all the dwellings which were located in the south¬ 
ern part suffered from the effects of the shells. The following day 
the Cay was abandoned and the inhabitants transferred to the city. 


Lieutenant Julian Garcia Duran was appointed second in com¬ 
mand of tlie cruiser Reina Mercedes; he had arrived a short time 
before in command of the merchant steamer Mejico, with torpedo 
supplies, which he landed at the port of Guantanamo. 

Later, after the Mercedes sank, this same officer was placed in 
command of the naval forces that occupied the Socapa; and later, 
of the whole navy encampment, until they were embarked and 
taken back to Spain. 


I 


XIX. 

THE FIRING CONTINUES. 


June 7th .—At daybreak nineteen ships in front of the month. 

At 9.15 the body of Commander Emilio Acosta was brought on 
shore. 

At 9.130 the funeral procession started, headed by Admiral Cer- 
vera and Generals Toral and Rubin, and including, in spite of the 
rain, the civil and military authorities of the city, delegations from 
all the different divisions, and a great many private citizens. On 
both sides of the body walked the battalion of volunteers and the 
company of guides, the only forces that were in the city, with the 
music of the Santiago regiment. 

At 6.30 p. m. the ships increased the distance that separated 
them from the coast. 

The French cable had been cut, and we were not in communica¬ 
tion with Guantanamo. 

8th .—Nineteen ships were in sight at daybreak, about 6 miles from 
the mouth. 

During the night the fleet had constantly thrown its search¬ 
lights on the coast. 

9tli .—At daybreak eighteen ships, at a distance of about 7 miles. 

The steamer Tomas Brooks delivered 25 planks at the mouth of 
the harbor, which were attached to a steel cable stretched from Cay 
Smith to Punta Soldado, the object of the planks being to keep it 
at the surface of the water; the cable was laid to prevent the pas¬ 
sage of any torpedoes which the enemy might attempt to send into 
the harbor with the entering tide. 

10th .—At daybreak the eighteen ships of the preceding day were 
to be seen about 10 miles distant. At 7 o’clock another one, a mer¬ 
chant vessel, arrived from the south. 

The Pluton and Furor went alongside the steamer Mejico , one 
at each side, to rest from the service of the night. 

At 11 the lookout made a signal, taking it down shortly after, 
that fire was being opened. Nothing was heard in the city. 

The Morro said that the enemy had fired upon Punta Berracos, 
but had stopped very soon. 


( 33 ) 



During the niglit the American fleet continued to examine the 
coast by means of the searchlights. 

11th .—Seventeen ships* some G miles distant, others 10. 

12th .—The same seventeen ships, from 5 to 6 miles distant from 
the Morro. 

13th .—Fifteen ships, 6 miles from the harbor. 

14th .—At 5.15 the enemy opened fire on the mouth of the harbor; 
it ceased at 6.50. 

The projectiles fell toward Cajuma Bay, close to the Vizcaya. 

Only one ship kept up the fire on the Morro and Socapa, both 
batteries answering it. 

At the latter battery Ensign Bruquetas and two sailors were 
slightly wounded. 

At 10 General Linares went to the Socapa and the Morro, re¬ 
turning at 12.30. 

The enemy continued the fire during the night, aiming his pro¬ 
jectiles upon the coast, especially above the mouth of the harbor. 

15th .—At daybreak seventeen hostile ships in sight, among them 
the Vesuvius, this being her first appearance before the harbor. 

The Vesuvius is a vessel of 900 tons displacement and of peculiar 
construction, being very long, narrow, and low. She is the only 
one of her class in the world, and throws, by means of guns or 
pneumatic tubes, dynamite bombs or projectiles a distance of 
about 2 miles; they are probably provided with a screw; nobody 
knows them exactly. I do not believe this vessel, though it ma}^ 
cause serious destruction, would be able to sustain a fight with 
another, even though smaller, for the reason that the range of her 
projectiles is very short and she has no protection. 

From the 7th to the 15th the hostile fleet hardly threatened the 
batteries which defended the harbor, nor the coast either, contenting 
themselves with watching it incessantly day and night. 

In the city nothing appeared to have changed, and yet the situ¬ 
ation was very far from being what it was a month ago. 

In the stores many articles were wanting, and those that could 
be had brought fabulous prices. Unfortunately, one of the first 
articles that gave out was flour, and no bread could be baked. 
Hardtack (galleta) was used instead, but only a few people could 
pay for it; there was no milk to be had, indispensable for the sick 
and for babies. The soldiers commenced to eat bread made of rice 
and rice boiled in water, which weakened them very much; and 
though they were not suffering actual hunger, everybody knew 
that calamity was not far off and was inevitable, for no provisions 
could be expected, either by land or sea. 

Fortunately, the sailors of the ships and defenses, thanks to the 
foresight of the general commandant of the naval station, were 


85 


still receiving full rations and liad tliem for some time to come, 
thanks also to the interest taken in this matter by the Comman¬ 
dant of Marine. 

The music continued to play at the Alameda and in the market 
place, hut the people, who had nothing to eat, had no desire to go 
walking, and the market place and Alameda were deserted. 

Horses and dogs were.dying before our eyes. Carriages stopped 
going about for want of horses, which the scavenger carried off at 
night, and gradually the city acquired that stamp of sadness and 
absence of life which is seen in places into which cholera and 
plagues carry sorrow and death. The situation became more 
serious every day, and the discouragement was general, for every¬ 
one knew that if the blockade should continue, the ruin of the city 
was imminent. 

I must state that while the ships of the hostile fleet were firing 
on Punta Cabrera and Mazamorra on the 7tli, 9th, and days fol¬ 
lowing, insurgent bands, commanded by their principal chiefs, 
sustained a continued musket fire on land. In these attacks they 
were repulsed with great losses. 






XX. 


THE LANDING EXPEDITION APPEALS. 


June 16th .—Eighteen ships in sight. 

At 5.45 the hostile fleet opened fire. 

At 6.15 Punta Gorda commenced firing, but stopped shortly after. 

The greater part of the projectiles dropped close to the Spanish 
fleet. 

At G.30 the fire became more intense. 

At 6.35 smoke was seen for a few minutes issuing from the In¬ 
fanta Maria Teresa. It was learned afterwards that a fragment 
of shell had caused a slight injury in the starboard gallery. 

At 6.40 Punta Gorda again opened fire; ten shots. 

At 7 the firing ceased. 

At 7.15 the Furor and Pluton , which had their steam up during 
the firing, went alongside the steamer Mejico. 

It was reported from the Morro that the ships which had been 
firing were eight in number; that the fire had been directed against 
the castle and the Socapa, both of them answering; that at the 
Morro battery a gunner had been killed and an officer and five 
soldiers (all belonging to the artillery) wounded; that at the Socapa 
two sailors had been killed and four sailors and Ensign Bruquetas 
wounded, the latter for the second time; and that one of the Hon- 
toria guns had been put out of action by debris obstructing it, but 
that the enemy had not succeeded in dismounting a single gun. 

At 11.45 the four sailors who had been wounded at the Socapa 
arrived in a boat at the royal pier and were taken to the military 
hospital, one of them, who was seriously wounded, on a stretcher 
from the firemen’s headquarters, the other three in carriages. 

At 12 a second lieutenant and a gunner arrived from the Morro 
and were also taken to the hospital. 

During the night the ships continued to illuminate the coast with 
their search lights. 

The debris was removed from the Hontoria gun, which was 
again made ready for firing. 

17th .—At 5.30 steady gun fire commenced in the distance to the 
west. It was learned that one ship was firing on Punta Cabrera. 
A few minutes later another opened fire on the Socapa. 

Thirteen ships in sight. 


( 36 ) 



The ship firing on Punta Cabrera was also firing on Mazamorra. 

At 7.30 the firing ceased. 

There was nothing further of importance during the day and the 
following night. 

18th .—Fourteen ships in sight at daybreak. The Iowa left and 
the Massachusetts , which had been absent for several days, took 
her place. 

At 7.45 p. m. gun fire was heard. 

It was learned that it was from the Socapa firing at a ship which 
had passed within a short distance and had answered. About 20 
shots were exchanged. 

19th .—Fifteen vessels in sight. 

At 7 two battle ships arrived from the south; total, 17. 

At 2.30 p. m. General Linares went to the mouth of the harbor, 
returning at 7 p.m. 

During the night the ships were again running their search lights 
along the coast and the entrance of the harbor. 

20th .—At daybreak there were 21 vessels in sight, 7 of them 
battle ships. 

The Oquendo changed her anchoring place and went farther to 
the north. 

At 12 the Morro reported that 39 hostile vessels had arrived; 
shortly after 3 more came, so that, with the 21 that were already 
opposite the Morro, there was a total of 63. 

At 12.05 a loud detonation was heard and a great deal of smoke 
was seen at the piers of Luz and San Jose; it came from the schooner 
Trafalgar , where a shell had exploded while being fired, killing a 
sailor of the steamer San Juan and wounding three of the Mortera , 
one of whom died a few minutes later. The schooner had to be run 
ashore to prevent her going down. 

Orders were received for the formation of the fourth army 
corps, in command of General Linares, composed of the division 
of Santiago, which was already under his command, and the 
division of Manzanillo. 

Another cable was stretched between the Socapa and Cay Smith, 
like the one stretched between Cay Smith and Punta Soldado, and 
twelve Bustamente torpedoes were planted, half of them between 
Cay Smith and the Merrimac , and the other six between the latter 
and Punta Soldado. 

21st .—It was learned that the 42 vessels that had arrived the 
previous day had proceeded in an easterly direction during the 
night, leaving only the former 21, most of them war ships. 

At 2.30 p. m. the Morro stated that the 42 vessels were again 
returning from the south. 


38 


Tlie cruiser Reinci Mercedes left her anchoring place at the 
Socapa and cast anchor in the hay, west of the captaincy of the 
port. 

On the 16th the American fleet had again opened fire on the 
batteries at the mouth of the harbor, and although it could not be 
compared with that of the 6th, either in intensity or duration, yet 
it had caused us two deaths at the Socapa, and two officers and 
several sailors and soldiers had been wounded there and at the 
Morro. A 32-cm. shell, which exjdoded at the former of said 
batteries, raised such a quantity of earth that it partly buried one 
of the Hontoria guns, making it useless for the time being, and 
came near burying also the men serving it. During the night the 
earth covering the gun was removed, so that it was again ready 
for service. 

The names of the Morro and Socapa have been repeated many 
times, and it has been shown that these two poor batteries were the 
main objective of the hostile fleet and had to withstand the fire of 
over 90 guns, most of them of large caliber, which they always 
answered; yet, I can not help but speak once more of the heroism, 
truly worthy of admiration, displayed by those who served them, 
constantly exposing their lives and having to watch after fighting, 
without a moment’s rest or sleep; for the enemy was always on 
the lookout for the least remission in watchfulness in order to sur¬ 
prise them and attempt a coup de main on the harbor. 

Each one of them, and the governor of the castle first of all, 
earned the gratitude of the country every day for two months. 
Their self-denial and valor kept a powerful fleet in check for sev¬ 
enty days. The resistance which the Morro and the Socapa offered 
under the prevailing circumstances is a true feat of heroism. 

On the 17th the ships reconnoitered along Punta Cabrera and 
Mazamorra, firing on the detachments of the Asiatic column. 

On the 20th, the day when the 42 vessels of the convoy appeared 
with the landing expedition, a shell exploded in the hold of the 
schooner Trafalgar , causing several deaths and injuring the hull 
of the schooner, which had to be run ashore in order to prevent 
her from sinking. 

I shall not speak at length of a matter which is of no importance, 
but will mention it briefly, because it gives an idea of the craze 
reigning at Santiago, to which the frequent bombardments, which 
must have cost at least a million dollars, gave rise. 

Whether by reason of the type of their fuzes, or because many 
of the shells did not have the requisite powder charge (I have dis¬ 
charged a 57-mm. shell myself, which had only one-eighth of it), 
certain it is that many did not explode and remained intact as 
though they had not been discharged; as they were being thrown 




89 


in such large numbers, many people wanted to keep one as a curi¬ 
osity or as a souvenir of an event which does not happen often in 
a lifetime. Some wanted them of small, others of large caliber; 
others wanted to make a collection of all sizes. I have a friend 
who called on me one evening to show me a 20-em. shell which had 


been discharged and had not suffered the least deformation. The 
fad had cost him *10 pesos, and he was as happy over it as a child 
over a new toy. But I was thoughtless enough to tell him that 
there were 32-ein. ones, and he was inconsolable. It will be under¬ 
stood from the above that the fad was being paid for dearly; and 
as capital is always made out of everything, many people made a 
business of gathering up and discharging projectiles and selling 
them. That was the cause of the unfortunate occurrence on board 
the Trafalgar ; a shell had been discharged without the necessary 
care, and what happened was but the natural consequence. 

Another monomania of this period: As the Americans kept up 
the bombardments all through the month of June, so that there 
hardly was a day when gunshots were not heard at a greater or less 
distance, people were hearing them all the time; the falling of a 
chair, the closing of a door or window, the noise of carriage wheels 
in the distance, the crying of a child—everything was taken for 
gunshots, and gunshots was all that was being talked about. 
When they finally ceased, Santiago had become so identified with 
them that people almost missed them and were surprised to hear 
them no longer. 




XXI. 


LINE OF OBSERVATIONS. 


J - 

We have now readied a period wlien the events acquire the 
greatest interest and assume exceptional importance. So far it 
was only the fleet that had been antagonizing us; and numerous 
and powerful though it was, it had threatened only one point, 
which experience showed us it did not dare attack or force. Hence¬ 
forth we shall find ourselves menaced also on land by an army 
equipped with numerous modern artillery, which, supported by 
the ships that had control of the sea and could therefore, without 
trouble, communicate with their depots and base of operations, 
and further supported by the insurgents who had control of the 
field, was constantly receiving reenforcements of men and material 
and had at its disposal everything which we, unfortunately, were 
lacking. 

From this time on the events are precipitated, so to sjieak, and 
lead with dizzy rapidity to a denouement which it is not difficult 
to foresee. In view of the exceptional location of the island of 
Cuba, we can not hope for help either from within or without; we 
can not hope for provisions nor ammunition, and without these the 
soldier can not be fed and can not fight—a sad and desperate 
situation for men who ask for nothing else and whom fate seems 
to pursue. 

When speaking of military operations and movements of troops, 
it is not always possible to give a full account of them as they 
happen; there is danger that some of the occurrences, the situation 
of the forces, and the points they defend or attack, may not be 
known. In order to obviate this, and to give the reader a better 
understanding of the events that took place later, I will give an 
outline, though perhaps incomplete, of the distribution which 
General Linares made of the forces he had at his disposal. 

It has already been stated that on the 20tli the Fourth Army 
Corps was organized, consisting of the Santiago division and the 
Manzanillo division. General Linares was made commander in 
chief, and Lieutenant Colonel Ventura Fontan, who had been chief 
of staff of the latter division, retained the same position relative to 
the corps. 


( 40 ) 



41 


General Toral, tliough in command of the division of Santiago, 
remained at the head of the military government of the city, with 
the same general staff. It may, therefore, be said that nothing 
was changed. 

From telegrams received, the enemy’s plans could he, if not accu¬ 
rately known, at least surmised, and as it ivas supposed that they 
might effect a landing at a point on the coast more or less close to 
the city, General Linares ordered the concentration of his forces so 
that they might be assigned to convenient positions. First of all, 
orders were sent from Havana to Manzanillo, by telegraph, for 
General Escario to proceed with all the forces available, and with 
the least possible delay, to Santiago de Cuba. Said general left 
Manzanillo on the 22d with 3,300 infantry, 250 cavalry, two Plas- 
encia guns and 60 transport mules. The infantry was composed 
of the battalions of Alcantara, Andalusia, Puerto Rico chasseurs 
and two battalions of the Isabel la Catdlica regiment. These 3,300 
men who, from the time they left Manzanillo, had encounters every 
day with the insurgents, who killed and wounded 97 of them, could 
not arrive here, in spite of forced marches, until the evening of 
July 3; this should not be lost sight of. 

At another place I have spoken of the scarcity of provisions in 
the city. The authorities, in order not to diminish the chances of 
assistance which they might obtain from the region under cultiva¬ 
tion, for the men as well as the horses and mules, combined the 
operations and position of the troops with the object of attempting 
to preserve that region and looking out for the enemy in all di¬ 
rections. 

With this object in view, a line of observation was established, 
as follows: To the north, from Palma Soriano through San Luis, 
El Cristo, and Socorro; to the west, from Punta Cabrera through 
Monta Real and El Cobre, on the roads which lead to the city on 
that side, and to the east, from Daiquiri through Vinent and Fir- 
meza to the harbor of Escandell. 

On the 22d the first companies of the Spanish fleet disembarked, 
with a force of about 130 men each, under orders of the third com¬ 
manders of the ships respectively; two companies were stationed 
at San Miguel de Paradas, to guard the coast west of the bay and 
assist the Socapa or the city; the third company at the Socapa, to 
reenforce that point, and the fourth and last company at Las Cruces, 
to assist the Morro, Aguadores, or the city. 

At night of the same day, the second companies disembarked, 
including men from the Mercedes and the destroyers, a total of 450, 
who, under command of Capt. Joaquin Bustamente, went the fol¬ 
lowing day to occupy the line from Dos Caminos del Cobre to the 
Plaza de Toros; that is, south and southwest of the precinct. 


42 


The only forces in the Santiago district prior to the declaration 
of the present war were nine companies of mobilized troops and 
two of the Santiago Regiment, to garrison the city and the forts of 
the precinct, besides a small number of the Civil Guard and a few 
artillerymen, and as much cavalry as was indispensable for convoy 
and other services properly belonging to the cavalry. 

When war was declared, six more companies of the Santiago 
regiment came for the purpose of commencing the fortification works 
of the precinct of the city, under the directions of the chiefs and 
officers of the corps of engineers; another company was occupying 
the position of Ermitano (east of the city) and another was at 
Socorro. 

I believe I have already stated that by orders of General Linares 
the Talavera battalion had come from Baracoa and was stationed, 
with three companies of mobilized troops, along the coast to watch 
the same, occupying Daiquiri, Siboney, the railroads, and the forts. 

The Asiatic battalion, in command of Colonel Aldea, took up its 
position of observation west of Santiago: Four companies, with 
the colonel at Punta Cabrera, covering the coast road.; another, 
with one mobilized company, occupying Mazamorra, both to be 
ready to reenforce the former four or the forces at the Socapa, if 
necessary, and to prevent in due time a landing at Cabanas; 
another occupied the camp at Monte Real, and finally another, 
with one mobilized company, garrisoned El Cobre. With these 
forces all the roads leading to Santiago from the west had to be 
covered. 

Gradually, as information was being received concerning the 
enemy’s plans, the available forces of the San Luis brigade, in 
command of General Vara de Rey, were concentrated in the 
district. 

First, four companies of the Provincial Battalion of Puerto Rico 
(No. 1) arrived, one company remaining at El Cristo and one at 
Songo, both of them occupying also the forts on the railroad of 
both towns. Later came three companies of the San Fernando 
battalion, one remaining at El Cristo and two at Palma Soriano. 
Finally, General Vara de Ray, with three companies of the twenty- 
ninth regiment (Constitucion), one company of guerrillas on foot, 
and two Plasencia guns, occupied El Caney, where there were only 
40 men of the Santiago regiment and 50 of the mobilized troops, 
leaving three companies of the twenty-ninth regiment at the towns 
of San Luis, Dos Caminos, and Moron. Two squads of cavalry 
were distributed in said three towns. 

It is only necessary to cast a glance at the chart, without much 
study, to understand that the line which our troops occupied was 
too extensive to be solidly covered and effectively defended by such 
small forces. 



43 


Why did General Linares not limit it and occupy positions closer 
to the precinct and more susceptible of effective defense? For a 
reason which outweighs all others. He could not do so without 
condemning its defenders from the outset to an inevitable disaster. 

I will repeat once more—for to this must he attributed the 
reverses we suffered—that there was nothing left in Santiago 
except rice, and only 500,000 extra cartridges outside of the regu¬ 
lar supply of the soldiers, namely, 150 each; for although there 
were many more included in the surrender of the Park, they are 
of the Remington, Argentine Mauser, and other types, and of cali¬ 
bers differing from those of the Spanish Mauser, which is the 
weapon carried by almost all of our forces. Of course, 150 car¬ 
tridges are used up very rapidly. It was the scarcity of provis¬ 
ions, confined almost entirely to rice, which, more than anything 
else, compelled General Linares to defend the line which, begin¬ 
ning at Ermitano and passing through El Caney, San Miguel de 
Lajas, Quintero Hill and the hills of La Caridad and Yeguita, 
would protect the railway to Sabanilla and Moron and the aque¬ 
duct. If the troops could have maintained this line, they would not 
have suffered for lack of water, as they did in some positions, nor 
would the food, as long as we remained in possession of the culti¬ 
vated region, have been reduced to rice bread and rice boiled in 
water, which the soldiers could not stand and which made them 
unfit for the active operations necessary in war. 

The Morro and the Socapa had to he not only occupied, hut well 
protected; they were the key to the harbor. If the enemy had 
taken possession of them, it would have been easy to remove the 
torpedoes and force the hay, and then the city and its defenders 
would necessarily have had to surrender. 

It was equally necessary to occupy Daiquiri, Siboney, and Agua- 
dores, so as not to allow the enemy to make a landing at any of 
them with impunity (as they did after all, supported by the war 
ships, at the first-named place) and gain possession of the railroad. 
For the same reasons also, it was necessary to cover the landing 
places of Cabanas and Guaicabon (near Punta Cabrera), as also 
the west coast of the bay, and preserve the railroads leading to 
the city. 

All this proves that it was not only desirable, but absolutely 
necessary to defend said line. To give it up would have meant to 
be resigned from the outset to perish from hunger, and perhaps 
from thirst, which is worse. 

If El Caney and the San Juan position had not been taken we 
should not have lost our communications with the cultivated 
region, nor would the aqueduct have been cut, and it is easy 
enough to understand how much these two things had to do with 


8630—4 




later events, and how different tlie situation would have been with¬ 
out them. Unfortunately the small number of our forces made 
it impossible to save these positions. 

The ships would no doubt have reduced the city to ashes and 
ruin, but there would have been water and more provisions, and 
the army would have been able to maintain itself and fight, at 
least until the last cartridge was gone. 

Unfortunately the insurgents, firing from ambush, as usual, 
on General (then Colonel) Escario’s column, succeeded in delaying 
its march long enough so that it could not arrive before the 1st of 
July. Fate is not always just. 


XXII. 


EVENTS OF JUNE 2 2d TO 27tii. 


* * * * * * * 

On the evening of the 21st it was learned, as has been stated, 
that the enemy was effecting a landing at Punta Berracos. 

June 22d. —At 6.30, the usual ships were opposite the month of 
the harbor; in Aguadores Bay there were two yachts and one 
monitor; at Punta Berracos, the 42 vessels of the convoy, among 
them the Saint Louis , with the Indiana. A steamer, with tugs, 
could also be seen. We therefore knew that the landing was being 
effected. We also saw the house on fire that the English had on 
San Juan river. 

At 8 the enemy opened fire and Punta Gorda answered. 

At the same time, one ship fired upon Aguadores. 

The Brooklyn , Ioiva, and Texas were firing on the Morro and 
Socapa, and the batteries were answering. 

At noon the firing ceased in the mouth of the harbor. 

Punta Gorda only fired five shots. 

The firing continued on the coast toward the east. 

During the day the first companies of the Spanish fleet (4 com¬ 
panies, about 520 men) disembarked. At midnight the second 
companies (about 450 men) disembarked. It has already been 
stated what part of the ground they were to cover. 

At 11 o’clock p. m. two shots were heard and a loud detonation, 
followed by a noise resembling that of a screw revolving in the 
air. Shortly after, another similar detonation was heard. 

23d. —Opposite the Morro entrance, and at a distance of about 6 
miles from it, 8 battle ships, 2 destroyers, the Vesuvius , and 8 
merchant vessels. The rest, as many as 63, continued the landing 
on the coast, protected by some of the warships. 

At 2.30 a yacht, with a white flag, left the fleet and approached 
the Morro. The tug Colon went out to speak with her. At this 
time there were 24 ships opposite the harbor. 

During the night the enemy examined the coast again by means 
of search lights. 

2IJh. —Eight battle ships, 2 destroyers, the Vesuvius (which, at 
11 o’clock on the previous night, had thrown two dynamite bombs 

( 45 ) 



46 


on the port, fortunately withont doing any harm) and 12 merchant 
vessels, are guarding the mouth of the harbor, stretched out from 
Aguadores to Punta Cabrera. The others, as many as 03, among 
them six war ships protecting them, continued the landing at Dai¬ 
quiri. 

The yacht that came up yesterday with a flag of truce was sent 
by Admiral Sampson, who inquired whether the lieutenant who 
had been made prisoner was being kept in the Morro. Mr. Concas, 
who was delegated to parley, answered evasively, as was natural, 
that the prisoner was in a safe place. 

At 11.55 the Brooklyn opened a slow fire on Daiquiri and adjoin¬ 
ing points on the coast. 

At 1.30 the firing ceased. 

At 1.55 it was again heard in the same direction, ceasing at 2.30. 

At night the hostile fleet used the projectors again. 

25th —At 4 a. m. 14 shots were heard in the direction of Dai¬ 
quiri. It was presumed that they were firing on General Rubin’s 
column. 

At daybreak there were at the mouth of the harbor 8 battle 
ships and 12 merchant vessels. 

From 12.30 to 2 o’clock the hostile fleet kept up a slow fire on 
the coast from Aguadores to Daiquiri. 

It was noticed that the vessels landing troops or material were 
going back and forth, so we felt sure that new reenforcements 
were constantly arriving from the United States. 

26th. —At daybreak the Netv York , Brooklyn , Indiana , Oregon , 
Massachusetts , Texas, Vesuvius , 1 monitor, and 6 merchant ves¬ 
sels were in front of the harbor. To the east, in the direction of 
Berracos, 11 steamers could be seen, and 8 at Daiquiri, inside of the 
roadstead. 

The Vesuvius had discharged two bombs the preceding night, 
one completely destroying the house of the lighthouse keeper, the 
other seriously damaging the fortress, wounding three sailors of 
the Mercedes and a soldier of the garrison. 

27tli. —The same ships blockading the harbor as the preceding 

During the night the Vesuvius threw 3 dynamite bombs, doing 
no damage, as they fell in the water, although inside of the harbor. 

The search lights were going again during the night. 

On the evening of the 21st the enemy had commenced to effect 
the disembarkation of the landing expedition (which according to 
New York newspapers consisted of 50,000 men), and, in order to do 
so in perfect security, even though they had in all 63 vessels, count¬ 
ing both merchant and war ships, they landed them at Punta Berra¬ 
cos, 20 miles from Santiago, in spite of there being no water and 


47 


no roads, because our troops, few in number, could not cover sucli 
an extensive region. 

To assist the landing, the ships were firing on the whole coast 
from Berracos, east of Santiago, to Punta Cabrera, 27 miles west. 
How could we cover so many threatened points and occupy so 
extensive a territory ? Impossible, even if we had had much supe¬ 
rior forces than we did. 

The battle ships, always in imposing numbers, remained in front 
of the harbor so as to keep our fleet in. The war ships were pro¬ 
tecting the landing, and as they controlled the sea it was impossi¬ 
ble for soldiers with small arms to prevent it. 

How many men did the Americans disembark ? 

As Santiago was cut off from the rest of the world, or almost 
so, it was not easy to ascertain the exact number, nor was it neces¬ 
sary. The vessels of the convoy, as soon as they had landed men 
and material, returned to the United States and came back with 
fresh contingents. But it may be safely stated that the first 
expedition consisted of at least 15,000 men, with more or less war 
material. 

* * * ^ * * * 

Every night, with great regularity (between 11 and 2), the 
Vesuvius threw her three dynamite bombs on the batteries at the 
mouth of the harbor, with the greatest humanity possible, for it - 
will be remembered that such was the pretext of this war. For 
that purpose she would come close to the coast, accompanied by 
another ship, usually a battle ship—for the mission of the Vesu¬ 
vius is only the offensive, she has no defensive qualities—and as 
soon as she was within convenient distance she would discharge 
three tubes at regular intervals. If the projectiles dropped close 
to a battery its ruin was certain, for one must see the effects of 
one of these projectiles to understand them. Fortunately, they 
do not appear to be very sure, either in range or in aim. 

On the sea, matters continued in the same condition. Let us now 
see the operations carried out on land by the Army forces during 
this period, the latter events taking place at diametrically opposed 
points. 

On the 22d Daiquiri and Siboney were bombarded by the ships. 
At the same time the enemy appeared at the former place. As the 
force guarding it could not cope with the ships, it retreated by way 
of Vinnent to Firmeza, gathering up all the detachments from the 
forts. 

General Rubin, with three companies of the Provisional Battalion 
of Porto Rico, three of San Fernando, and two artillery guns 
(Plasencia), j)roceeded to Siboney. There he received orders to 
proceed with his column and with the whole force in the mineral 


48 


region to the heights of Sevilla before daybreak, where they were 
to take position in three echelons, the foremost one under Com¬ 
mander Alcaniz, formed of the three companies of Porto Rico and 
one mobilized company. 

On the 23d this echelon alone checked the enemy’s advance in 
the morning, and again in the evening, the echelon having been 
reenforced by one company from San Fernando, half engineers, and 
two gnns. When the battle was over the forces withdrew to their 
former positions, the echelon remaining on the same site. 

At daybreak on the 24th the echelon was reenforced by two com¬ 
panies from Talavero, and not only resisted a strong attack of the 
enemy, but also forced the latter to retreat. 

In spite of this advantage they received orders to withdraw be¬ 
cause the enemy was approaching the Morro by rail, and as there 
were not forces enough to oppose him, it would have been sur¬ 
rounded. In compliance with the order received the column with¬ 
drew to the city. 

The official report of this battle is as follows: 

“General Rubin’s column under orders of the commander in 
chief of the Fourth Army Corps was attacked yesterday at noon 
and in the evening. 

“ This morning considerable forces with artillery guns made a 
resolute attack and were repulsed, losing many men. 

“ On our side we had in the two days seven dead; Josd Lancds, 
captain of the provisional 'battalion of Porto Rico, and Zenon 
Borregon, second lieutenant of the same battalion, seriously 
wounded; Francisco las Tortas, first lieutenant of the regiment of 
Royal Artillery, slightly wounded.; two privates seriously wounded, 
two slightly wounded. Various contusions.” 

Later on it was learned that the forces which attacked General 
Rubin’s column, or rather the echelon of the same, under Com¬ 
mander Alcaniz, were as follows: 

The seventh, twelfth, and seventeenth regiments of United States 
infantry, the second Massachusetts, the seventy-first New York, 
and 16 dismounted squadrons. 

On the 26th the following was published: 

“General order of the Fourth Army Corps, dated June 26, at 
Santiago de Cuba: 

‘ £ Soldiers: We left the mineral region because I did not wish to 
sacrifice your lives in vain in unequal battle, with musket fire, 
against the pompous superiority of the enemy, who was fighting 
us under cover of his armored ships, armed with the most modern 
and powerful guns. 

“The enemy, rid of our presence at the points referred to, has 
already landed his troops and proposes to take the city of Santiago. 


49 


\J 


44 The encounter is at hand and it will take place under equal 
conditions. 

* “ Your military virtues and your valor are the best guarantee of 
success. 

4 4 Let us defend the right, ignored and trampled upon by the 
Americans, who have united themselves with the Cuban rebels. 

“ The nation and the army look to us. 

“More than a thousand sailors, disembarked from the fleet, will 
assist us. Volunteers and firemen will take part in the task of 
repulsing and defeating the enemies of Spain. 

4 4 The other division of this army corps is hastening toward us to 
reenforce us. 

44 I make no recommendations, because I feel sure that all will vie 
in the defense of their coast with firmness and resolve; but I will 
say that those assigned to any position, he it in the precincts of the 
city or at the foremost points, must stand firm at any cost, without 
vacillating, without thinking of retreating, but only of saving the 
honor of our arms. 

4 4 1 shall comply with my duties, and, in conclusion, I say with 
all, Long live Spain ! 

“Linares. 

44 The foregoing was published to-day, by order of His Excellency, 
for the information of all. 

“Ventura Font an, 

44 Lieutenant Colonel , chief of staff” 

In order to convey a better understanding of the foregoing ojjer- 
ations of General Rubin’s column, I will give below a copy of the 
instructions and orders which said general received from General 
Linares, all of which were drawn up in camp and written with 
lead pencil. 

They are as follows: 

“Poso, June 23 , 1898. 

44 Peasants have handed to me the paper which you wrote to me, 
and we have heard firing since a quarter to five, and afterwards 
gun fire., 

44 1 have impressed upon Colonel Borry to guard well the path 
or road to the Redonda, where he is encamped, so that the troops of 
the line, if they should find Sardinero occupied, can take that road 
to the Redonda. 

44 1 have sent to Santiago for all the transport mules and 10 carts, 
which will be at your camp by 7.30 or 8 o’clock. You will have 
the sick ready, and also the ammunition, so that they may at once 
be taken to Santiago, with the same convoy that will go with the 
mules. 


50 




“ Make arrangements to liave tke first mess of tlie morning taken 
there and then you will receive further orders. 

“Linares. 

“To General Antero Rubin.” 

(A seal. “Army of Operations of Santiago—4th Army Corps— 
General Staff.”) 

“After eating the first mess you will march with the whole 
column to Santiago, effecting a retreat from that point by echelons 
as carefully and slowly as may he necessary, so as to he in good 
condition to repulse any attack of the enemy. 

“ The Talavero Battalion will go to Sueno and will there meet 
the chief of the town, who will indicate to it the points to he 
occupied. 

“The Porto Rico Battalion, with the two mobilized companies 
from the mineral region, will proceed to Canadas and will there 
receive orders concerning the points it is to occupy, and the San 
Fernando Battalion is to proceed to Central Benefico, and will also 
receive instructions. The section of artillery will go the quarters 
at Dolores. The section of engineers will proceed to Cruces, tak¬ 
ing quarters in the offices of the mineral company. 

“ Linares. 

“ Poso, June &£, 1898 . 

“ Note: The captain of engineers is to return to Santiago with 
the convoy of sick and to report to Colonel Caula. 

“To General Antero del Rubin.” 

(Seal. “Army of Operations of Santiago—4th Army Corps— 
General Staff.” 

% 

“You have already received orders to retreat, which is to he 
done when the convoy of sick has started under the protection of 
two mobilized companies and one Talavero company. 

“The whole impedimenta will retreat first, and upon arriving 
at Santiago, they will go to the points designated, and with the 
three echelons of Porto Rico, San Fernando, and Talavero, you 
will make the retreat, alternating by echelons in such manner that 
when the forward echelon leaves a position the other two will he 
in position, until arriving at Santiago. There I shall await you. 

“ Linares. 


“To General Rubin.” 


XXIII. 


END OF THE MONTH OF JUNE. 


June 28th .—The Morro said that the Massachusetts , which had 
been gone, had returned; that the Iowa had left instead, and that 
at 7 a. m. a merchant vessel was embarking the sick of the fleet, 
estimated at about 50, judging from what could be made out with 
the help of glasses; that to the east, at a distance, the ships were 
firing slowly. 

During the night they continued to watch with search lights. 

29th .—The Iowa returned. 

In the evening, firing on Daiquiri was heard. 

30th .—The same ships are blockading the harbor. 

The Morro said that at 3 p. m. a steamer was sighted to the 
south; that, when she saw the American fleet, she shaped her 
course eastward at full speed; that a yacht and a battleship went 
out to chase her; that the latter returned with the steamer which, 
with the American flag hoisted, joined the convoy at Daiquiri. 

At 8 p. m. a few musket shots were heard in the direction of 
Campo de Marte (east of the city). 

Later the sound came from the Plaza de Toros (northeast). 

At 9 firing was again heard at the cemetery (to the north). 

Nothing further occurred. . 

The last three days of the month of June are devoid of interest 
and we enjoyed unusual quiet. So much had the people of San¬ 
tiago become accustomed to the sound of gunshots that they almost 
missed them. 

But how true it is that when a calm comes after a storm, it is 
often only the precursor of another storm. The enemy was prepar¬ 
ing to begin the month of July in a manner that Santiago de Cuba 
will remember many a day. 

The hostile fleet continued to antagonize the coast as usual. 
But without neglecting their main objective and their constant 
care, that of watching our fleet, which, being short of provisions, 
would sooner or later be compelled to take some decisive action, 
they were gathering at the entrance of the harbor a large number 
of their most powerful ships, and the army, no doubt intrenching 
itself at Daiquiri, so as to have another shelter besides that of the 



52 


ships, and a safe base of operations, was preparing to attack the 
city, supported by the insurgents who had joined them in large 
numbers under their leaders Calixto Garcia, Demetrio Castillo, 
Cebrecos, and others less known. 

This is proved by the musket fire which was heard a short dis¬ 
tance from the city, to the northeast, on the night of the 30th. 

From the news we had received from the Morro it might have 
been inferred that about 3 o’clock in the afternoon of that same 
day, the hostile fleet had captured a merchant vessel, which, after 
the American flag had been hoisted upon her, joined the convoy; 
but this is not probable. Aside from the fact that the flag of a ship 
is not changed as easily as that, the truth would have become 
known sooner or later. It is more probable that it was a vessel that 
was not expected and they went out to reconnoitre. That is my 
opinion about this incident, which, in reality, is not of much 
importance. 

A few words more about the Vesuvius that gave us so much 
trouble for a few nights—that time, it seems, suiting her best to 
carry out her exploits. This ship is the only one of her class; her 
projectiles and the apparatus throwing them are not known, and 
she has made her debut here. One of the proj ectiles which fell on the 
northern slope of the Socapa, tore up trees right and left for a dis¬ 
tance of about 20 metres. From a certain distance, as I could see 
the day I went to the Mercedes , it looked as though a road had 
been opened across the mountain. 

Another, which fell a short distance from the one just referred 
to, made an excavation, not very deep, but very wide; I was told 
that it would hold twenty horses. % This would seem to indicate that 
the screw with which they are provided keeps on re volving even on 
solid ground.* 

Still another dropped in the water, but close to one of the destroy¬ 
ers, which was violently shaken, as also the Mercedes , anchored at 
a short distance. I heard this from the commander of the former 
and the officers of the latter. 

The forces of the army which, as has been stated, abandoned the 
mineral region, not being able to maintain it, concentrated in the 
city, preserving, as was indispensable, the line from Aguadores to 
Cruces, after destroying the bridge at the former point. The line 
(4 kilometers) was covered by six companies of the Santiago regi¬ 
ment and two of mobilized troops, a total contingent of about 800 
men. 


* The reference to the “ screw ” in this paragraph probably refers to the vanes 
or feathers on the rear end of these shells. They are for the purpose of <nvin°- 
the shell rotation in its flight, and being fixed to the shell they have no inde¬ 
pendent motion.—O. N. I. 




53 




The advance post of Caney (a league and a half—about 6 miles— 
from the city), in command of General Vara de Rey, was defended 
by three companies of the battalion 44 Constitucion ” (the 29th), 
one company of guerrillas on foot, in all 430 men, 40 soldiers of 
the Santiago regiment and 50 of the mobilized troops, being a total 
of 520 men. 

The line of the precinct (9 kilometers), extending from Dos 
Caminos del Cobre, west of the city, to the fort of Punta Blanca, 
to the east, on the seashore, was defended by the following forces: 


Corps of sailors from tlie fleet (four second companies).. 458 

Four companies of the Provisional Battalion of Puerto Rico_ 450 

Talavera Battalion, No. 4 (Peninsular)_ 850 

Four companies of the San Fernando Battalion, No. 11_ 440 


Total, army........2,198 

Three companies of mobilized troops.... 330 

V olunteers....... 440 


Total ....2, 968 


Also a small number of gunners, for there was not a sufficient 
number to serve the guns installed, the number and place of which 
has been mentioned. It may therefore be said that there were, in 
round numbers, 3,000 men. 

This was the fighting force. Within the city was the cavalry 
force (for which the ground, being hilly and cut up by trenches, 
was not adapted), and a small force of the civil guard assigned to 
duty in the city, and the firemen with their engines in readiness. 

This line is divided into sections in command of colonels. 

Of the 3,000 men defending it, two companies, one of the Pro¬ 
visional Battalion of Puerto Rico and the other of the Talavera 
Battalion, defended the advance position at San Juan, one being 
assigned to the right, the other to the left side of the road. 

Finally, at the Socapa, that is, at points in an opposite direction 
from that line, there were 400 men, 450 at the Morro, and 120 at 
Punta Gorda. It must be remembered that these three positions 
overlook the entrance of the harbor, and are its key, and must for 
that reason be maintained at any cost; and these forces were in¬ 
dispensable there, as the enemy might attack them, as indeed he 
did attack them the next day. 

The same day, the 30tli, the following telegram, addressed to 
the aid of marine (ayudante de marina) of that district, was re¬ 
ceived at the comandancia de marina from Manzanillo: 

“Commander Marine, Santiago: 

“Last evening, for about an hour, we sustained in the waters of 
this harbor a battle against three hostile vessels of medium ton¬ 
nage, which passed, at a distance of about a mile from the head of 
the piers, in a northeasterly direction, under low steam. 












54 


“ The following took part: Gunboats Guantanamo , Estrella , and 
Delgado-Parejo, under my command, and a group of vessels that 
were disabled, consisting of the pontoon Maria and gunboats Cuba 
Espanola and Guardian. With the former three we arrived in 
time at the other group, as the enemy passed by, who, finding him¬ 
self attacked, stopped his progress only a short time on account of 
an injury which our vessels had inflicted on the second of theirs, 
which made it necessary for the third one to tow her to windward, 
and then, with slow speed, though keeping up a steady fire during 
the retreat, they doubled the headland northeast of the Manza¬ 
nillo Cays, heading north, and soon disappeared from sight. The 
city cooperated efficiently with the few guns it has. We had two 
dead, two slightly wounded, and one bruised, on the Delgado- 
Parejoj two slightly wounded and two contusions on the other 
ships; in the city, a few wounded; injuries to all the ships, but 
not material. 

“Barred a.” 


XXIV. 


BATTLES OF EL CANEY AND SAN JUAN. 


July 1st .—At 7 gun and musket fire were being heard in the 
direction of the Plaza de Marte (east of the city). 

According to the Morro the Minneapolis arrived to reenforce 
the hostile fleet. 

At the commandancia de marina we could hear a slow gun and 
steady musket fire in the direction of Campo de Marte. 

The enemy had a captive balloon, from which he observed our 
positions; from the Reina Mercedes headquarters (converted into 
a hospital) it could be plainly seen. It was in the direction of 
Sevilla. 

The American fleet is firing from Aguadores, the greater part 
of the projectiles passing over the city. Others fall inside, some 
exploding and some not. Many have already fallen in the houses, 
among others a 20-cm. shell, which fell in the house of the chief 
pilot of the port, but did not explode. The ships firing from 
Aguadores are the New York and the Oregon. 

The streets of the city are almost deserted; only soldiers and 
volunteers are seen as they go to their posts. As usual, many 
projectiles are falling in tne bay near our fleet. 

The firing from the ships ceased at 11. 

At 2 intense musket-fire was heard in the direction of El Caney; 
at 2:30 also gun-fire. 

By 3 o’clock the musket-fire became steadier; constant volleys 
were being heard; at 4 it became less intense. 

'" At 10 p. m. General Cervera left his ship, returning at 12. 

On July 1st, at 6 a. m., the nucleus of the hostile army under 
command of General Shafter, and which must have consisted of 
at least 15,000 men, with many modern guns, without including 
the insurgent parties, attacked the lines of the precinct east and 
east-northeast of the city, that is El Caney, defended by General 
Vera de Rey with 520 men and two Plasencia guns, and the position 
of San Juan, occupied by two companies comprising 250 soldiers. 

The attack which the Americans made with 12,000 men, as stated 
by themselves, was commanded by General Wheeler, second in 
command of the army. 


( 55 ) 



56 


y 

A brigade of 3,500 men, also under the orders of said General 
Wheeler, and supported by another, directed its efforts upon El 
Caney, while Colonel Chaffee with 2,000 men attacked the hill and 
fort of San Juan. 

The Americans, it must be acknowledged, fought that day with 
truly admirable courage and spirit. The houses of El Caney, 
which General Vara with his 520 men converted into as many 
fortresses, threw forth a hail of projectiles upon the enemy, while 
one company after another, without any protection, rushed with 
veritable fury upon the city. The first company having been deci¬ 
mated, another appeared, then a third, and still another, and those 
soldiers resembled moving statues (if I may be permitted that 
expression for want of a better) rather than men; but they met 
heroes, and although the houses had been riddled with bullets 
by the artillery and musketry, and although the streets were 
obstructed with dead and wounded, El Caney had been converted 
into a veritable volcano, vomiting forth lava and making it impos¬ 
sible to go near it. 

Both sides being short of forces and out of breath, almost with¬ 
out having stirred from their relative positions, the battle ceased 
for some time, and General Yara de Bey took advantage of this 
circumstance to have his soldiers reform the lines and again get 
ready for the battle. 

General Linares, who was repulsing the attacks at the position 
of San Juan, upon learning the result of these assaults, warmly 
congratulated the handful of lions in these words: “When the 
American army attacked El Caney they had not counted on a 
general of Yara de Rey’s stamp, and on troops as fiery and inured 
to warfare as those he had under his command.” 

The fight commenced once more and the enemy attacked again 
and again, being always repulsed, but as we had no reserve forces, 
and the Americans, on the contrary, had a great many, the battle 
was no longer possible under these circumstances. The General 
was wounded almost simultaneously in both legs by two musket 
balls, and as he was being carried away on a stretcher, the bullets 
falling around him like hail, he was killed by a third one, at the 
same moment as two of the men who were carrying him. The 
greater part of the commanders and officers (among them two rela¬ 
tives of the General) were dead or wounded, as also the majority 
of the soldiers. Finally, at 7 p. m., the commander being dead 
and those 520 men having been reduced to less than 100 and most 
of these slightly wounded and bruised, that handful of heroes, for 
want of forces and a commander, retreated from the site, which 
for ten hours they had been defending without being able to get 
any reenforcements, for there were none to be had, and the enemv 


57 


J 


occupied the position on which he, in his turn, had made such a 
bold attack. 

Of the 520 defenders of El Caney only 80 returned, most of them 
crippled and bruised. The Americans acknowledged that they 
had 900 casualties. 

As has been stated, 2,000 men under the command of Colonel 
Chaffee, well protected, attacked in the morning the position of 
San Juan with the same spirit and enthusiasm with which Wheel¬ 
er’s men made the attack on El Caney. 

Our headquarters were situated in an excellent position, at the 
crossing of the roads to El Caney and Pozo. General Linares had 
no available reserves; he therefore formed the echelon close to the 
positions of San Juan where he could observe the movements of 
the enemy and assist personally at points where his presence might 
be necessary. 

With him was General Ordonez with two rapid-fire guns. 

In the foremost echelon at San Juan was Colonel Jos6 Baquero* 
of the Simancas regiment of infantry, who had come from Guam 
tJnamo with a message, and could not return on account of th& 
blockade. This echelon was two companies strong, and before the 
Americans opened fire, it was reenforced by another company. It 
is here that Colonel Ordonez was, with the rapid-fire division; the 
position being defended by 300 infantry and two guns. 

The echelon nearest San Juan consisted of three companies of 
Talavero, one company with General Linares to the right of the 
Pozo road, forming an angle, in order to prevent a surrounding 
movement on the part of the enemy from the right of San Juan; 
another at the angle of the two roads referred to, and a third at 
Veguita toward El Caney, crossing their fire with that of the forces 
at Sueno. 

In view of the small numbers of our forces and the ever increas¬ 
ing numbers of those of the Americans and their war material, we 
reenforced our positions by some trenches, under shelter of which 
we might be able to prolong the fight for a longer time. 

The cavalry formed the third line at the fort of Canosa, pro¬ 
tected by a small hill. 

After the cannonade of the morning, in which our guns with 
accurate aim succeeded in causing the enemy many casualties and 
silencing the fire of one of his batteries erected at Pozo, and when 
the Americans had brought together considerable forces of infantry, 
they attacked about noon with cannon, machine-gun, and musket 
fire. 

The situation of the line commanded by Baquero was critical. 
Colonel Ordonez and the commander of the Porto Pico battalion, 
Mr. Lamadrid, had been wounded. One-lialf of the officers had 


58 


V 

also fallen under the action of the lead that was pouring down 
upon the line. The enemy was advancing in large and compact 
masses, firmly resolved to take the positions, but Baquero, the 
brave soldier, who had distinguished himself so highly in the cam¬ 
paign, was there, keeping up by his example the spirit of the 
troops, almost annihilated by hunger and fatigue, and decimated 
by the clouds of bullets and grapesliot. 

At this critical moment the cavalry was ordered to advance rap¬ 
idly in order to protect the retreat of Colonel Baquero’s forces and 
save the artillery if possible. Lieutenant Colon-el Sierra hastened 
to carry out the order, as Commander Arraiz had done before him 
at San Juan. 

The line which General Linares commanded personally now 
formed the vanguard. With his assistance the General’s aids and 
his chief of staff had to organize the remnants of the first line. 

It was necessary to maintain that position at any cost, for its 
loss would give the enemy free entrance into the city. The brave 
men of the first line were retreating. Colonel Baquero had dis¬ 
appeared, killed, no doubt, when he led that retreat under the hail 
of grapeshot and lead. The enemy was advancing in compact 
masses, and running at what was now the first line. Fortunately 
the fire of our infantry, accurately aimed, compelled the Ameri¬ 
cans to recede, and they retreated behind the positions of San 
Juan. At that moment General Linares and the brave com¬ 
mander of infantry, Arraiz, fell wounded; the latter officer, who 
had already shed his blood at Cacarajfcara, was one of the most 
beautiful examples of the army. 

While these cruel battles of El-Caney and San Juan were carried 
on the enemy sent forces against our whole line, for the purpose, no 
doubt, of harassing us and making the attack more general. 

The San Juan forces tried once more to recover themselves. 
Others came to their assistance, among them the company of 
marines which had been stationed at the Plaza de Toros with Cap¬ 
tain Bustamente; but the enemy was already strongly occupying 
the position, our forces were scant, and success was impossible. 
Our artillery was steadily firing at many points of the line, load¬ 
ing the guns (old ones, as has been stated) without any protection, 
but the fire was extremely slow and therefore of little efficacy. 

At 3.30 p. m. I went toward the Campo de Marte, impatient to 
learn what had happened. At the Plaza de Dolores I met General 
Linares. His arm, which had been seriously wounded in the first 
trenches, as stated, had been dressed at the military hospital and 
he was now being taken to his house on a stretcher, escorted by a 
few horsemen. 


59 


When I arrived at tlie end of Enramadas street and was only a 
few feet from a trench of the third line, covered by a section of 
volunteers, I saw part of the battlefield. The musket fire wag 
very slow, and although Santa Ursula, situated to the right and 
somewhat in the rear of the trenches referred to, was firing as rap* 
idly as its muzzle-loading guns permitted, it will be easily under' 
stood that there was no new attack that day. 

I then went to the headquarters of the cavalry, at the entrance 
of El Caney road, where a section of the cavalrymen were ready to 
hasten wherever they might he ordered. 

It may he said that the battle was at an end and many com¬ 
manders and officers were arriving, all tired out and almost dying 
from thirst. Among others, I saw Commander Irles, of the 
general staff, who had had either one or two horses killed undeT 
him, and there I learned that the number of commanders and offi¬ 
cers wounded had been comparatively very large. Mr. Molina, 
lieutenant colonel of the civil guard, arrived and said that Com¬ 
mander Bustamente of the navy had been seriously wounded and 
was being carried on a stretcher. My consternation may b^ 
imagined. I hurried out to meet him and found him a tew min- 
utes later. In spite of the heat, he had been wearing his blue- 
cloth suit in the fight, by which he could easily be distinguished 
from all others. He was covered with blood, pale and disfigured, 
his eves closed, and without his sabre and revolver. I learned 
that before he was wounded his horse was killed under him and 
his hat shot through. I accompanied him to the military hos¬ 
pital. In spite of his insignias of a commander, nobody paid 
much attention to him. This can be readily understood, for that 
dav, in a short time, over 300 wounded had been received, and 
they were still coming. It was difficult to find beds and the 
attendant personnel, although increasing, was not sufficient to 
look after all. 

I succeeded in finding Antonio Canaz, the surgeon of marine, 
whom I know, and in whom I have unlimited confidence, and 
thanks to him, the wounded man was placed on a bed and his 
clothes taken off. They had to be cut with scissors. The wound 
was in the right side of the abdomen; his legs were covered with 
blood. The position of the bullet, the aspect of the wounded man, 
and above all the look with which Dr. Oanaz answered mine, left 
me no doubt. I knew that he had only a few moments to live and 
I left the hospital deeply affected. 

I will add that, as the hospital was situated in the sector 
attacked by the enemy and neai the trenches, being outside the 
city, musket balls were falling in great quantities in the court 
and on the roof; later on, shells were flying over it in all 
directions. 


8630 - 5 



60 


As lias been seen, two battle sliips from Aguadores were throw¬ 
ing projectiles upon the city and the bay, causing victims among 
the inhabitants and damages to the buildings. As I went to the 
captaincy of the port in the morning when the firing commenced, 
I saw at the ambulance improvised at the Bottino pharmacy, a 
woman who was having her head dressed, which had been struck 
by a fragment of shell. The wound, although not deep, was wide, 
and looked as though made with a razor. 

At nightfall the firing ceased along the whole line. 

Such were the battles of that day, so serious by reason of the 
blood that had been shed, as well as by their results. 

With the loss of El Caney, we lost the line which it had been 
so imperative for us to keep, and also the aqueduct and the region 
under cultivation—that is, provisions and water. We had to con¬ 
fine ourselves to the defense of the precinct, knowing full well 
that, though the sad end might be held off for a day or two longer, 
there was no possibility of avoiding it. 

Our casualties were as follows: 

Killed: Brigadier General Joaquin Vara de Rey, 3 commanders, 
12 officers, and 78 men. 

Missing: Colonel of Infantry Josd Baquero, 4 officers, and 116 
men. The colonel was probably killed, but this could not be 
verified. 

Prisoners: Two officers. 

Wounded: Lieutenant General Arsenio Linares Pombo, 6 com¬ 
manders, 30 officers, and 339 men. 

(Among the wounded officers was Colonel of Engineers Caula 
and Colonel of Artillery Ordonez.) 

TOTAL CASUALTIES. 


Generals.. 2 

Commanders. 10 

Officers. 48 

Men. 533 


Total..... 593 


Almost one-fifth of the combatants covering the whole line, and 
the whole line was not even attacked, but only a sector of it; con¬ 
sequently not all of them fought. 

The casualties of the enemy, as acknowledged by themselves, 
were: 


In tlie attack on El Caney..... 900 

In the attack on San Juan.._ _.... 432 

At other points of attack....*_ 328 


Total.-..... 1,760 













61 


■V 


In these cruel battles the army inspired the enemy with respect 
and true admiration, perhaps because he had supposed that they 
fought in the same manner as the insurgents. The foregoing is 
my firm conviction, because I have seen and observed the events 
which I narrate and have dwelt much upon them. 

On the 1st day of July the Americans fought, as I have stated, 
without protection and with truly admirable courage, but they 
did not fight again as they did that day. They entrenched them¬ 
selves and set up their artillery as fast as they received it, and did 
not again come out from behind their fortifications. Did they 
think on that first day that all they had to do was to attack our 
soldiers en masse to put them to flight? God knows. 

It was difficult to convince them that only 520 men had been 
defending El Caney for ten hours. When doubt was no longer 
possible their admiration had no limits. When they entered San¬ 
tiago de Cuba, the American soldiers and ours looked upon each 
other without any prejudice or jealousy, perhaps because they 
knew that both had fought like brave men, and whenever the 
Americans saw one of our men of the twenty-ninth (the number 
of the battalion “ Constitucion,” which had defended the city, 
and has been referred to so many times) they would call him, 
look at him, and treat him with great admiration, wondering 
perhaps, how so simple a soldier could do such great things. 

The men of the twenty-ninth, known to have done something 
worth doing, were loved and feasted by everyone and spent whole 
hours with the Americans, who did not understand them, but 
applauded everything they said, on the assumption, perhaps, that 
he who is brave must also be bright. 

Incidents like these I saw, not once, but a hundred times, and 
they have made me believe and say what I have stated. I maybe 
mistaken, but I do not believe it, because I have also noticed that 
the Yankees treat the insurgents, although they are their allies, 
very differently. Besides, I am only citing facts, and anyone can 
construe them to his own satisfaction. 

From the foregoing, it is reasonable to believe that when 520 men 
maintained themselves at El Caney for ten hours, and 250 at San 
Juan for four hours, if Escario could have been there that day, so 
that there had been 3,000 men more in our lines, neither El Caney 
nor San Juan would have been lost, though attacked by almost the 
whole hostile army. 

General Linares surrendered the command to General Toral. 

In the battle of July 1, General Rubin, who commanded the 
forces of San Juan and Portillo del Caney, had his horse killed 
under him at the latter place at 5 o’clock p. m. 



XXV. 


ACTIONS OF THE 2d AND 3d. 


July 2d .—At 5 o’clock gun and musket fire commenced, well 
sustained in tlie direction of the land. 

At 6 the hostile fleet opened fire on the Morro and the Socapa. 
The greater part of the projectiles fell in the bay and on our fleet. 

The firing ceased at 8.30. 

Punta G-orda, which also opened fire, discharged 8 shots. 

The musket fire was intense. 

At 8.15 Punta Gorda again opened fire. At the same time the 
Pluton started up toward the mouth of the harbor. The musket 
fire ceased. 

At 9.30 the military governor said by telephone: “I ask your 
excellency to send a boat, so that by going as close to the coast as 
possible, the enemy may be checked at San Antonio and Plaza de 
Toros.” At this time the enemy opened musket fire in the same 
direction. It ceased shortly after. 

The companies of the fleet ^embarked again. A pilot was sent 
to each one of the ships. 

The body of sailors that disembarked was protected in a line of 
trenches by Colonel Aldea’s column (Asiatic battalion), which 
withdrew from the coast to the city. 

At 8 o’clock four wounded from the Socapa were brought to 
the pier. A shell which exploded on one of the guns killed three 
men and wounded six, completely disabling the mount of the 
Hontoria gun, which could no longer be used. Among the 
wounded was Ensign Fernandez Pina, who was in command of the 
battery. 

At 1.30 a slow gun fire was heard in the distance. 

The French consul, on horseback, with a flag of his nation on a 
very long pole, left for Cuabitas, followed by many people. 

During the firing several projectiles of all calibers fell on the 
city. 

At 3.15 musket and gun fire was being heard in the direction of 
Campo de Marte. The line of fire was very extensive and the 
musket fire intense. 


( 62 ) 




63 


At 4 o’clock the musket fire ceased, only the gun fire being 
heard now. 

At 4.40 musket fire was again opened; volleys could he heard at 
intervals. 

At 6 the firing ceased. 

At 7 musket fire broke out again; ceasing at 7.30. 

At 8.30 two blazes could he seen at tdie top of Monte Real to the 
west. 

At 9.45 the enemy opened a violent musket and gun fire from 
the Plaza de Toros to the Campo de Marte (from east to east-north¬ 
east). To the left (Plaza de Toros) frequent volleys could he 
heard. 

At 10.30 the musket and gun fire ceased. 

The night was extremely dark. From 10 to 11.30 the ships of 
our fleet spoke hy means of the ardois (light signals). 

The enemy, during the night of the battle of Caney, and after 
burying the dead, not without paying due honors to General Vara 
de Rey, commenced work on the trenches, which they never left 
again, continued to surround our lines with the new reenforce¬ 
ments constantly arriving, and installed modern artillery and ma¬ 
chine guns on the heights. The insurgents were covering Cuabitas 
and adjoining points, although in second line. We were decidedly 
surrounded and all our communications by land cut off, as they 
had been by sea for over a month and a half. Each hour that 
elapsed the enemy fortified the circle that inclosed us. 

During the night the enemy kept up most incessantly a violent 
musket and terrific gun fire which we hardly answered, so as not 
to waste the little ammunition that we had left, which was, no 
doubt, what the enemy intended. 

The Asiatic column (Colonel Aldea) arrived from the coast and 
occupied in line the post vacated by the companies of the fleet, sit¬ 
uated on the road to Caney (in the entrance). 

In the meantime the fleet was once more bombarding the Morro 
and the Socapa, where, after killing several men, they finally suc¬ 
ceeded in dismounting one of the two Hontoria guns, which they 
had been constantly antagonizing since the 18th of May. At the 
same time they were bombarding the city from Aguadores, wound¬ 
ing several persons and ruining several houses. 

The cruiser Eeina Mercedes changed her anchoring place and 
remained at the head of the bay as much as possible, awaiting 
orders to open fire on Quintero Hill to check the enemy if he should 
appear there. 

The French consul was the first to leave the city, which was 
abandoned by almost the whole population a few days later. 


64 


A little before 10 a. m. the enemy, who no donbt intended to 
surprise us, furiously attacked our lines, and was repulsed with 
great loss. 

The events of the second of July may be summed up as follows: 

Lively bombardment by sea and land, killing several men and 
disabling one of the only two guns with which we could attack the 
enemy trom the mouth of the harbor; bombarding with impunity 
the defenseless city; a battle from trenches, the fire of which we 
hardly answered, and finally a night surprise that resulted in 
failure. 

The companies of the fleet embarked rapidly in spite of the pre¬ 
vailing conditions. A pilot was sent to each one of the ships, which 
latter took in their boats and steam launches and loosened the spring 
on their cables, and the gunboat Alvarado, which had come out of 
the slip and was afloat, raised at night the six Bustamente torpe¬ 
does that were obstructing the channel to the west. Everything 
indicated, without leaving room for doubt, that the fleet was about 
to go out; but when and how ? 

It occurred to me (and nobody could have dissuaded me from it) 
that a fleet from the Peninsula was on its way to Santiago; that it 
would pass in sight of the semaphore of Porto Rico; that conse¬ 
quently Admiral Cervera would know, given the distance and the 
speed of the former and allowing for the difference in time, when 
it would reach Santiago; and when fire was opened on the enemy 
it would leave the mouth free, he would go out and the two fleets 
combined would defeat the enemy. I remembered everything I 
had read in newspapers about the purchase of ships, and the date 
when those building had been launched. Everything became clear 
to me. We had ships and they were coming. No doubt they were 
quite near, or perhaps only a few miles distant, but where had the 
ships come from ? I do not know—from heaven, from earth, from 
the air, from nothing at all—I do not know. But everything ap¬ 
peared possible to me, except that our fleet should go out alone to 
fight the ships that were assembled at the Morro. 

The aid of marine, Mr. Dario Leguinia, even more optimistic 
than I (and that is saying a great deal), could not rest a minute. 
I shall never forget how during that night of the 2d we were sitting 
on the doorsteps of the captaincy of the port, making calculations 
as to the number of ships that might arrive and the probabilities 
of success that we could count on. Our ships communicating by 
means of the ardois were another proof of this. The event 
announced was near, and we were to see great things happening. 
At times we even thought we heard firing out there on the sea at 
a great distance and in a southeasterly direction. How much 
desire and imagination can do! 


65 


At 1 o’clock at night there was nothing special to he seen, and 
so, feeling snre that important events were to take place the fol¬ 
lowing day, I retired, not without repeatedly impressing upon the 
seaman (cabo de matricula) to notify me at once at the first move¬ 
ment of the fleet, or the first gun shot. It would not have been 
necessary. My impatience and anxiety would have taken care of 
that much better than the cabo. 

The next day it was learned that the blazes we had seen on the 
Monte Real were from the burning of the forts and the heliograph, 
which the detachment there had abandoned to hasten to Santiago, 
in order not to be cut off and surrounded. During the march, 
which was full of hardships, it became necessary to kill a horse 
for food. 



XXVI. 


SORTIE OF THE FLEET 


If I were to live a thousand years and a thousand centuries, never 
should I forget that 3d day of July, 1898, nor do I believe that Spain 
will ever forget it. The day dawned beautifully. One of those 
summer days when not the slightest breath of air stirs the leaves 
of the trees, when not the smallest cloud is visible in the skies; 
when not the slightest vapor fills the atmosphere, which was won¬ 
derfully transparent, so that the horizon could be observed at a 
great distance. 

Nothing special was to be noticed among the ships of our fleet; 
motionless on the quiet waters of the bay, that reflected their hulls, 
though inverted, with wonderful accuracy, they looked as though 
they ought not to leave an anchoring place where they could 
remain in such perfect safety. 

It was 8.30. Feeling sure that the ships would not go out, and 
taking advantage of the chance of getting a horse, for the distance 
was great, I went to the military hospital to see Mr. Joaquin Bus- 
tamente, whom I found a different man, as the saying is. His 
voice was strong, his eyes bright, and his cheeks flushed. He 
moved with ease and did not appear to experience any difficulty in 
doing so. . I was agreeably surprised. 

Why does one remember things that are really not of great im¬ 
portance? Is it perhaps because they are connected with others 
that are ? I cannot explain it. I only know that I remember, 
word for word, the conversation that took place between us. It 
was as follows: 

“Is the fleet not going out,” he asked, without giving me a 
chance to say anything. 

“Not just now, I believe, though it is ready to go out. Is it 
known when the other fleet will arrive ? ” I said. 

“What other fleet?” 

‘ ‘ The one that is supposed to come from Spain; they probably 
know at about what time it may be expected at the mouth of the 
harbor.” 

“Don’t be simple.” (I don’t remember whether he called me 
simple, or innocent, or a fool.) “There is no other fleet; the ships 

( 66 ) 

_ / 



67 


are going out and that is all there is to it. I have a letter from 
Don Pascual (Admiral Cervera) in which he tells me so.” 

I remained thunderstruck. I could doubt no longer. I know 
Admiral Cevera sufficiently well, as does everybody else, to know 
that he does not say, and still less write, what he does not intend 
to do. 

“ Do you think he will go out to-day? ” I said. 

“ I thought he was going even now.” 

I could not answer. A gunshot which, judging from the direc¬ 
tion, could only be from one of the two fleets, left me motionless. 

Two or three minutes later a terrific cannonade commenced, 
such as I have never heard, nor will probably ever hear again, a 
cannonade more intense than that of June 6, a thing which I be¬ 
lieved impossible, shaking the building, thundering through the 
air. I could not think coherently. I kept looking at Mr. Busta- 
mente like an imbecile, and he looked at me and didn’t say a word. 
I felt something that commenced at my feet and went up to my 
head, and my hair must have stood on end. Then suddenly, with¬ 
out taking leave, I went out, got on my horse and rode down the 
hill at breakneck speed, and I hardly understand how it was that 
I did not break my neck. I arrived at the captaincy of the port, 
where I found them all, from the commander of marine to the last 
clerk, with emotion painted on every face, and all looking in the 
direction of the mouth of the harbor, the mountains of which, that 
had been such a protection to us, and which now prevented us 
from seeing what was going on outside, we should have liked to 
grind to powder. 

The noise caused by the gunshots which the mountains and 
valleys echoed was truly infernal and comparable to nothing. 
An idea may be gained of what it was when it is remembered 
that over 250 guns, most of them of large caliber and all breech¬ 
loading, were firing incessantly. The earth trembled, and very 
soon Punta Gorda, the Morro and the Socapa took part in the 
frightful concert, adding the thunder of their guns to the noise 
of those of the two fleets. 

But the firing continued and that is what puzzled me. I 
thought, taking into account the number and class of hostile ships 
and of our own, that the catastrophe of the latter must necessarily 
take place in the very channel of the harbor, which is such a 
difficult one, even for ships of less length and draft than those 
which formed our fleet, under normal conditions; how much more, 
then, when sustaining a battle. A deviation, a change of course 
ahead of time, an injury to the rudder or the engine, even though 
slight and momentary, the least carelessness, in a word, might 
run a ship aground, and such a disaster would cause also the 


68 


destruction of the other ships that were coming after and which 
would have collided with the first; the hostile ships might sink 
the first right there and then; for the same reasons, the disaster of 
the others becomes inevitable. 

To my mind, the going out from Santiago harbor under the cir¬ 
cumstances Admiral Cervera did, and as confirmed by the command¬ 
ers of the ships of the fleet, constitutes the greatest act of valor 
imaginable, for it meant to go out to certain death, not only with 
fearlessness, but with a clear head, for a man must be completely 
master of himself in order to command a ship without becoming 
excited nor losing his head. One may form an idea of it from the 
horror which I experienced, who was not in any of the ships, but 
I knew perfectly well the dangers of the enterprise, which, in my 
opinion, was impossible. 

The day, as I said, was most beautiful and the calm perfect. 
Therefore, the smoke, far from vanishing, rose up in a straight line. 
When the first moments of excitement were over and we had some¬ 
what cooled down, we could see perfectly that the smoke from the 
firing formed four groups more or less distant from each other, 
but what group did our fleet form? If the one farthest to the 
west, then no doubt it was not surrounded and had the open sea 
before it, and this was a great advantage. If, on the contrary, it 
formed the second or third, then it was between two fires. 

Later on it was noticed that the firing was at a greater distance 
and decreased in intensity, and that the columns of smoke were 
moving farther to the west. Had they succeeded in escajAng and 
outwitting the hostile fleet ? For the present one thing was cer¬ 
tain : Our ships had not gone down in the entrance of the harbor, 
nor even close to it, and that was of great importance, for the great¬ 
est danger was in the channel. Imagine our joy when the Morro 
advised us by telephone that our fleet was fighting in wing forma¬ 
tion and that the enemy did not have the range. Evidently the age 
of miracles is not over. I will not try to describe what we felt that 
day—we, at Santiago, who have the honor of belonging to the 
navy. 

I still had the horse at my disposal, and as I remembered the 
anxiety in which I had left Mr. Bustamente and his delicate state 
of health, I hastened to bring him the news, which I thought 
would do him a great deal of good. When I arrived, he knew it 
already, as everyone else did in Santiago. He had been all over 
the city. I found him radiant with satisfaction. 

I may safely say that the 3d of July was a day of true rejoicing, 
for, as will be seen later when I relate the events of that day, it 
was believed that our ships had accomplished their object, 
although at the cost of the destroyers, the loss of which was 


69 


already known. And although we felt very sad over the victims 
there must have been, the result, on the whole, was so brilliant 
that it surpassed all reasonable expectations. 

How great were my consternation and sorrow when, at 6 o’clock 
in the evening, I saw the pilot Miguel Lopez arrive, his appearance 
changed and his clothing and shoes wet from the drizzling rain, 
with the news that he had at his house at Cinco Reales five ship¬ 
wrecked from the Maria Teresa and Oquendo , worn out and weak; 
that both ships, on fire, had run aground on the coast close to each 
other west of Punta Cabrera and about 8 miles from the harbor of 
Santiago, and that a great many more, some wounded and all tired, 
were on the road. 

The Teresa and Oquendo lost, besides the Pluton and Furor! 
What a horrible contrast and what a sad awakening! In the 
morning I had believed the ships safe and was already thinking of 
a telegram from Havana announcing their arrival at that port. 
At night the news of the catastrophe, the full extent of which I 
did not know even then! 

But as my comments and lamentations do not explain what had 
happened, I will give the news as it was received in the course of 
the day at the captaincy of the port. It will explain why, for 
eight hours, we believed at Santiago de Cuba that the Spanish fleet 
was in safety. 


< 



XXVII. 


NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA. 


July 3d. —The hostile fleet in sight, about 5 miles distant. 

At 9.45 the Spanish fleet went out. Shortly after, a violent 
bombardment was heard. 

At 10.40 the Morro said: “ The Spanish fleet is fighting in wing- 
formation at Punta Cabrera; the enemy does not have the range 
and it seems as though they would succeed in escaping. The 
American fleet is composed of the Brooklyn , Indiana , Iowa , Texas , 
Massachusetts , Oregon , and one yacht. The ships from Aguadores 
have come to assist in the battle.” 

At 11.15 no more firing was heard. 

At 12.30 the Morro said: “When the fleet went out it did so 
slowly. After the four large ships had gone out the destroyers 
went, and all of the American ships fell upon them. Our fleet 
opposed the attack and the destroyers hurried to join them, but 
near Punta Cabrera one of them took fire and ran ashore. The 
other continued to fire and when she saw herself lost she lowered 
two boats filled with men; one reached the coast, the other was 
captured. On leaving the destroyer they set it afire and she ran 
aground burning.” 

So they are both lost. When our fleet passed Punta Cabrera one 
of the ships, apparently the Teresa , went close to the shore and a 
great deal of smoke was seen. The Iowa and New York were pur¬ 
suing her and the others followed them. By this time the hostile 
ships from Aguadores were already taking part in the fight. 

At 2 an English warship was signaled to the south. 

At 3 the Morro said that the ships which pursued our fleet were 
24 in all; 15 warships, armored and unarmored; the others mer¬ 
chant vessels equipped for war. 

At 6.30 the pilot, Miguel Lopez, said that at his house at Cinco 
Reales, he had five shipwrecked from the Teresa and Oquendo , and 
they said there must be others at Cabanitas. 

The tug Esmeralda , with the second commander of Marine and 
Ensign Nardiz, with the pilot, Lopez, and ten armed sailors, went 
out to gather them up. Forces of the army also went out in the 


(70) 



71 


steamer Colon to protect those who might be returning by roads 
and paths along the coast. 

At nightfall Colonel Escario’s column arrived from Manzanillo. 

My friend, Mr. Robert Mason, Chinese consul, who is interested 
in naval matters, and has a good understanding of everything 
concerning them, witnessed the battle from the Yigia del Medio, 
which is the highest mountain in the bay and overlooks a great 
part of it. But we must take into account that, as it is quite dis¬ 
tant from the coast, the ships that pass close to it cannot be seen. 
As soon as he arrived he told me what had happened as he had 
seen it, and I put it down as he dictated it to me. The following 
is what I heard from his own lips, word for word, without chang¬ 
ing anything in this interesting account: 

“The Teresa went out first, then the Vizcaya and Colon ; after 
a somewhat longer interval, the Oquendo , then the destroyers. 
The Admiral passed the Morro at 9.45. A little to windward of 
the Morro (west) was the Brooklyn. Opposite the Morro another 
ship, apparently the Massachusetts, and I could distinguish no other 
war ships from the Yigia. When the Admiral passed the Morro 
the hostile ships and the Morro and Socapa opened a violent fire 
simultaneously; the hostile ships that could not be seen and that 
were at Aguadores also opened fire at the same time. After pass¬ 
ing the Morro, the Admiral went west and was lost from sight on 
account of the Socapa. The Vizcaya followed, and then the other 
two. In the meantime the destroyers remained in the bay. The 
Spanish ships were now visible again, the Vizcaya in the lead, the 
Colon , Oquendo , and Maria Teresa in line ahead at a certain dis¬ 
tance from the American fleet. The Spanish fleet was firing slowly, 
the American ships lively, so that I did not lose sight again of the 
Spanish ships, but often of the American ships on account of 
the smoke. In the meantime the American war ships and two 
yachts were gathered opposite the Socapa, and when the destroyers 
came out it seemed impossible that they should be able to escape. 
The fire was horrible from the large guns, as well as from the 
rapid-fire guns. Nevertheless, the destroyers were lost from sight, 
but they appeared again, firing from their stern guns. As long as 
the ships could be distinguished it could not be estimated whether 
they had received injuries of any kind. When they disappeared 
from sight, at 10.30, we could see no injuries in the masts or smoke¬ 
stacks, or anything special. At this time we saw all the American 
ships firing in a westerly direction, and at that hour the New York, 
which had not yet entered the fight, passed the bay headed west¬ 
ward. When I left the battle I had not seen any ship run aground 
nor on fire, either Spanish or American.” 


72 


Before I continue, in order to give a better understanding, I will 
recall tlie fact that the coast between Santiago and Punta Cabrera, 
a stretch of about 6 miles, forms a kind of bay on which are situ¬ 
ated Cabanas and Guaicabdn; that Punta Cabrera projects south 
and is very high land, consequently the ships which are west of it 
and close to the coast can not be seen. It is absolutely necessary 
to remember this in order to understand why it was that the final 
result of the battle was not seen. 

At 9.30 the Spanish fleet started up; first the Maria Teresa, 
Admiral Cervera’s flagship, the Vizcaya , then the Cristobal Colon , 
and Oquendo. Behind these the Pluton and Furor. This was the 
order of sortie as I learned from the pilots, Lopez and Nunez. 

The Brooklyn, Iowa, Indiana, Texas, Massachusetts, Oregon, 
and one yacht were waiting at the mouth of the harbor. The 
others arrived soon from Aguadores, where they had been, with 
their engines going and under steam. One of the last ones to 
arrive was the New York, which, the same as the Brooklyn , has a 
20-mile speed. 

The Spanish ships, which necessarily had to go out in line-ahead, 
received, as each went out, the fire of all the American ships, 
which they could not answer until they had passed the bank of 
Diamante, because they could not present the broadside, conse¬ 
quently their guns, to the enemy. Therefore, as long as they 
were inside of the harbor, they all sustained a terrible fire. 

Nevertheless they came out without serious injuries and reached 
the open sea. 

The Vizcaya, which was the fastest ship, but had not had her 
bottom cleaned, was making only 13 miles, and the other ships had 
to regulate their speed by hers in order to preserve the line. 

I suppose from what happened and taking into account the order 
of the sortie that Admiral Cervera intended to protect the retreat 
of the Vizcaya f accompanied by the Colon (which did not have her 
turret guns mounted), with the Oquendo and Maria Teresa, and 
then have the latter, by putting on forced draft, rejoin the former, 
but both were set on fire by the stern, which they presented to the 
hostile fire, and they were soon converted into one immense blaze 
and went aground on the coast, the Teresa about 7 miles from San¬ 
tiago harbor, west of Punta Cabrera, then close to her the Oquendo. 
These events I learned at nightfall from the shipwrecked who had 
arrived. The fate of the Vizcaya and Cristobal Colon I will antici¬ 
pate, in order to complete the account of what happened to the 
whole fleet as it was told me by an officer of the Austrian cruiser 
Maria Teresa (same name as ours) the next day. 

When the Oquendo and Teresa had been lost, two or three 
American ships remained there to consummate the surrender and 


73 


gather up the shipwrecked and wounded and take the others pris¬ 
oners. The other ships continued to pursue the Vizcaya and the 
Colon . The first of the two also took fire at the stern and stranded 
at a distance of about 20 miles (toward Aserradero); the second 
did not take fire. Probably her engine was damaged and she ran 
up on the coast about 60 miles distant (off Turquino). 

Such was the hecatomb (for there is no other name for it) of 
our ill-fated fleet, and I do not believe that history records 
another like it. Not a single ship was saved from the catastrophe. 
The commanders and officers of all the ships knew well what was 
going to happen, when, calm and serene in spite of everything and 
ready to do their duty fully, they took leave of each other and of 
their comrades who remained on shore, as they did not belong to 
the fleet. 

A person who has witnessed and seen with his own eyes an 
event like the one which I have in vain tried to. describe, must 
necessarily be of interest, even though of little prominence and 
education. For that reason I have had the pilots Miguel Lopez 
and Apolonio Nunez, who took out the Teresa and Oquendo 
respectively, repeat to me a hundred times what they had seen. I 
shall not copy everything they said; that would be too much of a 
task, but only what relates to the battle and which gives an idea 
of that veritable hell, for that is what the mouth of Santiago 
harbor was for fifteen minutes. 

Miguel Lopez, who is cool-headed and daring on land as well as 
on the sea, said to me about as follows: 

“ I was in the forward tower by the side of Admiral Cervera, 
who was as calm as though he had been at anchor in his own cabin, 
and was observing the channel and the hostile ships and only said 
these words: 

“‘Pilot, when can we shift the helm?’ He had reference to 
turning to starboard, which could only be done after we had passed 
Diamante Bank. After a few seconds he said: 

“ ‘Pilot, advise me when we can shift the helm.’ 

“ ‘I will advise you, Admiral,’ I answered. 

“A few moments later I said: ‘ Admiral, the helm may be shifted 
now.’ 

“In a moment the Admiral, without shouting, without becom¬ 
ing excited, as calm as usual, said: ‘To starboard,’ and the next 
minute, ‘ Fire! ’ At the same moment, simultaneously, the two guns 
of the turret and those of the port battery fired on a ship which 
seemed to me to be the Indiana. I thought the ship was sinking. 
I can not tell you, Don Jos6, all that passed. By this time there 
were already many dead and wounded in the battery, because they 
had been firing on us for some time, and I believe that in spite of 


74 


tlie water that was in the ship she was already on fire then. The 
Admiral said to me: 

“‘Good-by, pilot; go now; go, and be sure you let them pay 
you, because you have earned it well. ’ And he continued to give 
orders. ” 

These were, more or less, the words that Miguel Lopez spoke to 
me, and which he repeats to anyone who wishes to hear them. 

Apolonio Nunez, who took out the Oquendo , is very different 
from Lopez, not daring, but rather easily frightened. These were 
his impressions: 

“When we arrived at Santa Catalina battery, they were already 
firing. There was a hail of bullets on board which can not be com¬ 
pared to anything. I was in the tower looking after the course of 
the ship. The commander, who is very kind, and who knew me 
because I had taken the ship in on the 19th, said to me: 

“‘You can go, pilot; we can get along now, and later on per¬ 
haps you will not be able to go.’ I thanked him and should have 
gone gladly enough, I can tell you, but I was afraid they might 
shift the helm before they passed Diamante, and you can imagine, 
Don Jose, what would have happened. I remained on board, and 
when we had passed the bank I said to him: ‘ Commander, you can 
shift the helm.’ 

‘ ‘ ‘ Go, pilot, go, ’ he said, and then he commanded to put to star¬ 
board and shouted, ‘ Fire! ’ The noise caused by the big forward 
gun and the shaking of the ship made more impression on me than 
the fire of the Yankees. I thought the Oquendo had been cut in 
two. I do not even want v to remember it. I was lowered in a boat 
and then I thought I was a dead man. The bullets were falling all 
around me. Finally I reached Estrella Cove, where Miguel Lopez 
had already arrived. I did not even dare look at the battle, which 
was now outside of the harbor.” 

These two accounts, which perhaps, do not inspire the interest 
which no doubt they possess, because I have not been able to 
remember the exact words of the men, although in substance they 
are the same, may give an idea of that never-to-be-forgotten sortie 
which had such fatal consequences. 

I supposed that the American fleet would await the Spanish 
fleet at the mouth of the harbor and absolutely prevent it from 
going out, under penalty of having the ships attacked. But that 
requires a great deal of courage and presence of mind. Neverthe¬ 
less, it would have been the safest means for accomplishing it. 
By not doing so they exposed themselves to being outwitted and 
this is proved by the fact that our ships succeeded in getting out 
of the harbor and as far as Punta Cabrera (about 6 miles), so that 


i 


75 


they really accomplished the most difficult part, and there is no 
doubt that if they had not been set on fire and if they had had a 
speed of even 18 miles they would have run the blockade. 

It will also have been noticed that the three ships built in Spain 
all had the same fate; they were burned. The one built in Italy, 
although not having the turret guns, and which had suffered from 
the hostile fire much longer, because she “died” later than the 
others, was not burned; she had a different fate, but not that. I 
believe I am not bold in affirming that if the four ships had been 
protected like the Colon , they would have outwitted the enemy’s 
pursuit. In that event they might have reached Havana, for as 
the whole, or nearly the whole, American fleet was in front of 
Santiago, they would have met no one to prevent them and the 
situation would have been very different. 

A few of the shipwrecked arrived in the tug Colon and were 
embarked by our commander of marine in the cruiser Feina Mer¬ 
cedes. 

The tug Esmeralda , with Ensign Nardiz, ten armed sailors, 
and th6 pilot Lopez, went to Cabanitas Cove to gather up ship¬ 
wrecked ; but, although they made a careful search, they found 
none. 

At night Colonel Escario’s column, whose forces have already 
been mentioned, arrived from Manzanillo. The next day General 
Escario told me that when he heard the fire of the battle in the 
morning, he proceeded with a small vanguard to the heights of 
the harbor of Bayamo, and that the detachment there told him the 
same thing, viz, that they saw our ships run the blockade and dis¬ 
appear past Punta Cabrera. 

To my mind there is nothing so interesting and eloquent as the 
account of a naval battle by persons who have taken part in it. 
Lieutenants Bustamente and Caballero, second in command of the 
destroyers Furor and Pluton , respectively, who escaped by a mira¬ 
cle from the horrible hecatomb, in which the greater part of their 
crews perished, told me two days after the catastrophe, still sick 
and tired, of the battle which their ships sustained. Their accounts 
follow: 

Mr. Caballero: “The last ships were already outside of the 
harbor when the destroyers, which had stopped between the Socapa 
and Cay Smith for the purpose of getting up steam, proceeded and 
passed through the channel as far as Punta Morrillo, where the 
Furor , which was in the lead, put to port as though trying to go 
east, but when she discovered the Gloucester and other ships which 
were near Aguadores, she put to starboard, following the lead of 
our fleet, which was already at some distance, opening fire on the 
Gloucester which we (the two destroyers) had left astern. And 


8630 - 6 




the Indiana , Oregon , Ioiva, and Texas , which we had passed in 
the order named on the port hand, continued to fire very rapidly, 
which made it extremely difficult for us to serve the guns. After 
we had passed Cabanas we commenced to gain on the Furor , and 
when we came up with her and were about 50 meters to starboard, 
she listed rapidly on that side, her rudder having been disabled, 
and passed astern of us at a distance of 1 meter, and sank by the 
stern, standing up almost vertically, and was buried in the sea a 
moment later, before reaching Punta Cabrera. 

“As we (the Pluton) were making a great deal of water we con¬ 
tinued close to the shore to reach Punta Cabrera, and when we 
were close to the headland which it forms, we received a 32-centi¬ 
meter projectile which exploded the forward group of boilers, 
blowing up the whole deck and cutting off communication between 
the two ends. She then veered to starboard and struck on the 
headland, tearing off a great part of the bow. The shock threw 
her back some distance, then she struck again. I jumped into the 
water and reached the shore. 

‘ ‘ I climbed up on the headland of Punta Cabrera and lay there 
for about fifteen minutes, during which the fire continued. When 
it was at an end I went into the mountains and gathered up such 
personnel of the ship as I met—about 20 or 25—and with them I 
went around a small hill for the purpose of hiding from the coast 
and took the road to Santiago de Cuba, avoiding the roads and 
seeking the densest thickets and woods. The pilot, on pretext that 
the road which I was following was not a good one, left us and did 
not again put in an appearance. We continued walking in an 
easterly direction—some clothed, others naked, and the rest half 
clothed—for two hours, resting now and then, and trying to keep 
close to the coast. When we reached the beach we met Lieutenant 
Bust amende with a group of shipwrecked from the Furor (his ship) 
and some from the Maria Teresa. We saw a yacht with the 
English flag close to the coast maneuvering back of Punta Cabrera, 
as though trying to gather up the shipwrecked there. We made sig¬ 
nals to her with a shirt, and seeing that she paid no attention to us 
we walked on, avoiding the formation of large groups and hiding 
ourselves as much as possible. 

“About 3.30 we reached the harbor of Cabanas, which we had to 
cross swimming, and on the opposite shore, about 9 o’clock at 
night, we reached the trenches of the Socapa, where at last we 
could rest for the night, with the assistance of some guerrillas, 
who supplied us with what they could.” 

Mr. Bustamente : “When we (the Furor) reached the mouth of 
the harbor and saw the Spanish fleet, we thought that by shaping 
our course westward we could seek the protection of the Spanish 


fleet, which was already at some distance, and we maneuvered 
accordingly. One of the projectiles struck one of the hatches of 
the boiler ventilators, thereby reducing the pressure and conse¬ 
quently, the speed of the ship. By this time the projectiles were 
falling on board in large numbers. One of the shells struck Boat¬ 
swain Duenas, cutting him in two; one part fell between the tiller- 
ropes, interrupting them momentarily, and it was necessary to 
take it out in pieces. Another projectile destroyed the engine 
and the servo-motor, so that the ship could neither proceed nor 
maneuver. Another had struck the after shell room, exploding 
and destroying it. 

Our torpedoes had their war-heads on and were ready to be used, 
but we did not launch them because we were never at a convenient 
distance from the enemy. Under these circumstances the com¬ 
mander of the destroyers, Captain Fernando Villaamil, gave 
orders to abandon the ship, and I with part of the crew jumped 
into the water, about 3 miles from the coast. In the water, one of 
the men near me, I believe the first boatswain, was struck by a 
bullet in the head and was buried in the water forever. The ship 
in the mean time, after a horrible series of explosions, went down. 
When we reached the land we went in an easterly direction 
towards Santiago. Shortly after we met Lieutenant Caballero and 
with him and his men we reached Santiago, and following the 
same road and the same fortunes; as they are identical, I will not 
here relate them.” 

To what has been said it is useless to add another word. 


XXVIII. 


CAUSES OF THE LOSS OF THE NAVAL BATTLE 

OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA. 


Words fail me to describe tlie painful impression produced upon 
me by the disaster of the four cruisers and two destroyers under 
Admiral Cervera’s command, and by what I may call the hecatomb 
of their crews, which was not complete for the only reason that the 
battle had taken place so near the shore, where the ships, all on 
lire, could run aground, rather than surrender to the enemy. In 
less than two hours the ships were destroyed, and yet, this is not 
strange. I am surprised, on the contrary, that they were not sunk 
in the channel. 

The loss of the fleet had been foretold by all its commanders, 
with whom I have talked more than once, and was prophesied, so 
to speak, as soon as the order was received at the Cape Verde 
Islands to start for Cuba; and the admiral who was in command 
advised the GovernmenCto that effect several times; these official 
communications are still in existence. But it seems that public 
opinion in the island of Cuba, especially at Havana, required the 
presence of the fleet in those waters, and between that and the very 
sensible and logical reasons advanced by the admiral, the Govern¬ 
ment decided in favor of the former, and the fleet departed, shaping 
its course to the west. From that moment the loss of the fleet 
became inevitable, and it was only a question of time, as will be 
easily understood from what follows. 

The fleet left the Cape Verde Islands with no more coal than was 
in the bunkers, the greater part of which must necessarily be used 
up during the voyage across the Atlantic Ocean. The three de- I 
stroyers, Pluton , Furor , and Terror accompanied it and had to be 
convoyed and supplied with coal, which involved difficulties and 
delays. 

At Martinique (where the Terror was left, being no longer able 
to follow the fleet) the ships could not coal; and at Curagao, in 
spite of the government’s promise that they were to find a ship 
there with fuel, which did not put in an appearance, only two of 
the ships could get a small number of tons. 


(78) 




79 


The order to proceed to the island of Cuba was there; what could 
they do under such circumstances? The only natural and logical 
thing: go to the harbor that was nearest and for that reason offered 
the least dangers, go to Santiago de Cuba, which Admiral Cervera 
believed well defended, as the harbor is suited for that purpose, 
and supplied with provisions. How great was his surprise when 
he found that only two guns worthy of the name defended its en¬ 
trance, and that provisions were lacking in the city, as well as 
ammunition and everything else. 

I have already stated, and will here repeat it, that during those 
days of May, before the hostile fleet appeared with forces superior 
to ours (that is, from the 20tli to the 27th) the ships could not go 
out, not only because they did not have coal enough, but also be¬ 
cause there was considerable swell in the sea, which prevented them 
from going out, as was stated by all the pilots of the locality, who 
said that the ships were almost sure to touch bottom, especially 
the Colon , which drew more water than the others. 

We must take into account, for it means everything for a fleet, 
that they had not cleaned their bottoms for a long time and their 
speed was therefore far from what it should have been; the Vizcaya , 
above all, was not able to make 13 miles, and later, after being in 
Santiago harbor for 46 days, her speed was reduced to even less. 

But even if there had been no swell in the sea to the south and 
the ships could have gone out, where would they have gone ? To 
Havana by the shortest route ? They would have met Sampson’s 
fleet, as Admiral Cervera knew only too well, and that was just 
what he wished to avoid. Perhaps he might have succeeded by 
taking a course which he would have been least expected to take, 
through Providence Channel, for instance; and this did occur to 
Admiral Cervera, but it was impossible, for the simple reason that 
he did not have fuel enough for so many days of navigation. 

Moreover, when the fleet reached Santiago harbor, everybody 
there, as well as in the Peninsula, believed it safe and congratu¬ 
lated its commander on his success and his clever maneuver; and 
when I say “ everybody ” I do not mean the common people only, 
but the official element. Could there be a better proof that Ad¬ 
miral Cervera complied with the wishes of the Government ? 

The fleet received definite order from the Captain General of the 
Island of Cuba to leave the harbor of Santiago, which he reiterated, 
in spite of Admiral Cervera’s remonstrances. After that, what 
was to be done ? Only one thing: go out, as indeed they did, 
resigned, but calm and serene, those heroes; for all those who went 
out with the fleet to certain death, as every one knew, deserve that 
name. And I say that they went out calm and serene, and shall 
say it a thousand times, for only thus can ships be maneuvered in 


80 


so narrow and dangerous a channel, without any of them running 
aground, which can happen so easily even under ordinary circum¬ 
stances, when it is not necessary to oppose the fire of a hostile 
fleet, and with ships of less draught and length. The sortie from 
that harbor, under the circumstances under which those ships 
effected it, I do not hesitate in calling the greatest act of valor, 
fearlessness, skill, intelligence and practical experience in seaman¬ 
ship that can be conceived. This was stated repeatedly and with 
great admiration by the commanders and officers of the English 
corvette Alert and the Austrian cruiser Maria Teresa , who, it may 
be said, witnessed the battle. 

The number of ships that were awaiting ours at the mouth of 
the harbor, and with which the latter had to fight, as well as their 
nature and the kind of armament they mounted, was given in one 
of the first chapters, from statistics of the American Navy. This 
alone is more than sufficient to demonstrate that, in view of the 
inferiority of ours in quantity and quality, it was impossible to 
sustain the battle. 

But there is more, much more, to be added in order to explain 
what happened in the naval battle of Santiago de Cuba, the greater 
part of which is not known by the people in Spain. 

I have already stated that the Colon , the only really protected 
ship of the four that composed the fleet, did not have her turret 
guns. Of the 14-cm. guns of the Teresa , Oquendo, and Vizcaya , 
which are the ones that do most of the firing in a battle, six had 
been declared useless; and while the Teresa could change hers, the 
Oquendo and Vizcaya could not do so, and had to fight, the former 
with one, the latter with two useless guns, as I have stated. 

Moreover, the supply of ammunition for all of the ships was 
inadequate, and the Teresa had 70 useless charges. The greater 
part of the primers were no good, and consequently the guns did 
not go off. The breech-plugs were imperfect, so that after the 
second or third shot they no longer closed. The firing-pins blew 
out, and from many of the survivors of the Oquendo and Teresa 
I have learned that a number of the men serving the guns were 
wounded by their own pieces. Therefore, if the whole thing were 
not so sad and serious, it might be said that the guns of our ships 
were like the “carbine of Ambrosius,” which went off at the 
breech; that is, that far from injuring the enemy, they were a 
danger to those who had charge of firing them. 

The majority of the cartridge cases did not have the required 
diameter, and on the Maria Teresa it happened that seven had to 
be discarded before one good one could be found. Under these 
conditions, it will be readily understood that the armament, which 
was intended to be converted into rapid-fire artillery, was instead 


81 


converted into artillery—I do not know what to call it, but it was 
certainly entirely useless. 

After what has been stated, can the result of the battle of San¬ 
tiago be wondered at? Certainly not. The only thing that may 
appear strange is that, under such conditions, a fleet should have 
been sent to the scene of war. 

It was under these circumstances that the sortie was made from 
the difficult harbor of Santiago by those commanders and officers 
who, convinced that they would all perish, contented themselves 
with saying farewell to the comrades who remained on shore and 
whom they never expected to see again. 

We Spanish are very proud of the disaster of Trafalgar on 
account of the heroism which our navy showed on that occasion, 
when they placed honor above everything else, though our ships 
were buried in the sea. The battle of Santiago de Cuba is much 
more glorious even than that of 1805. In this latter battle, thirty- 
two allied ships of 64, 80, and 120 guns fought with twenty-eight 
English ships, also of 120, 80, and 64 guns; the forces, therefore, 
were almost equal; and if the battle was lost, while it might very 
well have been won, it was because our fleet was commanded by 
Villeneuve, and the hostile fleet by Nelson. In the battle of San¬ 
tiago, six ships (if the Pluton and Furor may be called such), had 
to fight against twenty-four* that were better protected and armed. 
After these figures, anything else that might be added would 
appear to be useless. 

I have never been able to understand the reason why there 
was sent to the Island of Cuba a fleet that was in no manner 
able to cope with that of the United States and which therefore 
could in no wise prevent the ships of the latter from blockading 
our ports and controlling the sea; but since it was sent, without its 
arrival being able to prevent the loss of the island, which was lost, 
as experience has shown, from the very moment when war was 
accepted, owing to the conditions prevailing there, then it should 
have been prevented from being destroyed, as it was, without 
resulting in any advantage whatever. 

The only way of gaining any advantage would have been, in my 
opinion, taking advantage of the fact that all the hostile ships were 

* The writer makes a strange error in the number of the American ships en¬ 
gaged in this fight. He has evidently counted all those enumerated in Chapter 
IX. Those ships, however, were scattered among the fleets at Manila, Havana, 
Key West, and Santiago. Those actually engaged were as follows: Brooklyn (flag), 
Oregon , Indiana, Ioiva, Texas, and yachts Gloucester and Vixen. The flagship 
New York, with the torpedo boat Ericsson, took part toward the latter end of 
the engagement, the battle being practically fought by the six ships first named. 
Counting only numbers of ships, therefore, the Americans had five fighting 
ships against the Spanish four, with two armed yachts against the two Spanish 
torpedo-boat destroyers.—O. N. I. 





82 


in Cuba, to send a few ships of great speed, more or less well 
armed, to tlie commercial ports of the United States and bombard 
them, even though not very effectively. It is probable that public 
opinion, especially of those who did not participate in the war, would 
have exacted the return of the ships, and then the Spanish fleet 
could have left Santiago in perfect safety, and a catastrophe would 
have been avoided which has brought us no advantage. At the 
same time, the ports of the island, freed from the blockade, could 
have supplied themselves with provisions; and although the final 
result would probably have been the same, it would not have been 
so immediate. 

But all this is nothing more than hypothesis and supposition, 
and not timely; besides, it was not my object in writing this book. 
I have told how Admiral Cervera’s fleet started from the Cape 
Verde Islands, how it arrived at Santiago, and how it went out to 
fight with Admiral Sampson’s fleet, convinced that the greater 
part of the people living in Spain are ignorant of what I have set 
forth, and also convinced that, when the facts are known, the 
results will be judged differently. 



XXIX. 


SINKING OF THE MERCEDES. 


July Jf-th .—Opposite the mouth of the harbor, the New York, 
Brooklyn , Indiana , Massachusetts , Minneapolis , Vesuvius , one 
yacht, and seventeen merchant vessels. 

At 7 an English corvette arrived and asked for a pilot. 

At 9 the Austrian cruiser Maria Teresa arrived. 

The boats of both ships entered the harbor. 

At 4 they departed with subjects of their respective nations. 

At 8 p. m. the cruiser Reina Mercedes started up. 

At 11.30 two gunshots were heard in the entrance at the foot of 
the Morro; afterwards many more. 

At 12.45 the fire ceased. It was answered by the Socapa. 

There was hardly a day when the hostile fleet and the Morro 
and Socapa did not exchange shots, or when some information was 
not received of injuries to one or more of the hostile ships, even of 
their having been burned and sunk, but as this has never been 
proved I have said nothing on the subject, being resolved to say 
nothing except what has been positively proved and what everybody 
knew who remained at Santiago during the time when the events 
that are the object of these notes occurred. It is natural that the 
ships which sustained the fire so many times (the opposite would 
be improbable) should have suffered some damages and casualties, 
although they were stationed at a considerable distance, but there 
is no doubt that they were not serious; if so, they would have been 
clearly seen. 

On the day of the battle of the two fleets I was assured by sailors 
from the Socapa and by those shijDwrecked that they had seen such 
and such a ship sunk, or such other one on fire, and such and such 
a tug had taken off some other ship. It seemed probable, but noth¬ 
ing of the kind happened. The next day the ships that had fought 
with ours were all at Daiquiri, at Aguadores, or opposite the mouth 
of the harbor; that is the reason why I have never spoken of the 
damages done to the blockading ships. 

The English corvette Alert and the Austrian cruiser Maria 
Teresa could, of course, not enter the harbor, because we had 


(83) 



84 


planted Bnstamente torpedoes (although only a part of them) and 
stretched wires across. The tug Colon went out with a flag of 
truce to notify them to that effect, and they sent in their boats, 
towed by steam launches. 

From the Austrian officers it was learned at the commandancia 
de marina what had happened to the Vizcaya and Oquendo in the 
battle of the preceding day, for they had arrived just in time to 
hear the gunshots and to see the ships stranded and lost on the 
coast. All agreed, of course, that our fleet had fought admirably, 
and, above all, that the sortie of the ships from the harbor under 
the circumstances under which they executed it, showed a courage, 
skill, and practical seamanship truly admirable. It is always a 
comfort to see that justice is being done, and that comfort I had at 
that time. 

As the interior of the harbor did no longer have the safeguard 
of the fleet, as the Bustamente torpedoes (six of them) had been 
taken up so that the fleet could go out and had not yet been 
replaced, and as, finally, the first line of mines no longer existed, 
the commander of marine decided—General Toral also being of 
his opinion—to sink the Mercedes (the only ship that was suitable 
for that purpose) in the narrow part of the channel; consequently, 
the commander of the cruiser received orders to do so. Hurriedly, 
for time was pressing, the wounded and sick from the lost fleet 
were transferred to the steamer Mejico , which had been converted 
into a hospital and hoisted the flag of the Red Cross. Important 
papers that had been saved, memoranda, portable arms, beds, and 
the most necessary things, were taken off the Mercedes , and at 8 
p. m., with her commander, Ensign Nardiz, a few engineers, the 
necessary sailors, and Pilots Apolonio Nunez and Miguel Lopez, 
started toward the entrance, with her bow anchor and stern spring 
on the cable ready. 

At 11.30, as soon as the enemy, who was watching with search 
lights, sighted her, he opened a continuous fire on the ship. In 
spite of this the ship was sunk at the intended place, a very diffi¬ 
cult operation under any circumstances and especially under fire, 
as will be readily understood. Unfortunately the ship did not 
come to lie across the channel, because it seems a projectile cut 
the spring on the cable; the sacrifice was useless and the harbor 
was not obstructed. Yet it was not entirely useless, since the 
enemy could not take possession of her, as she is all riddled by 
bullets which she received that night, and I do not believe she can 
ever again be used. 

And since so much has been said of this ship, I will give an 
account of all the victims of her crew, some on board, some at the 
Socapa, Punta Gorda, and the Morro, from the beginning to the 
end of the war. 


85 


Commander Emilio Acosta, second in command, was killed. 
(Here follow the names of the killed and wounded. The list 
includes 5 dead, 11 seriously wounded—two of them fatally—16 
slightly wounded.) 

The enemy cut off the aqueduct so that there was no water left 
in the city, except in the wells and cisterns. 

The shipwrecked, who have arrived from the fleet, are Lieuten¬ 
ants Bustamente and Caballero, second in command of the destroy¬ 
ers, respectively; Midshipman Navia; several engineers and about 
150 sailors. 

Many were murdered by the insurgents with guns and machetes. 
I say murdered, because I believe there is no other name for kill¬ 
ing with guns and machetes men who were not only disarmed, but 
almost naked, sick, and many of them wounded. I realize the seri¬ 
ousness of such an accusation, but it is the statement of all who 
have succeeded in escaping. 


XXXI. 


IN THE CITY AND IN THE BAY. 


July 5th .—The usual ships blockading the harbor. 

The greater part of the population has left the city, fleeing from 
the bombardment. 

The merchant steamers are firing up. 

The Morro says that there are 28 merchant and war vessels in 
sight. The Oregon and Brooklyn are missing. 

In the city the streets are deserted and nearly all the houses 
locked up. 

6th .—The two 9-cm. Krupp guns at Punta Gorda were taken 
down to be installed in the precinct of the city. 

A German war ship was signaled to the south. 

Mr. Mason, with a flag of truce, went out in the tug Colon to 
communicate with her. When he arrived at the mouth of the 
harbor the ship had already left. 

At 5 General Toral was advised by General Shatter that the 
suspension of hostilities was at an end. 

Lieutenant Hobson, of the Merrimac , and the seven men were 
exchanged. 

In the American fleet there are 1,100 Spanish prisoners, among 
them over 300 wounded. 

7tli .—It was learned that the prisoners of our fleet are being sent 
to the United States. 

The two 42-centimeter guns of the Mejico were disembarked for 
the jmrpose of being erected in the precinct of the city. Forty 
Mauser guns were also taken off the ship. They could not be 
set up. 

8th .—The hostile fleet continues the blockade. 

Orders were given by the commandancia de marina to the cap¬ 
tains of the merchant steamers to sink their ships. 

A private house was prepared to receive the sick and wounded 
of the fleet. The convalescents were sent to the quarters of the 
firemen. 

9th .—The hostile fleet in sight as usual. 

Order of General Toral to have the merchant vessels refill their 
bunkers at the piers of Las Cruces and the Railway. 


( 86 ) 



87 


The wounded and sick of the fleet were transferred from the 
Mejico to the house fitted out for a hospital by the Navy. 

On the 4tli General Shatter notified the consuls that the city 
would he bombarded, so that all those might leave who did not 
form part of the garrison. At their request for more time in order 
to take away their families, the term was prolonged twenty-four 
hours. 

The panic became general, and at daybreak of the 5th the pop¬ 
ulation almost en masse left in the direction of Caney, so as to 
avoid a bombardment which all supposed would be horrible and 
not leave one stone upon the other. 

The steamers, full of people, were ready to proceed to Las 
Cruces, Cinco Reales, and all the coves on the eastern coast of the 
bay, where they thought they would be better protected and safer. 

All along the coast regular camps were established within the 
shelter of the mountains. It may be safely said that there were 
not 5,000 inhabitants left in the city. All the windows and doors 
were closed, and Santiago presented the same aspect that Pompeii 
and Herculaneum must have offered. Not a single store was 
open, not even the drug stores. The desertion and solitude were 
complete. 

A few horses were running through the city, pulling up the 
grass growing along the sidewalks. Many dogs are staying at the 
entrances of the houses, which their masters have abandoned, 
without having anything to eat, nor anything to drink, which is 
worse. At night they bark incessantly, which makes the scene 
still more impressive. I have several times gone from the cap¬ 
taincy of the port to the military hospital, that is, across the city 
from one end to the other, without seeing a single door open or 
meeting a single person in the streets or public places, except a 
guerrilla or one or two couples of the civil guard. The solitude 
and the silence were absolute. 

At night the city was truly impressive. The streets, the lamps 
not being lit, were as dark as wolves’ dens, and it was not possible 
to cross them without being in constant danger of stumbling. A 
few guerrillas, taking advantage of the circumstances, were break¬ 
ing into abandoned stores and houses, which they ransacked; for 
instance, the house of my friend, Commander Ros, governor of 
the Morro, situated in San Tadeo street, which I saw with my 
own eyes. They left nothing whole, and him only with the cloth¬ 
ing he wore and 20 pesos which he had with him. The criminals, 
who were caught in the act, were four guerrillas. I speak with a 
perfect knowledge of what happened, and, as will be seen, I cite 
examples of well-known persons. 


88 




% 


There is no excuse for such actions, and I shall not try to exten¬ 
uate them; but it is also just to say, in honor of the truth, that the 
soldiers, who had hardly anything to eat and little water to drink, 
and who spent day and night in the trenches, were not to be found 
in the city, and when on rare occasions one would go there to see 
whether he could not get a glass of water or buy a box of sardines 
or a piece of hardtack, which the merchants were hiding, the latter 
asked him six times what it was worth, and fleeced him (I find no 
other word for it) without shame or compassion. 

I must also add that such abuses, which were repressed as soon 
as they were commenced—thanks to the civil guard and patrols, 
who walked through the city day and night—were not committed 
by the troops, except in isolated cases, as in that of Mr. Ros. 
They were committed by citizens, although they were imputed to 
those who knew how to enter the houses without forcing the prin¬ 
cipal door. I might cite a thousand examples which would con¬ 
vince the most incredulous and which I omit for the sake of brev¬ 
ity. Thanks to the energy displayed by General Toral, the street 
lamps were finally lighted, so that it became possible to venture 
into the streets at night. As a proof of the proportions which 
this plundering reached, I will copy a decree which the General 
found it necessary to promulgate. The decree was as follows: 

“I, Jose Toral y Velazquez, General of Division, Commander 
General of the Division of Santiago de Cuba, and Military Gov¬ 
ernor of the City and Province, 

“ In view of the frequent robberies which are being committed 
in this city, by reason of the peculiar circumstances in which it 
finds itself, in order to repress them, and by virtue of the author¬ 
ity vested in me under Article 670 of the Campaign Regulations, 
issue the following: 

“ DECREE. 

“Article 1. All soldiers who, in disobedience of this decree, shall 
destroy or set on fire buildings or property, or commit any acts 
of violence on persons, shall be punished by confinement in the 
penitentiary for life, after previous degradation, in conformity 
with Article 239 of the Code of Military Justice. 

“ The penalty of death shall be imposed upon the instigators, or 
persons employing soldiers for this purpose. 

“ Criminals caught in the act of committing these offenses shall 
be summarily judged in conformity with Article 649 of the Code 
of Military Justice. 

“Article 2. Civilians who shall commit the same offenses shall 
be adjudged in conformity with the Civil Code in force in this 
island, and the law shall be applied in its whole rigor by the 
respective Council of War. 


89 


“Article 3. Anyone surprised in the act, wlio shall not give 
himself up at the first intimation, shall be fired upon. 

“Jose Toral. 

“Santiago de Cuba, July 16 , 1898.” 

As it is my object to relate everything that happened at Santiago 
de Cuba, without omitting even the most insignificent events, so 
that an exact idea may be formed of everything, I must also state 
that, as I was told by Mr. Romero, captain of the civil guard, who 
was wounded at Caney on the evening of the 1st, where he had 
arrived in the morning to take charge of the military commandancia 
of that place, and taken prisoner by the Americans, he was nursed, 
attended, and treated with all the attention due to his rank and 
condition, as also others who were in the same case. This proves 
that only the Government of the United States and the jingoes are 
the authors of the unjust war that is being carried on, but not the 
people in general, and still less the Army, which, as its own officers 
and soldiers have assured me, is desirous of having it terminated 
as soon as possible. 





XXXII. 


BATTLES AND BOMBARDMENTS OF THE 10th AND 11th. 


July 10th .—The usual ships opposite the harbor. The general 
staff of the fourth army corps has asked for a statement as ’to the 
personnel and armament of the navy, which was forwarded to him. 

General Shatter gave notice that hostilities had again broken out 
since 4 in the afternoon. 

At 3 the hamlet of Dos Caminos was burned. 

At 5 a gunshot was heard which had been fired by the fleet; im¬ 
mediately after a sustained musket fire, which became very intense. 

The artillery on land is firing, ours is answering. 

At 5.15 the fleet opened fire on the coast. 

At 6.30 the firing ceased by sea and by land. 

The enemy has abandoned two trenches. 

11th .—The fleet is guarding the harbor and Aguadores. 

At 6 a slow musket fire commenced on land; a few volleys are 
heard. 

At 8.30 two ships opened fire on the city from Aguadores. A 
few projectiles fall at the head of the bay, where the Alvarado is 
at anchor. 

During yesterday 46 wounded were received at the military hos¬ 
pital. There were seven dead. 

At 2 p. m. the bombardment ceased. 

At 2.30 firing ceased in the precinct. 

At 5 the enemy hoisted a flag of truce on the Fort San Juan. 

At night many fires were seen on the heights near the cemetery 
and at the head of the bay (to the northwest). 

The gunboat Alvarado asked for permission to fire; it was 
denied on account of the truce. 

On the 10th the enemy, already in the trenches and being in 
possession of all the adjoining heights where he has installed 
numerous modern guns, opened a lively musket and gun fire, at 5 
p. m., upon a great extent of our line. The artillery answered 
firmly, but there was hardly any musket fire, because orders had 
been given and complied with to economize ammunition at any 
cost. 


( 90 ) 



91 


Two hours previously, our advance forces had withdrawn to the 
city, abandoning the foremost position at Dos Caminos del Cobre, 
first setting it on fire. 

The fleet at the same time opened fire on Aguadores and sur¬ 
rounding points on the coast, and on our lines. The battle was 
limited to firing from the trenches. Nevertheless, as the enemy 
was very numerous and his lines only a few meters from ours, we 
had 7 dead and 47 wounded. During the engagement the Ameri¬ 
cans abandoned two trenches which they could not he u because 
they were flanked by ours. 

At 8.30 the following day the fleet bombarded the city from 
Aguadores, having given notice to that effect as early as the 4tli. 
As I said, the ships of the fleet, taking turns two by two, fired 
rather slowly, and only until 2.30 p. m., but notwithstanding, there 
were 59 houses that suffered considers e i amage. One shell went 
through a foundation in San Basillio t ureet, where it dropped and ex¬ 
ploded, and a shell cut an iron column of a provision store in two, 
penetrating into a house in Marina street, after piercing the wall. 
Another shell penetrated at No. 9 Santa Lucia High street, destroy¬ 
ing the hall and one room. In the provision store of Messrs. Brauet, 
in Fundicion street, two 20-meter shells (nearly all were of this cali¬ 
ber, or of 16 centimeters) fell; one only exploded, causing great 
havoc. The most remarkable case of all was Mr. Marcane’s house, 
in Santo Tomas Place. A single shell ruined it completely. It is 
hard to understand how a single projectile can do what that one 
did. 

Between the garden of the Alameda and the railway station, 
being a distance of about 800 meters, 23 projectiles fell. Many of 
them did not explode. One of them went through a tree, as though 
it had been a gimlet. At the ice factory two fell, and three at the 
railway station. A great many fell near the piers, and still more 
near the place where the gunboat Alvarado was at anchor. 

As tlm city was almost abandoned, there was no loss of life. 

In the meantime the enemy continued to antagonize our lines 
in order to compel the soldiers to consume the scant ammunition 
that remained, but orders had been given not to answer the fire, 
and so there was hardly any musket fire. Gun fire only answered 
very slowly, as is necessary with antiquated guns. The enemy, on 
the other hand, was constantly receiving modern guns and setting 
them up rapidly. We were within a circle of fire, and although 
that phrase has been somewhat abused, I find no other that better 
describes the situation. 

At 5 p. m. the enemy hoisted a white flag on Fort San Juan 
and a spokesman was received. 


8630—-7 


Though this may not ho the right moment, I want to make an 
observation. It has been asked many times why Admiral Cer- 
vera’s fleet, whose object was to run the blockade and elude the 
hostile fleet, did not go out at night. 

Of course, the Admiral did not tell me his reasons, but it is easy 
to understand them. 

The hostile fleet was constantly watching the entrance of the 
harbor with its search lights, making it as light as though it were 
day. There the ships would probably have been seen just the same. 
On the other hand, the sortie, which even in daytime is extremely 
difficult, would have been short of impossible at night, when 
blinded by the search lights, and would necessarily have resulted 
in a catastrophe. The sortie at night was impracticable. It was 
absolutely necessary to effect it in daytime; at least, if the enemy 
saw us, we also saw him, and the chances for not running aground 
in the channel were much better. From the foregoing I believe 
that anyone, even though not acquainted with naval matters, will 
understand why Admiral Cervera did not go out at night. 

As a proof of this, I will say that on the night when the cruiser 
Reina Mercedes was sunk the hostile ships fired upon her with the 
same accuracy as though it had been daytime. 

For a better understanding of the events and engagements of the 
10th and 11th of July, I will copy below the official report of Lieu¬ 
tenant Colonel Barbon and that of Lieutenant of Artillery Moreno 
to General Escario, as also a statement of the shots which our guns 
fired during those days. One need only glance at the statement 
referred to to see at once that on the first day 1G7 shots could be 
fired, and the next day, being the 11th, only 35, because the enemy 
had dismounted and disabled some of our guns. A simple calcu¬ 
lation is sufficient to understand that the following day not a sin¬ 
gle gun could probably have been fired. Before such proofs, com¬ 
ments are unnecessary. 

‘ ‘ Having been placed in charge of the forces on the right hand 
of the plantation called El Sueno, on the heights and in the 
glens which border on the avenues of Caney and Canosa, and the 
roads of Pozo and San Juan, composed of six companies of the 
Isabel la Catolica Regiment, two of the Alcantara Battalion, one 
of the Asiatic Battalion, and one of guerrillas as stretchermen, I 
have the honor to report to you that at 4.30 a. m. yesterday the 
enemy opened machine-gun and musket fire on our positions, with¬ 
out daring to make any forward movement; such prudence being 
founded, no doubt, on the respect inspired by our sepulchral silence 
before the thunderous noise of their many guns, for only 10 marks¬ 
men, in convenient positions, had orders to fire on a trench which 
they attacked on the flank and dislodged at the end of 15 minutes. 
At nightfall, 7.30 p. m., the enemy ceased firing. 


93 



“To-day, at 6.30 a. m., the enemy again opened fire, while our 
side did not waste a single cartridge, the enemy continuing with 
the same activity as yesterday, without coming out of his trenches, 
until 4.30 p. m., when he ceased firing and asked for suspension. 

“ The casualties on our side were, on the lOtli, 6 dead and 29 
wounded, and to-day, one dead, 5 wounded, and one bruised; total 
casualties during the two days, 42. 

“ You will see from the above that I have exactly complied with 
your orders not to fire until the enemy should come out of his 
trenches to attack. 

“I only need add that all the forces without exception did their 
duty as brave men, full of enthusiasm, and I had to recommend 
repeatedly that they should conceal in order to avoid needless 
casualties, which seemed difficult, and there is nothing strange 
about it, as our men, for the first time in three years of campaign, 
were enclosed in trenches and on the defensive. 

(Here follow special recommendations for bravery of three 
officers, being 1 commander and 2 lieutenants.) 

(Signed) “ Baldomero Barbon.” 

“Santiago de Cuba, August 11 , 18981 ’ 

Copy of the report made by the first lieutenant in charge of the 
artillery of the sector: 

“Artillery, City of Santiago de Cuba, 
Sector from the Portillo del Caney to San Antonio. 

‘ ‘ Honored Sir : Fire was opened by the enemy yesterday at 4.45 
p. m., and the batteries of this sector made it their business to 
silence it, or at least diminish it as much as possible, given the 
limited effectiveness of the guns which formed them—most of them 
muzzle-loading—and the reduced caliber of the only four which 
are of modern types, and can therefore keep up an accurate and 
rapid fire. The enemy’s batteries, as has been observed on pre¬ 
vious days by means of glasses, and as we have experienced practi¬ 
cally to-day, are quite numerous, very well installed without leav¬ 
ing any space uncovered, and occupy positions overlooking ours, 
and are for that latter reason well adapted to train successfully, 
and to be of great moral effect on our • troops, who are harassed 
almost vertically by the grapesliot (shrapnel ?) inside the trenches. 
The guns of these batteries are of small and medium caliber, as 
may be seen from the size of their projectiles, and the shape of 
the latter shows that they are breech-loading guns, and for that 
reason alone, of the greatest advantage over ours. A few fire 
dynamite projectiles, but it was noticed that they are of little 
accuracy, although very effective when they explode. At the 
same moment when the musket and machine-gun file was opened, 


which was hardly answered from the city, gun fire also commenced, 
and as the effect of the shells began to be felt at the first shots, it 
became necessary for us to do what we could to decrease the can¬ 
nonade. Firing was commenced on the whole sector at the same 
time and with such rapidity as each gun permitted, except the 
Plasencia guns, for if we had continued to fire them with the same 
rapidity as the gunners, anxious to injure the enemy, had com¬ 
menced, we would have consumed the whole of the ammunition in 
two hours. All the shots were made under the action of a constant 
musket and machine-gun fire, aimed particularly at the batteries, 
•for the apparent purpose of not allowing us to come out of the 
trenches to load and train our guns. In view of the sustained 
artillery fire from the city the enemy moderated his somewhat, 
especially in the sector between Nispero and San Antonio, and 
by 6 p. m. the only guns that were doing any firing worthy 
of mention were those installed opposite the Portillo del Caney. 
This circumstance was very favorable for us. The ostentatious 
artillery fire which we did during the first moments checked the 
enemy’s rapid fire along the greater part of the line, and if this 
had not been the case we should have been compelled to keep silent 
before his batteries, for of the 12 guns of different calibers of the 
batteries of Nispero, Sueno, Santo Ines, and San Antonio, we had 
left at the hour mentioned only three 8-cm. and two lG-cm. guns; 
the others had been put out. of action, the carriages of most of 
them having been disabled. The batteries of Portillo del Caney 
continued to answer the fire, which was aimed at them partic¬ 
ularly without a moment’s cessation, and in one of them I was 
an eye witness of an incident worthy of mention. A training 
gunner of one of the 8-cm. Plasencia guns, whose captain 
had been previously wounded, was shot through one arm, and he 
continued to train, for fear, that there would be no one to relieve 
him, until, a relief having been effected, he was obliged to go to 
the nearest hospital. At the same moment an artillerist came out 
with a mule and ran in the direction of the headquarters at Con¬ 
cha, passing through the musket and machine-gun fire, shouting, 

‘ Long live Spain! ’ through the streets. He was on his way to get 
another supply of common shells for the gun, its supply having 
been consumed during the first shots. These incidents, and similar 
ones which no doubt occurred all along the line and in the trenches, 
show, honored General, that while the enemy had succeeded, owing 
to the superior position of his batteries, in acquiring greater accu¬ 
racy of fire, he had not been able to quell the courage of our sol¬ 
diers, always cool-headed before the greatest danger, even to the 
very last moment. 


“At 7 p. m. the firing ceased, leaving us in bad condition for 

to-day, because, as I have already stated, only two 16-cm. and three 

8-em. guns, and two 8-cm. Plasencia, and two rapid-fire Krupp 

guns, are all that are available for the defense, and the majority 

of the mounts for the old ones are somewhat defective. * * * 

“At 5.30 a. m. to-day fire was opened by a few musket shots, 

and a few minutes after the artillerv battle commenced. The bat- 

%/ 

teries with which the enemy fired yesterday are not the only ones 
he has; he also has large-caliber guns, or perhaps howitzers, which, 
being installed at a considerable distance from the city and covered 
by the hills, keep up a constant fire upon us, which we are not able 
to answer. Yesterday we could distinguish the flashing from the 
batteries erected between the Portillo del Caney and San Antonio, 
and to-day we can see only three opposite the said Portillo; the 
others were firing completely under cover, and we were not even 
. able to disturb the composure with which they were trained. It 
is known that we did them some damage yesterday, and that is 
perhaps the reason why they have taken this position to-day. Only 
two shots were fired in the morning at Santa lues and two more 
at San Antonio. And the rest of the day we have been able to fire 
only from the 8-cm. Plasencia battery and the 7.5 rapid-fire Krupp 
battery, erected at the Portillo del Caney and Palomar, respect¬ 
ively, which had opposite them three 9-cm. batteries of the enemy 
at a distance of 1,100 meters from the former and 1,600 meters 
from the latter. From the first moment it could be seen that the 
enemy’s objective was to bombard the city, and his fire was aimed 
entirely at that target. Yesterday they took the exact distance 
from their batteries to the principal points of the city, and to-day, 
making use of yesterday’s notes, they put the shells just where 
they wanted, and the trajectories of those from the same battery 
were almost identical. I repeat that there were only three in sight, 
and upon these three we opened fire at 6 a. m. with the rapid-fire 
guns. When the first shot was discharged the enemy partly 
changed his objective, and soon the battery mentioned and one of 
the hidden ones aimed their fire at Palomar, but were not able to 
hit the rapid-fire guns until 10 a. m., because these guns, being of 
reduced dimensions, in sunken battery, and with hardly any smoke 
from the discharge, w^ere hardly visible to the enemy. For four 
hours we fired without knowing where we were, but very slowly, 
because the number of ordinary shells and grapeshot for the guns 
referred to is already very small. After these first four hours were 
over, the enemy answered each shot with 8 or 10 of his, which, with 
almost mathematical precision, were aimed at the battery. About 
the same thing, but on a greater scale owing to the proximity of the 
opposing batteries and the good target formed by the smoke which 


96 


developed at each shot, happened at the Plasencia guns. Since 8 
o’clock in the morning, when the fire was opened, until 3 in the after¬ 
noon, the places where the guns were erected were veritable centers 
of impact, since we had only two batteries and the enemy a great 
many. And when a shot was fired, all concentrated their fire on 
the one that had discharged. In order to fire at all, it was neces¬ 
sary to make the enemy believe, by using artificial means, that the 
gun had been put out of action. When this did not succeed, the 
gun fire aimed at the battery was incessant, and made it impossible 
for.us to load and train. As I have stated, at 3 p. m. the firing 
ceased, and yesterday as well as to-day I noticed the greatest order 
among the officers and men in charge of the different batteries. 
At the Plasencia guns, the second gunner, Antonio Escriba Escriba, 
belonging to the 2d section of the 1st battery of the 5tli Mountain 
Regiment, was wounded. The total number of shots fired yester¬ 
day and to-day is as follows: 16, with the rapid-fire guns; 33, with 
the 8-cni. Plasencia guns; 29, with the 8-cm. guns; 63, with the 
8-cm. short breech-loaders; 10, with the 16-cm. and 10 with the 
12-cm. bronze guns. 

‘ ‘ May God guard your excellency for many years. 

“Juan Moreno, 

' 4 ‘ First lieutenant , 

Commander of artillery of the sector. 

“Santiago de Cuba, July 11, 1898.” 

The guns which the Americans had in the batteries of the circle, 
were all of modern type, with calibers of 8, 9, 7, and 7.5 cm. They 
fired mostly grapeshot (shrapnel ?) with 10 per cent ordinary shells. 
They also made use of dynamite shells, but the number of these 
projectiles did not exceed 5 per cent of the total number thrown 
upon the city. 

The batteries that were most persistent in firing on the 10th 
were those erected in the vicinity of the Caney road, and they fired 
only about 150 shots, with an average rapidity of 14 or 16 shots 
per hour and battery. The others, which ceased firing an hour 
earlier, discharged about 100 shots. 

On the 11th the gun fire was more sustained, but slower. All 
the batteries fired about alike and discharged in all about 700 shots. 


BATTERIES OF THE PRECINCT OF THE CITY OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA. 


No. of shots. 


Batteries and gnus. j- 

10th. j 11th. 


Fuerte Nuevo: 

One 12-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun.. 1 

Canadas: 

One 16-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun.. 2 

Santa Ursula: 


Battery No. 1: Two 8-cm. muzzle-loading bronze guns_ 

Battery No. 2: Two 8-cm. long muzzle-loading bronze guns.. 
Battery No. 3: Two 9-cm. long muzzle-loading bronze guns.. 
Portillo Caney: 

Battery No. 1: Two 8-cm. short breech-loading bronze guns 

(Plasencia system)..... 

Battery No. 2: Two 8-cm. long muzzle-loading bronze guns.. 
Nisero: 


10 

8 

16 


25 

24 


Battery No. 1: One 16-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun_ 

Battery No. 2: One 12-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun... 

Battery No. 3: Two 8-cm. short breecli-loading bronze guns.. 
Sueno: 

Battery No. 1: One 16-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun.. 

Battery No. 2: One 12-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun. 

Battery No. 3: Two 8-cm. short breech-loaders__ 

Santa Ines: 

Battery No. 1: One 16-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun_ 

Battery No. 2: One 12-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun. 

Battery No. 3: Two 8-cm. short breech-loading guns.. 

San Antonio: 

One 16-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun.... 

Palomar: 

Two 7.5-cm. short breech-loading rapid-fire Krupp guns_ 


1 

2 

30 

3 

2 

25 


'2 

4 

10 

2 ' 


6 

10 


9 , 


1 

16 


During the firing on the 10tli, the following guns were put out 
of action : The gun of the battery of Fuerte Nuevo; one of each of 
the Santa Ursula batteries; the two of battery No. 2 of the Portillo 
del Caney; those of the Nisero batteries Nos. 2 and 3; those of 
batteries Nos. 1 and 2 and one of battery No. 3 of Sueno; and that 
of Battery No. 2 and one of Battery No. 3 of Santa Ines. 

To sum up, there were disabled: four 12-cm., one 16-cm., eight 
8-cm. guns, old systems, and one 9-cm. breechloader. 

The 9-cm. gun was disabled by the enemy, as also one of the 
12-cm. guns of Sueno, the cause being that the 12-cm. guns were 
mounted on “skeleton” carriages that did not belong to them, and 
broke at the first or second shot, and that the 8-cm. old guns, 
although mounted in their own carriages, these being of wood and 
in bad repair, they had the same fate as soon as a few shots were 
fired. The 16-cm. gun was disabled by the cartridge sticking in 
the chamber. 










































XXXIV. 


% 

CAPITULATION. 


July 16th. —The people have returned from Caney. 

Negotiations for the capitulation having been opened, we think 
it proper to give the following important document: 

“Neutral Camp near Santiago de Cuba, 

Under the Flag of Truce, July ijth, 1898. 

“Recognizing the nobleness, valor, and bravery of Generals 
Linares and Toral and of the Spanish troops who took part in the 
actions that have recently occurred in the vicinity of Santiago de 
Cuba, as shown in said battles, we, the undersigned, officers of the 
United States Army, who had the honor of taking part in the 
actions referred to, and who now constitute a committee, duly 
authorized, treating with a similar committee of officers of the 
Spanish Army for the capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, unani¬ 
mously join in asking the proper authorities that these brave and 
gallant soldiers may be granted the privilege of returning to their 
country carrying the arms which they have so nobly defended. 

(Signed) “Joseph Wheeler, 

Major General U. S. V. 

“W. H. Lawton, 

Major General U. S. V. 
“J. D. Miley, 

First Lieutenant , Second Artillery , Aid A 

Under a giant cotton tree the following capitulation was signed: 

“1st. The hostilities between the Spanish and American forces 
shall cease absolutely and finally. 

“2d. The capitulation shall include all the forces and war 
material in said territory (territory of the division of Santiago). 

“3d. The United States agree to transport all the Spanish forces 
in said territory to the Kingdom of Spain with the least delay pos¬ 
sible, the troops to be embarked, as early as can be done, at the 
nearest ports they occupy. 


( 98 ) 



99 


“4th. The officers of the Spanish army shall he permitted to 
carry their arms with them, and officers as well as men shall retain 
their private property. 

“ 5th. The Spanish authorities agree to raise, or assist the Amer¬ 
ican Navy in raising, all the mines and other obstructions to navi¬ 
gation now existing in the bay of Santiago de Cuba and its entrance. 

“ 6th. The commander of the Spanish forces shall deliver, with¬ 
out delay, to the commander of the American forces, a complete 
inventory of the arms and ammunitions of war in the district 
above referred to, as also a statement of the number of troops in 
the same. 

“ 7tli. The commander of the Spanish forces, upon leaving said 
district, shall be authorized to take with him all the military 
archives and documents belonging to the Spanish army now in 
said district. 

“8th. All that portion of the Spanish forces known as volun¬ 
teers, mobilized troops, and guerrillas who may desire to remain 
in the island of Cuba shall be allowed to do so, on condition that 
they will deliver up their arms and give their word of honor not again 
to take up arms against the United States during the continuation 
of the present war with Spain. 

“9th. The Spanish forces shall leave Santiago de Cuba with 
honors of war, afterwards depositing their arms at a place mutually 
agreed upon, to await the disposition which the Government of the 
United States shall make of them, it being understood that the 
United States Commissioners shall recommend that the Spanish 
soldiers be permitted to return to Spain with the arms which they 
have so gallantly defended. 

“10th. The clauses of the foregoing document shall go into effect 
immediately after having been signed. 

“Entered into this 16th day of July, 1898, by the undersigned 
commissioners, acting under instructions of their respective 
commanders in chief and with the approval of their respective 
governments. 


“Joseph Wheeler, 

Major General U. S. V. 

“W. H. Lawton, 

Major General U. S. V. 

“J. D. Miley, 

First Lieutenant , 

Second Artillery. 


“ Frederico Escario, 

Brigadier General. 

“Ventura Fontan, 

Lieutenant Colonel , 

General Staff. 

“Robert Mason, 

Interpreter. ” 


XXXV. 


THE EMIGEATION TO EL CANEY. 


I will here speak of a matter which, though not directly related 
to the military operations, nor the movements of troops, nor the 
attack or defense of positions, is yet so graphic and typical and so 
remarkable and far-reaching in the consequences which it entailed 
and still entails, that to omit it would he to omit one of the most 
important episodes of this eventful period, an episode that has been 
much commented upon and discussed. I have reference to what 
may well be called the emigration to El Caney. 

At daybreak of. July 5, a compact crowd,composed for the greater 
part of old men, women, and children, though strong, robust men— 
some of them volunteers, now in civilian’s clothes—were not want¬ 
ing, started from the city toward El Caney, about a league and a 
half distant, where they were going on foot, there being no car¬ 
riages, nor wagons, nor vehicles of any kind, nor even horses, 
which the enemy, moreover, would not have allowed to pass. All 
these people we^e crossing the ditches and trenches by which the 
whole road was cut and obstructed, all anxious to escape from the 
dangers of a bombardment of which notice had been given to the 
consuls. 

Many f those who emigrated were people of wealth, women not 
accustomed to such fatigues and hardships, which fear and terror 
alone enabled them to bear. 

« 

Being convinced, though I do not know why they should have 
been, that their absence would not be for more than sixty or seventy 
hours at most, the majority of them had nothing with them but 
the clothes on their backs and a little underclothing, and no pro¬ 
visions except what they could carry themselves. 

I have been told, not by one person alone, but by many who 
were there and with whom I have talked, that there were no less 
than eighty people in any one house, and in some of them as many 
as two hundred. As in the cemetery, each person had no more 
space than he or she occupied; and thus they were housed together, 
men and women, children and old people, white persons and black. 

■ . (100) 



101 


Tlie provisions which were calculated for three days at most were 
naturally soon exhausted, and this is probably the only instance in 
the nineteenth century when money was looked upon with disdain 
and when gold was of no value. Trading was going on, it is true, 
but it was exchanging rice for coffee, hardtack for beans, or sugar 
for codfish. 

The bodies of those who had been killed on the 1st of July had 
only partly been buried, and the houses in that portion of the 
town which had been shelled were riddled with bullets and there¬ 
fore leaking everywhere. Carcases of horses and other animals, 
even corpses of persons, were thrown into the river, and people 
washed their dirty clothes and bathed in the water, which was all 
there was to drink. Most of the people lived on mangoes and 
mamoncillos, and it is no wonder that malaria, fevers, and dysen¬ 
tery broke out and assumed alarming proportions. 

The houses had no sanitary provisions of any kind, and as the 
doors were kept closed in order to prevent new invasions, the 
atmosphere was terrible. The children, sick from lack of nourish¬ 
ment or from taking food which they could not digest, were cry¬ 
ing day and night, and quiet or rest became impossible. 

The faces of those who died were covered with a sheet or hand¬ 
kerchief, and the living remained by the side of the dead bodies, 
knowing that, if they should leave their places, others would 
come to occupy them. 

Why go on? I might write a hundred chapters and still not 
give an idea of the suffering during those days; suffice it to say 
that El Caney, which was a town of 200 houses, was invaded by 
20,000 people, who had counted on being there two days and 
who remained eleven, namely, until the 16th. 

Those eleven days at El Caney have caused more victims in 
Santiago than the three years of war; for the epidemic that broke 
out still continues. When the inhabitants of the city numbered 
45,000 there were, on an average, not over five deaths a day; and 
now, that the number of inhabitants is reduced to 30,000, there 
are not less than fifty a day. The house that does not contain one 
or more sick is an exception, and people who are well and hearty 
one day are buried a day or two later. The physicians can not 
attend all the sick, and the dead are carried to the cemeteries by 
members of their own families. The city wears that stamp of 
sadness and absence of life which is the mark of great calamities, 
and we hear nothing but wailing and sobbing. 

A bombardment, of course, inspires women with the greatest 
horror, and yet, they preferred its dangers and consequences to 
the sadness and miseries of El Caney and asked, as the greatest 


102 


of blessings, to be allowed to return to Santiago, and to that end 
they signed a petition drawn up by the British consul, Mr. Fred¬ 
erick Ramsden, a literal translation of which follows: 

“We, the undersigned women, in the name and at the request 
of all the women and children who are staying in this town with¬ 
out food or shelter, set forth to your excellency as follows : 

“At 3 o’clock in the afternoon of the 3d instant, the consuls of 
Santiago de Cuba were notified that your excellency intended to 
bombard the city the following day at 10 o’clock in the morning, 
unless the Spanish army should surrender by that time, and that 
your excellency had ordered that the women and children should 
leave the city prior to that hour. 

“The same evening, at the request of the consular committee, 
your excellency consented to defer the bombardment until noon 
of the 5th, and it was agreed upon that the noncombatants should 
proceed to El Caney, Cuabitas, and other places on the line of 
railway. 

“In conformity therewith, the civil governor of Santiago de 
Cuba issued a decree permitting all noncombatants to leave the 
following morning, between the hours of 5 and 9, on foot, and 
without vehicles or beasts of burden. Consequently, old and 
young, rich and poor, sick and invalid, went out in confusion, 
without extra clothing and with only the food they could carry 
themselves, fleeing from certain death, and firmly convinced that 
the city would be bombarded that same day, and that in two days 
they would be able to return to what might be left of their homes. 
Far from this being the case; it is now ten days since they came 
here; many are without a roof over their heads and the others 
housed together like hogs, without even having room enough to 
lie down on the floor, which is all the bed they have; the scant 
supply of food is exhausted and no more can be had at any price. 
The praiseworthy efforts of the army and of the Society of the Red 
Cross are inadequate to better the situation; they are perishing 
themselves of hunger; the old and the sick are dying for want of 
care and medicines and as a result of so much suffering. And 
still the city has not yet been taken or bombarded, except a partial 
bombardment last Sunday and Monday, by which no result appears 
to have been attained, nor does there seem to be any probability 
of a change in the horrible situation for the near future. 

“They now invoke that same humanity which has been the 
motive of this war, to ask that something be done as soon as possi¬ 
ble to put an end to this terrible state of affairs, or that arrange¬ 
ments be made with the Spanish authorities permitting us to return 


to the city, where we whould rather die from the shells or be buried 
under the ruins of our homes than perish slowly from hunger and 
disease, and the privations we are suffering. 

(Here follow signatures.) 

“Caney, July IJ /., 1S98. 

“To His Excellency General Shafter, 

Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army.” 

This document, remarkable under all aspects, describes the situa¬ 
tion better than anything that I might say. 


XXXVI. 


SURRENDER OF THE CITY. 


July 17th .—In conformity with the terms of the capitulation, 
the surrender of the city to 'the American army took place to-day. 

At 9 a. m. the Spanish flag was hoisted on Punta Blanca Fort 
and saluted by 21 guns; shortly after it was lowered. 

At 9.30 Generals Toral and Shatter, commanders in chief of the 
Spanish and American forces, respectively, the latter accompanied 
by his staff and many of the commanders and officers of the Ameri¬ 
can fleet, witnessed the marching by, under arms, of a company 
of the former, representing all the Spanish forces, as it was difficult 
to assemble them. The American forces presented arms and beat 
a march. 

The heights of Conosa were the theater of this sad scene. The 
morning was very beautiful, and the clearness of the sky formed 
a singular contrast with the gloom that enwrapped the spirit of 
our troops. 

When the march was ended, the American forces remained at 
their posts, while ours left the trenches and proceeded to the city 
for the purpose of depositing their arms. 

The forces of the Socapa and Punta Gorda were taken by sea, in 
the steamer Reina de Los Angeles , to Las Cruces pier, and from 
there they marched to the Artillery Park, where they delivered 
arms and ammunition. Without them, they proceeded to the 
camp outside of the city, where all the forces were to assemble 
until the arrival of the vessels which, as agreed upon, were to con¬ 
vey them to Spanish soil. The other troops did the same thing, 
after depositing their arms at the points designated beforehand. 

The troops having evacuated the city, 1,000 men of the United 
States Army entered it, hoisting the flag of that nation at the Pal¬ 
ace and Morro Castle. It is the only flag that has been raised in 
the city. No insurgent forces, nor individuals belonging to the 
same, have entered the city with arms. The situation remained 
the same till the day wher the army embarked for Spain. 

As the operations at the Park lasted several hours, it was curious 
to see the avidity with which the Americans were looking for num¬ 
bers worn by the 29th battalion (Constitucidn), sabres, buttons, and 

( 104 ) 



105 


decorations of our officers and soldiers. It was noticed with what 
satisfaction they kept whatever articles and arms they could 
gather. Some of them put on the crosses, covered with dirt and 
blood, that had adorned the breasts of the Spanish. There were 
so many incidents on the same order that it would really be tedious 
to enumerate them. They showed the high conception which the 
American forces had of the valor of our armv. 

X/ 

One incident, in conclusion, relative to this matter: When a 
Yankee officer of artillery and another of engineers took possession 
of the Morro, they inquired about the defenses and artillery of the 
fort. “There they are,” said the governor, pointing to the land 
batteries and old guns. The American officers did not believe 
him, personally they went all over the place in search of guns 
and more important works of fortification. And when they had 
convinced themselves that they had been told the truth, they 
exclaimed: “That fleet” (pointing to Admiral Sampson’s) “has 
no excuse for not having gained possession of the harbor and 
defeated the city and its defenses in so many days.” 

The Commander in Chief of the American Army is General 
Miles. (Here follow the names of the different commanders in 
chief of the United States Army and Navy.) 

At 10 a. m., an officer of the American Army, delegated for that 
purpose, took possession of the comandancia de marina and cap¬ 
taincy of the port, which were surrendered to him, after we had 
gathered up such documents and communications as should be 
preserved, and destroyed the others, or made them useless. 

The forces are still depositing arms and ammunition, preserving 
excellent order, which has not been disturbed for a moment. Then 
they march to the camp outside the city. The arms were all 
deposited at the park, and not surrendered to the enemy. In order 
to form an idea, though only approximately, of the number of the 
forces defending the city, I give below a statement which gives 
the number at the hospitals, several having been fitted up. 

On the 17th of July there were— -*■ 

In the military hospital.. 800 sick and wounded. 

At the Concha headquarters .. 500 sick and wounded. 

At the Mercedes hospital-- 500 sick and wounded. 

At Barracones. 800 sick and wounded. 

Total___ 2 ,100 sick and wounded. 

Note 1 : The number of sick, or rather of beds contained in the 
military hospital, and for which there was the necessary personnel 
in attendance, which naturally remained the same, was 500. The 
number of sick in normal times (during the insurrection) was from 
350 to 400. 








10 () 


Note 2: At tlie hospital, only the seriously wounded and sick 
were admitted; those who could stand on their feet were refused 
and sent hack to the trenches. If this had not been the case, there 
would not have been beds enough in which to put them nor phy¬ 
sicians to attend them. Therefore, the number of sick was in 
reality much greater than shown by the statement furnished by 
the hospital. 

The soldiers had but little to eat, and that little was bad, and not 
enough water. The latter was scarce, and means were lacking for 
transporting it to all the points on the extensive line they covered 
and which it was indispensable to maintain. 

The horses of the cavalry, as well as the animals of the artillery 
and military administration, had had no corn to eat for a long time, 
and the hay, their only food, was very difficult to get and caused 
sickness, which was worse. 

In conclusion, I will give a statement of the stock on hand which 
the artillery park turned over to the American officer commis¬ 
sioned to receive it: 

ARTILLERY PARK OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA. 

Statement of stock on hand, in arms and ammunition , of which the officer of 
the American Army, commissioned to receive it, takes charge. 


y 


Kind. 


Mauser guns, Spanish model, 7-mm., No. 1893 . 

Mauser guns, Argentine model, 7.65-mm., No. 1891 

Mauser guns, Turkish model, 765-mm., No. 1892_ 

Remington guns, 11-mm., No. 71__ 

Remington guns, 11-mm., No. 7189__ 

Mauser carbines, Spanish model_ 

Mauser carbines, Argentine model.. 

Remington carbines.... 

Revolvers..... 

Sabers... 

Machetes... 


Number of 
arms. 


Rounds of 
ammunition. 


7,902 1,500,000 

872 1,471,000 


1 


6,118] 

833' 

84 

330 r 


84 J 

267 


345,000 
1,335,000 

1,200 


692 


Santiago de Cuba, July —, 1898. Luis Melgar, 

Lieut. Col., Commander of Artillery. 

Found correct by the officer commissioned. Errors and omissions excepted. 

A. D. Borup, 

Lieut. Col., U. S. V., Chief Ord. Officer. 

It will be seen that nearly the whole armament with which the 
Spanish army was equipped consisted of Mauser guns, Spanish 
model (the Remington was that of the volunteers and a few 
mobilized companies); hence the ammunition for those was all 
that could be used and should be counted; the rest was useless. 



























107 


Therefore, the number of cartridges on hand and surrendered was 
1,500,000, and the number of guns 7,902. Hence there were 191 
cartridges for each soldier. Every army man will know the time 
it takes to use them up. 

Here end the events and military operations that took place at San¬ 
tiago de Cuba, and which are the subject of these notes. * * * 

I give below the official statement of all the casualties sustained 
by the forces of Santiago de Cuba in the different bombardments 
and battles from the 18th of May to the date of the signing of the 
capitulation. Those caused by sickness are not included. 

CASUALTIES IN THE BOMBARDMENTS AND ATTACKS ON THE CITY OF SANTIAGO. 


« • 

Date. 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

Prisoners and 
Missing. 

Generals. 

Commanders. 

Officers. 

Men. 

Generals. 

Commanders. 

Officers. 

Men. 

Commanders. 

Officers. 

Men. 

June 6: 

M orro 




2 

1 


1 

4 

25 




Estrella 








flay Smith 







2 

8 

11 

10 

6 

10 

6 

3 




Snrnpa. 











AT;i7am<irra 











Orniser Reinn. Mercedes 


i 


5 


1 

1 

1 

1 

1 




June 14: 

Socapa 







June 16: 

Morro 




1 

2 






Socapa 









June 21: 

Mnrrn 









June 22: 

Sora.na. 







1 

1 




A gna (lores 







6 

5 

24 

1 

8 

31 

339 

45 

16 




Pftinniri 




1 

9 






June 23 and 24 : 






3 

2 




June 25: 









June 26: 










July 2 : 




1 

78 

6 

1 



1 

30 

2 

1 




July 1, 2, and 3 : 

Caney and Santiago _ — 

July 10: 

Santiago 

1 

3 

12 

1 

6 

1 

1 

6 

116 

July 11: 








Total -- 









1 

4 

12 

107 

1 

9 

49 

556 

1 

6 

116 


8630-8 



























































































108 


RECAPITULATION. 



Generals. 

Com¬ 

manders. 

Officers. 

Men. 

Killed 

I 

4 

12 

107 

Wounded 

1 

9 

49 

556 

Prison firs and missing 


1 

6 

116 




General total 

2 

14 

67 

779 

• 






















SKETCH OF THE POSITION OF BOTH ARMIES ON JULY 5 . 





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ARMY OF OPERATIONS 


DIVISION or CUBA 


BRIGADE 



flest 'Bouvolary- /Vina. Afim river, f/ZZa /Yermiianc, /VZZuras 
/Sctzzfa Gerfrue/is and /Scinfa. 7/asa. a. / Cobre. 

A/orfft 2lou7tdary^ ^uerfo ZSayamo road, Sierra Waes/ra fV/muyV/ 
?7/e passes of Corra/if/o ) YsPeno, /S’nramao/as ana/Bom'afo 
a / Crzs/o. 

2/as? 73ou7ta/ary^f)zerrac J/aes?ra r V/eiyAfs of ^scana/e//ana/ 

y2P2oL2oi? zn SFf. c/zrecPion foovaro/s Pran V^iedr^/VetybAs 
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of ffe rivers f)a.iyuzri anoi JSerraco , 


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SKETCH OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA AND VICINITY 


ftfre/uarfa? //2 ffa 27/ J&d/zf J/zffff^dp/dd 

NAVY DEPARTMENT 
nov. 1838. 


— Water courses arret ravines. +. Port- 

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^s^r. Too/ " ^ by forces. 

^—*, 'Pa,Zb. fS/naZZ yucLrd Bouse occupied 

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t (<SiynaZ feZeyrapb or | Ct/y of /Sizn/cayo. 

\Pre/eoyrapPr 3 fa /-ion. u o TrencPres. 

ft TePep/rorre 

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16F T 77aiener\ 

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Z " For tin ( CO&r£ 1/t >. Cemen/erio SO.. JJuran ) 

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*3 .. MatacZer* *' A - 1 varf 

>• fj/OL 

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CQFPffS PUANTATIUIV 


3t.. fnacabuita. . 

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1/7" Buena. Vista* 93.. Puhia. 


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33 PC /Vf/Stat/nn J 

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34 1, PPtruanimcum. 

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sy .. j hso 


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70,. Yaratjo 
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77 '■ Jut Pci'. ?• >f Tie _ U7 „ P/varei Pspe/t) 


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32084 •_ ”L . v ■> 



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